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Chapter 1
Introduction
Many real systems from very dierent elds, such as food webs [13], the
electrical power grids, the social entanglement of acquaintances [4], the Word
WideWeb or the Internet [57], were almost intractable just a few years ago due
to both their large number of individuals and the complexity of the pattern
of connections among them. They all have been recently characterized as
networks [813], opening a new and very promising subject for researchers all
over the world.
In a few words, a network can be dened as a set of nodes or individuals,
and a set of connections or links that represent some kind of physical or ab-
stract relationship among them. Specically, a network can be considered com-
plex if it has a pattern of connections highly non trivial. These systems have
found in Graph Theory a useful tool that allow to study, analyse, reproduce
and describe them accurately, extracting some common structural features to
characterize and organize them accordingly. And surprisingly enough, most
of real networked systems seem to share some of these structural features, re-
gardless their particular origin, thus entitling this new discipline, far beyond
simple anecdotal facts.
Other real examples are neural networks of animals [14] (where the nodes
are neurons, and links represent chemical synapses), cellular and metabolic
networks [15] (where nodes stand for the dierent molecules or metabolites that
take part on the system of chemical reactions, and a link between two of them
means that one is the reactive and the other one is its product), the network
of actors in Hollywood (two actors have a link if they have worked together
in a lm), the co-authorship and citation networks of scientists (similarly, two
scientist will share a link if they have a common paper, or two papers will have
a link between them if one cites the other, respectively), the air transportation
network (nodes stand for airports and links represent direct ights between an
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origin and a destination) or the network of sexual human contacts (where a
link binds two human beings that have had sex together).
On the other hand, the fact that all of them have complex structures has
been proven to strongly aect the outcome of the great variety processes that
can take place on top of them, in comparison with well-mixed situations or
even lattice underlying structures. Thus, it modies sometimes drastically the
assumptions as well as the conclusions one can make from such systems. For
example, the dynamics of disease spreading is very dierent depending on the
social structure one considers for the propagation process (and so are the mea-
sures that should be taken in order to eectively ght it o), or when dealing
with trac jams in the road-network or on the Internet, it is also essential to
know the topology underneath, in order to design eective strategies.
In gure 1.1 we show some other examples of real networks: (a) represents
the email network from the members of the Universitat Rovira i Virgili (Spain),
where we can clearly see dierent branches (or communities), corresponding
to dierent departments and areas within those departments [16], (b) is the
network that combines local metropolitan commuters and long-range airline
travelers during a global epidemic [17], and (c) shows the New Testament social
network (http://www.esv.org/blog/2007/01/mapping-nt-social-networks/).
The rst attempts to model such real networks were over-simplifying: lat-
tices and regular random networks [18] were foremost used to try to encapsu-
late some of the basic characteristics of these complex networks. In a lattice,
the individuals are arranged at regular distances in one, two or three spa-
tial dimensions, with a xed number of neighbors (or coordination number).
On the other hand, random graphs are just a set of individuals with aleatory
connections among them, but without any order or periodicity. One can only
characterize the distribution of probability for the number of those connections
in the system by a Poisson distribution, so there is a well-dened mean value,
or it can also be given by a Dirac-delta, which means that every element in
the system has exactly the same number of neighbors. Nonetheless, the con-
cept of dimensionality is hard to dene in random graphs, and also in complex
networks in general.
Obviously, and despite its undeniable importance as rst attempts in the
matter, these kind of models are unrealistic representations of real systems.
Due to its lack of accuracy, they fail to explain some features such as the
well-know small-world or six degrees phenomenon [19, 20]. Roughly speaking,
it implies that any two individuals in the network are likely to be connected
through a very short sequence of intermediate acquaintances. This has been
the subject of anecdotal observation and folklore for a long time: often we meet
a stranger and discover, astonished, that we have an acquaintance in common.
3(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 1.1: Some examples of real networks: (a) the email network from the Universi-
dad Rovira-Virgili (Spain) [16], (b) the network of local metropolitan commuters and
long-range airline travelers during a global epidemic [17] and (c) the New Testament
social network (obtained from the homepage of the English Standard Version Bible:
http://www.esv.org/blog/2007/01/mapping-nt-social-networks/).
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Nonetheless, it nally became a signicant area of study in the social sciences,
in large part through the striking experiments by Stanley Milgram in the 1960's
[21]. Later on, it has been shown that many other real networked systems, such
as technological or biological ones, display often this feature.
Besides, in these social networks, it is very likely that two dierent friends
of a person have also met (high clustering coecient). Moreover, these two
properties usually appear simultaneously in real networks, so both should be
taken into account if one wants to model reality with some accuracy. On
the one hand, lattices achieve the second property, but not the rst one, and
for random topologies, it happens the other way around. Thus the next step
was to try to model a network that combines both features, and the Small-
word network [10] does it. This particular model was the rst one to enclose
simultaneously the two properties of real networked systems mentioned before,
and it works as follows: departing from a regular lattice, and by randomly
rewiring a certain percentage of the links, the network gets some shortcuts
between otherwise distant nodes, so they will have a low value for the average
path length, like random graphs, but still with a high value of the clustering
coecient, like lattices.
As an ulterior improvement in realism at modeling, one can consider yet
another very common feature among real networks, that is the heterogeneity
in the number of connections a node has: we all know people that are really
popular, and some other people that are incurably unsociable. In the same way,
there are a few very important airports and a lot of medium and even more
small ones. None of the previous models accounted for this particular feature,
and were the so-called Scale-free (SF) networks the ones that did it. This
particular kind of networks, have a power-law degree distribution (it is, the
probability of nding a node with k neighbors), P (k) ∼ k−γ , with 2 < γ < 3.
Usually, real networks are not strictly power-lawed, but they do present some
degree of heterogeneity.
As we have already mentioned, there are very dierent contexts where
networks can appear (zoology, biochemistry, sociology, technology...) and so
the processes that will take place on top of them can be very dierent as well:
from disease or rumor spreading to synchronization dynamics, trac jams and
cooperation. This last one is particularly interesting for us, since there are
countless examples of cooperation in Nature: cell cooperate to form tissues,
organs cooperate to form living organisms, and of course, when it comes to
groups of individuals, very complex phenomena can arise: they can cooperate
within a family to raise their ospring, form hunting parties, form alliances,
stick together in order to reduce the risk of predation, and in general, to form
societies...
5However, why cooperation emerges and survives in hostile environments,
when defecting is a much more protable sort-term strategy, is a question that
still remains open.
A lot of researchers are currently trying to answer that challenging question,
at least partially, and some key ideas have been pointed out so far, such as kin
selection or the necessity of protecting the ospring or the family in general
(for obvious evolutionary reasons, or as the geneticist and evolutionary biologis
J.B.S. Haldane said: 'I will jump into the river to save two brothers or eight
cousins'), the benet of cooperating with someone you will probably meet again
in the future (direct reciprocity) or if you gain some (good) reputation because
of it (indirect reciprocity, see [22] and references therein). On the other hand,
for repeated-encounter situations, where individuals have some kind of memory
of the past or even plans for the future, there are some complex strategies that
can be more successful than others...
Game theory attempts to mathematically capture the behavior of such
individuals in strategic situations, in which their success in making choices
(that is measured in terms of benets) depends on the choices of others. Evo-
lutionary Game Theory is a branch of Game Theory that studies the time
evolution of large populations of individuals who repeatedly play a game and
are exposed to evolutionary pressures (selection and replication, with or with-
out mutation), and it has been proven to be the mathematical framework to
deal with questions such as the problem of evolution of cooperation. Speci-
cally, the Prisoner's Dilemma game has been widely used [2230] as a perfect
metaphor for the study of cooperation among individuals, where it is clearly
more protable to defect regardless the opponent's strategy, but also it would
be better for the two adversaries if both of them decided to cooperate, instead
of defecting.
We are interested in cooperation on very simple scenarios: when individ-
uals have no memory or plan for the future at all, and they do not recognize
their families nor have reputations to keep. Thus, we want to study the merely
structural factors that can help cooperation in a given situation. Specically,
we have concern over analyzing the reasons why cooperation seems to be en-
hanced not only by spatial structure such as lattices [3133], but in particular,
by heterogeneity in the distribution of connections [3445], as opposed to what
happens in more regular environments, like random graphs.
Therefore, in the rst part of this Thesis, we will address the problem of
the maintenance of cooperation in complex static topologies, comparing the
dynamics on top of two fundamental kind of networks: random and scale-
free. We will model the issue of choosing between cooperation and defection
that individuals have to make via the paradigmatic and well-known Prisoner's
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Dilemma game. This is a very simple 2× 2 game, where there are two players
who can choose between two distinct strategies: cooperate and defect. And
depending on its strategy and its opponent's choice, they will get an accurately
dened benet (usually given by a payo matrix). Essentially, the problem is
that, given the payo matrix of this game, to defect is the safest strategy,
regardless the one the opponent chooses, but, if both decided to cooperate,
they would get higher payo than if both of them defect (hence, the dilemma).
Thus, we will study how cooperators and defectors in the system, sponta-
neously and after a transient period of time, arrange themselves at a micro-
scopic level, giving rise to very dierent organization patterns, which will be at
the root of the distinct levels of average cooperation achieved in the networks.
On the other hand, we are well aware that real networks are not static
entities at all: not only there can be dierent dynamics evolving on top of
them, but also the structure of the network itself usually changes over time.
New nodes can enter the system, others can disappear and also new connec-
tions can be established or erased. Moreover, the processes that take place on
top of them can shape the topology, and the other way around as well. So,
we consider that a natural next step in our study of cooperation in complex
networks should be a model where the dynamics and the growth of the net-
work are entangled. In this way, the second part of this Thesis will be devoted
to developing two dierent models of growing networks that reect some of
the characteristics of an evolving real network. Thus, in both our models, the
outcome of the dynamics will be taken into account for the growth. Speci-
cally, the dynamics will be again the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and the payo
obtained by the nodes will aect its capability of attracting links from the
newcomers. Nonetheless, the two models dier in the kind of dependence be-
tween the probability of attachment of the new nodes with the payo of those
already present in the system, and, on the other hand, the way a node evalu-
ates if it will keep its current strategy or not, by comparing with its neighbors
will also be dierent in both models. Besides, we will analyse, along with
the average levels of cooperation achieved in every case, the structures that
can emerge from these combined processes, depending on the specic values of
the parameters of the system. And in order to do that, we will measure the
relevant topological magnitudes, such as the degree distribution, the average
path length and the clustering coecient of the resulting networks. Moreover,
we will establish some comparisons between the results obtained with these
models, when the nal size is achieved, and those known for xed-size static
networks, such as Erdös-Rényi (ER) random networks, Barabási-Albert (BA)
scale-free networks and random scale-free networks.
Chapter 2
Some basic concepts on
Complex Networks and Games
Since this Thesis is mainly devoted to the study of one particular game, namely
the Prisoner's Dilemma, on complex networks (static ones in the rst part of
it, and two more sophisticated models that combine the growth with the play
in the second), we consider that it is useful to state and explain rst some
notions on both networks and games. So, in this chapter, we want to provide
just a few very basic concepts and denitions on Complex Networks and Game
Theory that we will use later on during the full elaboration of this Thesis. We
hope they will help setting the basis to understand our work perfectly, so the
reader will not need any external help to comprehend, and also it will serve
as an introduction to the two fundamental components on which this Thesis
is based.
2.1 Complex Networks
The study of complex networks is a relatively recent eld, and it has been
inspired by the observation of many real systems, such as biological, social
or technological ones. In the rst part of this chapter we want to give a few
examples of real networks, just to motivate the study of such structures, by
establishing its ubiquity in natural and articial systems. Then, we will give
some of the basic denitions needed in order to properly describe networks
[12], such as the degree of a node, the degree distribution of a network, the
clustering coecient or the average path length. On the other hand, we will
also explain some useful models for building dierent kinds of graphs, such as
the Erdös and Rényi (ER), the Barabási-Albert (BA) or the Small-World by
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Watts and Strogatz model. Finally, we will mention some of the many possible
processes that can take place on top of complex networks.
2.1.1 Examples of real networks
As it has been pointed out along the Introduction of this Thesis, many real sys-
tems [9, 11, 12] can be described as complex networks, and this relatively new
approach can provide new insights to better understanding, and tools to deal
with unsolved problems. In very dierent elds, such as biology, immunology,
sociology, technology or economics, there are plenty of examples of networks.
In every particular eld, both the nodes and the links of the networks will
represent completely dierent things, but the fact that this kind of structures
are so ubiquitous in Nature, is surprising and very promising.
One can consider technological structures, such as the air transportation
networks for a particular region or for the whole planet, where the nodes are
airports and the links represent direct ights between them, the road networks
connecting cities or the power grids that supply electricity to a country, with
its power stations represented by nodes and the links standing for the wires.
There is also the WWW, where nodes are web pages connected by hiperlinks,
and the Internet (see gure 2.1 (Left)), made up of billions of hosts, physically
connected among them. Since modern societies depend strongly on these in-
frastructures, it is obviously very important to have detailed information about
them, in order to be able to predict its behavior or act correctly during a crisis.
In biology, there are several examples as well, like food webs on an ecosys-
tem (see gure 2.1 (Right)), or in a more basic level, the metabolic networks
of dierent processes. On the other hand, maybe some of the more tangled
complex networks one can consider (from the point of view of both number of
interconnections and variability over time) are those that describe social rela-
tionships, where nodes are people, and links represent some kind of interaction:
from groups of mere friends, people with similar interests or collaborators in
some particular eld [16, 46] (scientic collaborations or citations, or networks
of musicians that play together regularly,...), to sexual contact networks or new
global phenomena like Facebook, MySpace or Twitter. It could be because of
the complex nature of the human being itself, that such social structures can
be often so fascinating.
On the other hand, we want to point out that, when dealing with real
networks one has to take into consideration that the available data can (and
probably will) have mistakes: there can be missing or spurious nodes or links.
Some eort has been put to try to obtain the 'real network' and its topological
properties out of the observational data (see for example [47]).
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 2.1: (a) Gene regulation network for the Mycobacterium Tuberulosis. Every
node represent a gene, and the links stand for the regulation relationship between
a transcription factor and the correspondent regulated gene. Dierent colors mean
dierent character of the genes, as far as regulation dynamics is concern. (J. Sanz et
al. 2010, in preparation.) (b) Food web of the Caribbean coral reef located in the
Puerto Rico Virgin Islands. Node color represents trophic level: red nodes represent
basal species, such as plants and detritus, orange nodes represent intermediate species,
and yellow nodes represent top species or primary predators. Links characterize the
interaction between two nodes, and the width of the link attenuates down the trophic
cascade, so a link is thicker at the predator end and thinner at the prey end (Original
image from [1], and generated by FoodWeb3D).(c) Visualization of a portion of the
Internet, using over 5 · 106 edges. The colors represent dierent geographical regions.
In the inset it is shown a particular node and its neighborhood. (Original image from
'The Opte Project': http://www.opte.org ).
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Finally, the kind of processes that will take place on top of them can be
very diverse (synchronization, trac of information or something else, disease
or rumor spreading, games,...), but it is very useful to be able to characterize
them structurally as precisely as possible rst, trying to nd out what are the
main and more relevant features all of them share, if any. Moreover, as we will
see later on, the structure will be a key factor in the outcome of any process
or dynamics that will take place on top of such structured systems. Thus, we
will address next the topological characterization of complex networks.
2.1.2 Denitions
A network is a set of items (called nodes, points or vertices), with some con-
nections between them (links, lines or edges). A complex network is a network
with non-trivial topological features, i.e. its structure is irregular and complex
-as opposed to lattices, for example, that present total spatial regularity-, or
they can even evolve in time, adding or losing nodes and/or links.
Mathematically, we can represent a network using graph theory. A graph
G = (N ,L), consists of two sets, N and L, where N = {n1, n2, ..., nN} are the
nodes, and L = {l1, l2, ..., lK} are the links. Obviously, N is the total number
of nodes of the network, and K is the total number of links, which has to be
a non-negative number, whose maximum is N(N − 1)/2 (when the graph is
complete, i.e. every node is connected to everyone else). A specic node of
the network is denoted by a label i in the set N . On the other hand, every
link connects a pair of elements of N , i and j, and is denoted by lij . Thereby,
the pair of nodes i and j are called adjacents or neighbors. The usual way of
representing a network graphically is by drawing a dot for every node and a
line for every link that connects a pair of nodes. In addition to this, we can
also dene a subgraph G′ = (N ′,L′), of the graph G = (N ,L), if N ′ ⊆ N and
L′ ⊆ L. A special case would be the subgraph of all the neighbors of a given
node i and its corresponding links, denoted by Gi. On the other hand, a graph
is said to be connected if, for every pair of nodes i and j, there is a path to go
from one to the other. If there is not such a path for at least one pair of nodes,
then the graph will be disconnected or unconnected, and it will have therefore,
two or more disconnected subgraphs.
Besides, another very useful way of representing a network is by using the
matricial representation. Given a graph G = (N ,L), the adjacency matrix Aij
is a N × N square matrix, whose entry aij (i, j = 1, 2, ..., N) is equal to 1
when the link lij exists, and zero otherwise. Nonetheless, for implementation
or practical purposes, we can use the connectivity matrix Cij of the graph, that
is a Nxkmax matrix, where kmax is the maximum connectivity of the nodes
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of the graph, and where the row i of it contains all the neighbors of the node
i (ordered usually, but not necessarily, from the rst to the last to connect
with it when constructing the network). And we can also dene a matrix of
the pairs of neighbors, Dij , which is a Lx2 matrix, whose entries dl1 and dl2
are the pairs of nodes that are neighbors, with (l = 1, 2, ..., L), and being L
the total number of links in the network. The denition of these two matrices
is not for rigorous mathematical purposes, but nonetheless, they will be very
useful in order to implement them on programs and numerical simulations.
Degree of a node and degree distribution of a network
The degree or connectivity of a node is the number of neighbors it has. Using
the adjacency matrix, we can formally dene the degree of a node as:
ki =
∑
j∈N
aij (2.1)
If the graph is directed, then ki will have two components: the ingoing links
kini =
∑
j aij and the outgoing links k
out
i =
∑
j aji, so the total degree will be
ki = k
in
i + k
out
i .
On the other hand, the main and most basic topological characterization
of the whole network is the degree distribution. We can dene the degree
distribution of the graph, P (k), as the fraction of nodes in the network that
have connectivity k, or equivalently, the probability that a node randomly
chosen from the network has k neighbors. For example, random graphs (also
known as 'one-peaked' or 'single-scaled') have a Poissonian degree distribution,
while the P (k) for a so-called scale-free network is a power law.
For directed graphs, we will have two dierent distributions, P (kin) and
P (kout).
Thus, the mean degree of the graph, 〈k〉 is the rst moment of the degree
distribution:
〈k〉 =
∑
k
kP (k) (2.2)
Furthermore, the second moment of the distribution, 〈k2〉 is the measure of
the uctuations of the connectivity distribution. As we will see later on, 〈k2〉
diverges in the limit of innite graph size for scale-free graphs for certain
values of the exponent of the power-law distribution, which is a very interesting
property, that aects greatly the outcome of the dynamics that can take place
on top of such topologies. For an uncorrelated graph, i.e. if the degree of every
node is completely independent of its neighbors', then the degree distribution
P (k) is enough to describe the statistical properties of the network. But if
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the network is correlated, as it usually happens in many real systems, then
the probability that a node of degree k has a neighbor with connectivity k′,
depends on k. In that way, we can dene the conditional probability P (k′|k),
that a node with connectivity k has a neighbor with connectivity k′. We can
also calculate the average degree of the nearest neighbor of nodes with degree
k, given by:
knn(k) =
∑
k′
k′P (k′|k) (2.3)
So when the network is uncorrelated, obviously, we have that knn(k) is in-
dependent of k, and equal to knn(k) = 〈k2〉/〈k〉, but when it is correlated,
then we can have assortative networks, if knn(k) is an increasing function of
k, or disassortative ones, when knn(k) is a decreasing function of k. The rst
case implies that nodes tend to be linked with others with similar connectivity,
whereas in the second one, the highly connected ones are mostly linked to the
poorly connected ones.
Weighted and directed networks
Depending on the kind of interaction a link describes within the network, it
can be weighted or non-weighted, directed or non-directed, and so will be the
network, obviously.
If all the interactions in the network are alike, or in other words, when a
link only establishes the presence of an interaction between two nodes, then the
network is non-weighted. Otherwise, if there are dierent types of interactions,
for example, some more important, or more frequent than others, then the
links are weighted, and so is the graph. In this case, in addition to give the
set of nodes and links of the network, we need to specify also the weight of
every link in order to dene a graph. So now we have: G = (N ,L,W), where
W = {w1, w2, ..., wK} is the set of weights, that are real numbers attached
to the corresponding links. Usually, they will be positive numbers, so the
higher the value, the stronger the link between the pair of nodes, but also
negative links have been used, describing some kind of repulsive interaction,
for example [48]. On the other hand, if a link lij represents that i interacts with
j and vice versa, then it is called undirected, but if in a system i can interact
with j without j interacting necessarily with i, then in order to describe it
correctly, we need directed links. In this case, the adjacency matrix will not be
symmetric, in general.
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Figure 2.2: Examples of the local clustering coecient (of the blue node) for dier-
ent connecting situations. It is computed as the proportion of connections among
its neighbors which are actually realized (thick black lines) and the number of all
possible connections, which in this particular example, is three. For every situation,
the missing links are represented with dashed red lines.
Average path length, Betweenness and Clustering coecient
Given a particular network, it would be interesting to know the minimum
distance (geodesics) between every pair of nodes, i.e. the sortest path lengths.
The knowledge of this information concerning a network can be useful for some
processes that could take place on top on it, for example information trac
on the Internet, or rumor spreading on a social club, in order to work the best
they can. Thus, we can dene a square matrix D, of size N ×N , whose entry
dij is the minimum distance between the nodes i and j. On the one hand, the
maximum of these dij is called the diameter of the graph, but a more useful
magnitude to characterize the network, is the average path length, dened as
the mean value of the geodesics between every pair of nodes in the network:
L =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i,j∈N ,i6=j
dij (2.4)
One can also ask how important or 'central' a particular node is in a graph,
meaning how many sortest paths, or geodesics, go through it. Thus, we can
give a measure of the centrality of a node, by dening its betweenness:
bi =
∑
j,k∈N ,j 6=k
njk(i)
nij
, (2.5)
where njk is the total number of geodesics connecting the nodes j and k, and
njk(i) is the number of geodesics connecting the nodes j and k that go through
the node i.
The betweenness is a useful magnitude when constructing community de-
tection algorithms [49, 50].
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Figure 2.3: Diagram with some examples of networks, specically random (a), scale-
free (b) and hierarchical ones (c), and its corresponding plots of the clustering coef-
cient versus the degree of the nodes. This dependence is a power-law for the hier-
archical structures, while for the other two types, it is clearly independent. Original
gure from [51].
Clustering, or transitivity of a node, is a measure of how many triangles
are on the graph, or in other words, how likely is that, if a node i has two
neighbors, say j and k, then the nodes j and k are also linked to each other.
First, given a node i and the subgraph of its ki neighbors, Gi, we can dene
the local clustering coecient of node i as the ratio between the actual number
of edges in the subgraph, ei, and the maximum possible number of them in Gi:
ci =
2ei
ki(ki − 1) =
∑
j,m aijajmami
ki(ki − 1) (2.6)
where aij are the entries of the adjacency matrix, dened at the beginning of
this section. On gure 2.2 we show a diagram of how to calculate it for three
very simple cases.
Similarly, we can dene the clustering coecient of the whole network, as
the average of ci over all the nodes in it:
C =
1
N
∑
j∈N
ci (2.7)
Notice that, by denition, both the local and the global clustering coecient
satisfy: 0 ≤ ci ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ C ≤ 1. As we will see, SF networks have low
values for the average path length, but relatively high values for the clustering
coecient, while random topologies have low values for both magnitudes.
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Figure 2.4: All the possible 3-noded motifs on a directed network.
Finally, is worth mentioning that a power-law dependence of the clustering
coecient with the degree of the node (C ∼ k−1) is typical of a hierarchical
organization on the network, which implies that sparsely connected nodes are
part of highly clustered areas, with communication between these dierent
highly clustered neighborhoods being maintained by a few hubs (see gure
2.3).
Motifs and Communities on networks
A motif is a n-noded pattern of connections (a subgraph) in a network that
appears at a much higher rate than expected in a randomized version of the
same network (see section 5.1 for a detailed explanation of the randomizing
procedure). Some real networks, such as the metabolic ones, display character-
istic motifs, that seem to be specic of each kind of network. On gure 2.4 we
show as an example, all the possible motifs for a 3-noded directed subgraph.
Note that the number of n-noded motifs increases rapidly with n.
On the other hand, we can dene a community within a network G =
(N ,L), as a subgraph G′ = (N ′,L′) or a set of nodes, that are much more con-
nected among themselves than with other nodes outside the community. Using
just the sense that the intra-community connections are denser than the inter-
community ones is of course a qualitative way of describing it. Nonetheless,
to be able to detect such structures eciently, a magnitude has been intro-
duced to determine whether of not a partition of a network into communities
is accurate enough: the modularity.
Given an arbitrary network, and an arbitrary partition of it into Nc 'com-
munities' (and this time, by this term we mean articial communities, just a
way to part the graph), we can build a Nc ×Nc matrix whose entries eij are
the ratio between the number of links starting at a node in community i and
ending at a node in community j, and the total number of links present on the
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Pajek Pajek
Figure 2.5: Some examples of a network with (left) and without (right) community
structure, both with N = 256 nodes. Original data of the community network created
by Dr. L. Izquierdo (http://luis.izqui.org/communities/redes.zip)
network (so the sum of any row or column, ai =
∑
j eij , is the fraction of links
connected to the community i).
In the case of a random partition of the network i.e., if it does not cor-
respond to the actual community structure, or also if the network itself does
not have a community structure (see gure 2.5 for some examples of networks
with and without community structure), then the fraction of links within com-
munities can be estimated as the probability that a link begins at a node in
partition i, ai, multiplied by the fraction of links that end at a node in parti-
tion i, also ai, so the expected number of intra-community links is just aiai.
We also know the actual fraction of links exclusively within a partition, eii, so
now we can compare the two values, and thus, we can dene the modularity
for a specic partition of our network as [49]:
Q =
Nc∑
i
(eii − a2ij) (2.8)
Obviously, the closer to 1 the value of the modularity is, the more accurate the
partition we have made of the network into communities. It is worth noticing
that it is possible to nd partitions of random networks that display relatively
high values of modularity (up to Q ∼ 0.2). The reason for this is that random
graphs do have some community structure, just due to uctuations. Moreover,
it is important to stress that the presence of communities on a network can not
be detected just via its degree distribution, so we can have two graphs with the
same P (k), one of them with community structure, and the other one without
it.
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One can easily realize that the space of possible partitions of a given net-
work into communities is huge, so in order to eectively explore the landscape
of values of Q, and nd an accurately enough partition, we will need the help
of some optimization techniques. For some very nice works on dierent com-
munity detection algorithms, see [49, 50, 52, 53] and references therein.
Finally, we want to mention that it is also possible to consider complex
topologies with hierarchical structure, it is to say, networks that have commu-
nities within the communities. In this situation, we deal with several levels
of description of the structure of the system (multiscale representation) [54].
Also, one can have a system with communities, where there is some degree
of overlapping among them. This fact will make it harder to be accurately
detected [55].
2.1.3 Some network models
In this section we want to present just a few models for growing networks.
Specically, we will address the models to build two of the most used kind
of networks: the ER and the BA model for random and scale-free networks
respectively, since we will use them often, later on in this Thesis, and also the
well-known Small-World model by Watts and Strogatz. On the other hand, we
will explain the Gardeñes-Moreno (GM) model, which interpolates between
the ER and the BA model, because we will use it also in some chapters to
come, namely 3 and 4.
The ER model
Erdös and Rényi proposed a model (ER) [18] to generate random graphs with
N nodes and K links, where the term random refers to the disordered nature of
the arrangement of links between dierent nodes. There are two possible ways
of constructing such networks: in the rst one, we start with N disconnected
nodes and choose K pairs randomly, to link them with a probability 0 < p < 1,
avoiding multiple connections between two nodes, and also self-links. The
alternative procedure is to start with N disconnected nodes, and link every
possible couple with probability 0 < p < 1. While the rst option gets dierent
networks with exactly K links and an average degree of 〈k〉 = 2K/N , the
second, gets networks with dierent number of connections, an average degree
〈k〉 = p(N − 1), and the probability of having exactly K links in an particular
realization of the network is pK(1− p)N(N−1)/2−K . Nonetheless, both models
coincide in the limit of large N , or thermodynamic limit. The probability of
nding a node with a large connectivity decreases exponentially with K, so
vertices with large connectivity are practically absent.
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Figure 2.6: Diagram of the ER model for random networks with N = 20 nodes.
If one starts increasing the value of the probability of connection, from
p = 0 (nodes totally disconnected) to p = 1 (complete graph), there is an
interesting change of behavior for the critical value pc = 1/N , so if p < pc,
the graph is not connected (it has no component of size greater than O(lnN)),
if p > pc, then the graph has a component of O(N), and the transition at
pc has the typical features of a second phase transition. On the other hand,
the probability of having a node with k = ki connections follows the Binomial
distribution:
P (k = ki) = C
k
N−1p
k(1− p)N−1−k (2.9)
where pk is the probability of having k edges, (1− p)N−1−k is the probability
of the absence of the remaining (N − k) links, and CkN−1 is the number of
dierent ways of selecting the end points of these k nodes. Notice that, since
all nodes of the networks are equivalent, this probability P (k = ki) is also the
probability of choosing randomly a node with ki neighbors. In the limit of
large N and xed 〈k〉, the degree distribution of the network can be accurately
described by the Poisson distribution:
P (k) = e−〈k〉
〈k〉k
k!
(2.10)
Moreover, for this particular topology, the dependence of the clustering
coecient with the size of the system N is given by:
〈C〉ER = p = 〈k〉/N (2.11)
and the average path length, on the other hand shows a dependence given by:
〈L〉ER ∼ lnN
ln〈k〉 (2.12)
Notice that the value of the clustering coecient tends to zero in the limit of
large N . It is also important to point out that this model produces homoge-
neous random graphs, which do not share some topological features with the
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Figure 2.7: Diagram of the random rewiring procedure for interpolating between
a one-dimensional lattice and a random network in the Small-world model. The
networks have N = 20 nodes and k = 4. Original gure from [10].
real networks, for example, they have low values of the clustering coecient,
and do not show any correlations between nodes.
Small-world networks
A graph in which, although most pairs of nodes are not directly connected
to each other, they can nonetheless be in touch by a small number of steps
is called Small-world network, since it captures this so-called phenomenon of
strangers being linked by a mutual acquaintance (also known as six degrees
of separation [1921]). Some properties of real networks can be well modeled
using Small-world networks, for example social networks, gene networks or the
Internet. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that 'small-world' is
a concept that includes several kind of systems: empirical data [56] suggest
the existence of three classes of small-world topologies, as far as its degree
distribution is concern: scale-free networks, broad-scale or truncated scale-free
networks, and single-scale or random networks.
The rst Small-world network model was proposed by D.J. Watts and S.
Strogatz [10], and it interpolates between a regular graph and a random graph,
depending on one parameter p ∈ [0, 1], without altering neither the number
of nodes nor the number of connections per node of the original graph. This
is a random graph generation model that produces networks with Small-world
properties, possessing short average path length and high clustering coecient
provided the adequate range of the parameter p (see gure 2.8).
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Departing from a one-dimensional regular lattice or a ring, where each node
has exactly the same number of neighbors, z, we rewire every link with a proba-
bility p, avoiding multiple connexions between two nodes and self-connections
too. In another version of the model, we depart from the ring, where each
node has exactly z neighbors, and we add a link between every pair of nodes,
with probability p, instead of rewiring the existing links. Regarding the degree
distribution, for p = 0 we have P (k) = δ(k − z), where z is the coordination
number of the lattice (z = 4 in the case shown in gure 2.7); whereas for nite
values of p ∈ (0, 1], P (k) still has a peak around z, but it obviously gets broader
as p increases. For the cases where p ∈ (0, 1], the probability of nding a node
with a large connectivity decreases exponentially with k, as it happen for ER
random networks, so vertices with large connectivity are practically absent as
well. For p = 0 we keep the initial ring structure, which has high values both
for the clustering coecient (C ∼ 3/4), but also for the average path length
(L ∼ N/(2k)  1).
On the other hand, for p = 1 we have a random network -though, to be rig-
orous, in the second version, there are not any nodes with connectivity k < z/2,
as there would be in a random network built with a mechanism such as ER-.
Its average path length is short (L ≈ Lrandom ∼ lnNlnk ), but whose value for the
clustering coecient is also low (C ≈ Crandom ∼ k/n 1). Nonetheless, there
is an intermediate region of p where we can get a network with both features, a
high value for the clustering coecient and a short average path length. This
is due to the presence of long-range connections or shortcuts introduced by
the rewiring procedure. Notice that the introduction of these shortcuts makes
the average path length drop, not only for the pair of nodes involved, but for
all their neighbors too. Moreover, the removal of some links from a neighbor-
hood due to the rewiring process, does not aect the clustering coecient too
drastically, so it remains unaltered for small values of p . 0.01 (see gure 2.8).
In other words, during the dropping of L(p)/L(0), the clustering C(p)/C(0)
remains almost unaltered, which means that this transition to the Small-world
is undetectable on a local level.
Regarding the dependence of the small-world behavior with the size of the
system, it has been shown [57] that the emergence of this regime occurs for a
value of p that approaches zero as N diverges.
The BA model
Both the Small-world model and the ER model, explained previously, although
are most undoubtedly very useful and insightful, display two important features
that make them very dierent from the real networks. The rst one is the
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Figure 2.8: Average path length and Clustering coecient for the Small-world model,
as a function of the probability of rewiring p, normalized by their respective values for
the ring, i.e. when p = 0. Notice that the x-axis is shown in logarithmic scale. The
graphs have N = 103 nodes and 〈k〉. The data shown is the average over 20 dierent
rewiring procedures. Original gure from [10].
assumption that the whole system is present from the very beginning, it is to
say, that the network has a xed size N and it does not grow because no new
nodes are added. In contrast, it has been observed that most real networks are
open systems, and they get new vertices that connect with the ones already
present, so the number N keeps increasing throughout the lifetime of the graph.
The second one is the supposition that the probability that two vertices are
connected is uniform. Again, in contrast, most real networks show clearly a
preferential attachment: usually, the more connected a node is, the more easily
it will get even more neighbors due to the connections from new nodes.
The Barabási-Albert (BA) [8] is a model for building scale-free networks
that is based on two fundamental ingredients: preferential attachment, i.e. the
assumption that the likelihood of receiving new edges increases with the node's
degree, and growth. Actually, variants of the model, with just one of the two
ingredients have been tried, but neither of them gets networks with power-
law distributions. This was a model originally inspired on the growth of the
World Wide Web, and, as we have already mentioned, the idea behind it is
that the highly connected nodes get new links at a higher rate than the lower
connected ones or, in other words, the catchphrase 'rich get richer ' [58] (also
known in sociology as the Matthew eect [59]), a phenomenon easily found on
real systems).
We start with a little core of m0 disconnected nodes, and at each time step
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t = 1, 2, 3, ..., N −m0, a new node i is added to the system with m ≤ m0 links
to existing nodes. The probability that an existing node j gets one of the links
from the newcomer is proportional to its own connectivity, kj , in a linear way:
Πj =
kj∑
l kl
(2.13)
Since every new node links to m other nodes, at any given moment t, the
network has N(t) = m0 + t nodes and K(t) = mt links. Besides, for large
times, the average degree of the network is 〈k〉 = 2m. The degree distribution
of these networks is a power law, P (k) ∼ k−γ , with γ = 3. These scale-
free degree distributions imply that there are a lot of nodes with just a few
connections, and a small number of nodes with a very high connectivity. These
highly connected nodes are called hubs and they usually play an important role
in most dynamical processes that can take place on the system, as we will see
with some detail during this Thesis. Besides, the degree distribution P (k) of
the BA networks is independent of time, and thus independent of the size of
the system, indicating that despite its continuous growth, the system organizes
itself into a scale-free stationary state.
The dependence of the clustering coecient with the size of the system N
is approximately a power law, given by:
〈C〉BA ∼ N−0.75 (2.14)
The average path length, on the other hand shows a dependence given by:
〈L〉BA ∼ lnN
ln(lnN)
. (2.15)
The value of the average path length in BA networks is smaller than in ER
networks for any value of N , so obviously, the heterogeneous topologies help
bringing the nodes together more than the homogeneous ones. On the other,
hand, comparing the values for the clustering coecient, the corresponding
values for the BA networks are about ve times higher than for ER networks,
and this factor even increases slightly with the size of the system. Moreover, it
is worth pointing out the existence of the so-called age correlations [13, 60, 61]
among nodes for the scale-free topologies, which means that the older nodes,
i.e. the ones that appear rst on the system, are more likely to end up being
hubs, just by construction, while the later a node appears, probably, the lower
connectivity it will get.
We consider that it is important to stress again that SF networks built
via this BA procedure have very low values for the clustering coecient, when
comparing with real networks, so we must admit that this kind of topologies
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might reproduce the degree distribution of those systems, but can not do the
same for the clustering coecient. Along these lines, there have been some
other models that, based on BA, tried to put a remedy to this fact. For exam-
ple, the work by P. Holme and B.J. Kim [62], presents a model for constructing
SF networks with tunable clustering coecient. In few words, this model starts
with a set of m0 unconnected nodes and adds a new one to it every time step,
up to N . Each one of the new nodes launches m ≤ m0 links. The probability
of an existing node i to receive the rst link of a newcomer j is proportional to
its connectivity ki, but for the remaining m− 1 links that the new node j has
to establish, there is a probability p to launch them to a (randomly selected)
neighbor of i, and a probability (1 − p) to launch them following the original
preferential attachment rule. In this way, the family of networks we obtain
have all exactly the same power-law degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−3, but the
higher the value of the probability p, the higher the value of the clustering
coecient (it can easily achieve values of 0.5, when we recall that for BA,
it tends to zero as N increases, so the order of magnitude of a typical value
can be around 10−2 for N = 103). For the particular case p = 0, we recover
the original BA model, obviously. Moreover, with this Holme-Kim model, the
clustering coecient is independent of the size of the system, as opposed to
what happens with BA, where it decreases with N , as we have seen. On the
other hand, it is also worth mentioning that, one may think that, by increasing
p, the average path length of the nal structure will decrease, since some links
that would help shortening it by linking to nodes far apart, are now linking
nodes in the same neighborhood. As it turns out, the value of the average path
increases slightly with the probability p, but the dependence with the size of
the system remains logarithmic, so we do not lose the 'small-world' property
with this model.
Finally, we also want to remark two points regarding preferential attach-
ment. First, other mechanisms for building SF networks have been proposed
[63], that are not based on growth and preferential attachment like the BA
model is. Instead, an intrinsic tness (from a given probability distribution)
is assigned to each node in the system, and then pairs of them are linked to-
gether, according to a function of their tness. And second, if one combines
growth, preferential attachment and some aging mechanism or introduces a
cost per link, then one will obtain SF topologies with a cuto on the degree
distribution, or even make the scale-free regime disappears altogether [56].
The GM model
The Gardeñes-Moreno is a model [64] that interpolates between Erdös-Rényi
random networks and Barabási-Albert scale-free networks as far as the degree
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Figure 2.9: Degree distributions for several networks, obtained for the shown values
of the parameter α with the GM model, interpolating between the random (α = 1.0)
and the scale-free (α = 0.0) graphs. The size of the system is Ω = 5 · 103 and
〈k〉 = 2m = 4. Every point is the average over 103 dierent realizations.
distribution is concerned, through a tunable parameter α, so it generates a one-
parameter family of networks. This parameter α ∈ [0, 1] determines the degree
of heterogeneity of the network, whose nal size will be Ω. Thus, α = 0 gives
rise to scale-free networks and α = 1 to random graphs, and for in-between
values, the topology will have an intermediate degree of heterogeneity.
The procedure to generate these networks is as follows: we start with a
small fully connected core ofm0 nodes, and a set U(0) of (Ω−m0) disconnected
nodes. At each time step, a new node j from the set U(0) is chosen, and it
makes a link in two possible ways: with a probability α, it attaches to any
other node i from the whole set of Ω− 1 nodes with uniform probability:
Πuniformi =
1
Ω− 1 (2.16)
and with probability 1−α, it establishes a link following a preferential attach-
ment (PA) strategy. This means that the probability for any other node i to
get attached to node j is a function of its connectivity, in a way given by:
ΠPAi =
kˆi
pa
+Ai∑
l∈Ω(kˆl
pa
+Al)
(2.17)
where kˆi
pa
is the incoming PA degree of the node i, that is, those links received
by i when other node launches (in average) (1 − α)m links following the PA
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rule. On the other hand, Ai is an initial attractiveness (or tness) the new
node has when it is introduced in the connected component (either because
it is chosen at random by any node or because it is launching its m outgoing
links over the rest of nodes). This associated parameter is zero if the node i is
not in the connected set and is Ai = A if it is linked to other nodes, i.e., if it
belongs to N(t). Thus, the preferential attachment is strongly correlated with
the simultaneous uniform random linking, and, on the other hand, it is linear
with the incoming PA degree of the node kˆi
pa
. Next, we repeat the linking
procedure another m − 1 times for the same node j, and then we repeat the
whole process altogether for the rest of the nodes, i.e., for another U = Ω−m0
more time steps.
On gure 2.9 we show the degree distribution for some networks obtained
with the GM model, for several values of the parameter α but the same size Ω
and average connectivity k. Notice that the transition between heterogeneous
and homogeneous topologies is smooth, as α increases.
2.1.4 Processes on networks
So far in this chapter, we have studied some general topological properties of
networks, as well as some well-known widely-used models, and some real ex-
amples too. Nonetheless, we have to keep in mind that the ultimate goal of
studying these structures, is to nally be able to model, describe and predict
the dierent dynamics that can take place on top of them. Those include a
wide and varied collection, such as disease [11, 12, 6571] or rumor spreading,
synchronization [12, 7276], diusion, trac information and congestion, net-
work search and navigation, percolation, robustness against random failures
or targeted attacks [77, 78], cultural dissemination, opinion formation or lan-
guage dynamics [79], and games [42]. In this section, it is not our intention
to go exhaustively though all of them at all (for some very nice reviews on
the subject, see [11, 12, 42, 76]), but just to briey examine a few of them,
as an example, describing some the most popular models or approaches that
have been proposed, and also pointing out the dierences introduced by the
underlying topology on the outcome of the dynamics, in comparison to the
case of a well-mixed situation or a lattice.
Disease spreading
Epidemic spreading is a very interesting and obviously very important object
of study [11, 12, 6571]. The aim in this eld is not only to understand the
mechanisms through which diseases spread on a population, but also to design
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Figure 2.10: Schematic representation of the SIR model.
strategies to control them, and to be able to protect the population from
endemic situations.
Specically, Compartmental Models in epidemiology stand for some models
that, in order to describe the progress of an epidemic in a large population
comprising many dierent individuals, reduce such population diversity to a
few key characteristics which are relevant to the infection under consideration.
For example, for most common childhood diseases, such as the chickenpox,
that confer long-lasting immunity it makes sense to divide the population into
those who are susceptible to the disease, those who are infected and those who
have recovered and are therefore immune. Thus, one can ignore the rest of the
information about the population, such as age distribution or race, because
it is irrelevant for the model. These subdivisions of the population are called
compartments.
In particular, one of the more used (and at the same time simple) models
to study disease spreading is the SIR model. It considers that the population
is compartmentalized into three possible states: Susceptible, Infected (and
infectious), and Recovered (or removed), so a susceptible individual can get
infected with a certain probability if it is in direct contact with an infected
one, and in turn, an infected individual recovers (or dies) with a dierent
certain probability, not being able to get infected again in any case. This
simple model describes many infectious diseases, such as measles, mumps and
rubella. On gure 2.10 we show a simple scheme for the dynamics of this
model. Of course, there are other models much more sophisticated, that take
into account other intermediate states in the infectious process, such as latency,
infected asymptomatic individuals or vaccination (see for example [80, 81]).
As a rst approximation, one can consider the homogeneous mixing hy-
pothesis, which assumes that people with whom a susceptible individual has
contact are chosen at random from the whole population. This is a strong and
somehow questionable assumption, since it does not take into account local de-
tails, such as individual diversity on the number of acquaintances, community
structure or geographic constrictions. And, on the other hand, one should take
into account that some illness like the common cold, can be modeled accurately
enough as a random-contact process, ignoring the social structure underneath,
while it has been proved than for some others, such as the venereal diseases,
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one can not even describe them using a random degree distribution for the
population, but a scale-free, so in these cases, the structure is essential.
Nonetheless, this approximation made by the SIR model allows us to de-
scribe analitically the behavior of the models simply by using ordinary dier-
ential equations for the densities of individuals in each compartment:
ds(t)
dt
= −λk¯ρ(t)s(t) ,
dρ(t)
dt
= −µρ(t) + λk¯ρ(t)s(t) , (2.18)
dr(t)
dt
= µρ(t) ,
where s(t), ρ(t) and r(t) are respectively, the fraction of susceptible, infected
and recovered individuals on the population at time t, so s(t)+ρ(t)+ r(t) = 1.
On the other hand, one susceptible individual becomes infected (if in contact
with another infected one) with a probability λ, an infected individual recov-
ers (or dies) with a probability µ, and k¯ stands for the connectivity of the
population, assumed exactly the same for everyone.
The most relevant prediction of this model is the existence of a non-zero
epidemic threshold,
λc = 1/k¯ (2.19)
so if λ > λc, the disease spreads and infects a nite fraction of the population,
and if λ < λc, the total number of infected individuals (the so-called epidemic
incidence, dened as r∞ = limt→∞r(t)) is innitesimally small in the limit of
a large population.
On the left panel of gure 2.11 we show an example of time evolution of
the dynamics for a meaningful set of the parameters, namely, for λ = 0.94,
µ = 1.0, k¯ = 6 and using as inital conditions: s(0) ' 1, ρ(0) ' 0 and r(0) ' 0.
On the right panel, it is shown the dependence of the epidemic incidence with
the infection probability λ.
To deal with situations where the population is not well-mixed, or as we
have mentioned before, the nature of the disease itself does not allow us to
treat the pattern of interactions as homogeneous, we will need to represent the
system as a graph, where nodes are the individuals (belonging, as usual, to one
of the three possible states: Susceptible, Infected or Recovered), and links are
the interactions through which a susceptible node can become infected, if it has
another infected node as a neighbor. So now, we want study the SIR process
on an uncorrelated heterogeneous network (with generic degree distribution
P (k) and a nite average connectivity 〈k〉). We will study sk(t), ρk(t) and
rk(t), meaning the time evolution of the fractions of susceptible, infected and
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Figure 2.11: Time evolution of the SIR dynamics (left) for λ = 0.94, µ = 1.0, k¯ = 6
and taking s(0) ' 1, ρ(0) ' 0 and r(0) ' 0 as initial conditions, and the dependence
of the epidemic incidence (right) with the probability of infection, λ for µ = 1.0 and
k¯ = 6.
recovered individuals, respectively, within a connectivity class k, and with the
normalization condition sk(t) + ρk(t) + rk(t) = 1 for any given connectivity
class and time instant. The global magnitudes are now given by the average
over all the classes of connectivity present on the graph, so, for example, the
total fraction of infected individuals on the population at a given time t is:
ρk(t) =
∑
k P (k)ρk(t). Here it is important to notice that the network is
considered static, so P (k) does not change over time.
The equations for the evolution of the three compartments are similar to
equations 2.18, but now we dierentiate among connectivity classes:
dsk(t)
dt
= −λksk(t)Θ(t),
dρk(t)
dt
= −µρk(t) + λksk(t)Θ(t), (2.20)
drk(t)
dt
= µρk(t),
where Θ(t) is the probability of a given link to point towards an infected node,
and is given by:
Θ(t) =
∑
k kP (k)ρk(t)
〈k〉 . (2.21)
Notice that this probability is the same for any node we consider, so it does
not take into account any possible correlations between the connectivity of the
nodes.
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Again, one can get that there is an epidemic threshold, given by:
λc =
〈k〉
〈k2〉 (2.22)
below which the epidemic incidence is zero, and above which it has a nite
value. As we can see, this threshold depends inversely on the connectivity
uctuations of the network the disease is spreading on, so for a system whose
topology has a nite value, 〈k2〉, such as a random graph, then we get a
threshold with a nite value as well (and, therefore a standard phase transition
situation). However, for scale-free networks, we know that their connectivity
uctuations 〈k2〉 diverge when N → ∞, which implies a vanishing epidemic
threshold for increasingly larger systems.
The absence of a threshold in scale-free topologies is an important result
that diers drastically from the one obtained for random networks or well-
mixed scenarios, and it should be taken into account, for instance, for preven-
tion or vaccination strategies to be used by the health authorities, in order to
eciently ght o an epidemic.
On the other hand, it is also worth noticing that real networks, even when
they present some degree of heterogeneity on the connections, do have a nite
size, and thus an eective threshold, depending on its 〈k〉 and 〈k2〉. Nonethe-
less, this value is usually very small for a large enough population, and is
considerably smaller than the one for a random graph of the same size.
With regard to immunization strategies on scale-free topologies, we can
point out that random vaccination is not eective, since there is always a
non-zero epidemic incidence, even for very high vaccination ratios among the
population. Nonetheless, targeted immunization, i.e., vaccinating the most
connected individuals in a population, can give better results. On the other
hand, is not always realistic to assume that the number of connections of a
node on a real network can be known. A possible solution to this problem is
the vaccination of random acquaintances of random chosen individuals, since
the probability of reaching a particular node by following a randomly chosen
edge is proportional to its degree.
Finally, we can say that for correlated networks it has been found that the
qualitative behavior is the same as for uncorrelated networks, although there
are some quantitative dierences: on the one hand, while the likelihood of an
epidemic outbreak is not modied when taking into account positive correla-
tions, the epidemic incidence is smaller than in networks without correlations,
and on the other hand, the diseases can live longer in assortative topologies.
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Synchronization
Synchronization [12, 7276] is a self-organized phenomenon where a set of
individuals, initially acting on their own, gradually become more similar in
their deeds, without any appointed leader or environmental external signal to
guide them. In this way, after some time, they start behaving under the same
pattern, showing, if not total, at least some identiable level of clocking: they
became 'in sync'. There are many examples of synchronization in natural and
human systems: crickets chirping in a summer night, neurons ring at the
same pace, kids playing or singing along on spur of the moment, or groups of
women living together, whose periods synchronize,...
A simple model has been used often in order to address synchronization:
the Kuramoto model. It approaches the problem considering a mean eld
approximation, where every individual is an oscillator, and they are all sup-
posed to interact to everyone else through a purely sinusoidal coupling, so the
governing equations for each one of them is given by:
θ˙i = ωi +
K
N
N∑
j=1
sin(θj − θi) (2.23)
where K is the coupling constant, ωi is the natural frequency of the oscillator
i, and the factor 1/N is incorporated to make sure that the system behaves
correctly in the thermodynamic limit. The natural frequencies are assumed
to be distributed according to some unimodal and symmetric function, whose
mean frequency is Ω.
The collective behavior of the whole system is described by the macroscopic
complex order parameter:
r(t)eiφ(t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
eiθj(t) (2.24)
so the modulus 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 measures the phase coherence of the population,
whereas φ(t) is the average phase. The value r ' 0 corresponds to the lack
of synchronization (the oscillators move incoherently) and r ' 1 to the case
where almost the whole system is in sync (their phases are locked). It can be
derived the existence of a critical value, Kc, for the coupling, which separates a
'disordered' from an 'ordered' regime. In this second regime (when K ≥ Kc),
there are two types of long term behavior: a group of oscillators for which
|ωi| ≤ Kr, that are phase-locked at frequency Ω, and the rest of them, with
|ωi| > Kr, that are drifting around the circle, sometimes accelerating and
sometimes rotating at lower frequencies.
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Figure 2.12: Squematic representation of the dierent paths to synchronization dis-
played for SF (bottom) and ER (top) networks (higher values of the coupling
strength are shown from left to right. Original gure from [72].
If one should include some kind of structure in the population in order to
give an account of the complex interaction patterns among individuals, then,
instead of equation 2.23, one needs to consider an extension of it:
θ˙i = ωi +
N∑
j=1
σijaij sin(θj − θi) (2.25)
where σij accounts for the specic coupling strength between individuals i and
j, and aij is the adjacency matrix of the network.
The mean eld approach for complex networks considers that every oscil-
lator is inuenced by the local eld created in its neighborhood, so the local
order parameter is proportional to the connectivity of the node, ki. It can be
obtained the critical coupling for this situation:
σc = Kc
〈k〉
〈k2〉 . (2.26)
It is to say, we get a rescaled critical value for the all-to-all topology, Kc,
by the ratio between the mean connectivity of the particular network and its
uctuations. So once again, it is clear that for random networks there will be
a threshold, but for (innite) SF networks, this critical value will tend to zero.
Besides, it is important to point out that no exact analytical results for the
Kuramoto model on general complex networks are available up to date, but
one can always numerically simulate its dynamics. These simulations [72, 75]
conrm the theoretical predictions, since they have shown that the onset of
synchronization rst occurs for SF, and as the topology becomes more homo-
geneous, the critical point moves to larger values, and the system seems to
be less synchronizable. On the other hand, the particular paths to synchro-
nization [72, 76] are also very dierent depending on the underlying structure
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(see gure 2.12): in SF networks, links and nodes are incorporated together
to the largest of the synchronized clusters, while for homogeneous topologies,
what are added are links between nodes already belonging to such cluster,
making the route to complete synchronization a 'sharper' process, somehow.
In other words, in the presence of hubs, a giant component of synchronized
pair of oscillators forms and grows by recruiting nodes linked to them, while
on the contrary, in homogeneous structures, many small clusters rst appear
and then group together.
Cultural dissemination
A very interesting aspect of human interactions is how people from dierent
cultures, when they meet, can relate to each other, changing some of their
own cultural traits in the process. If two individuals do not share any cultural
features, it will be probably very hard for them to communicate and interact,
but if they do have initially something in common (like some interests, hob-
bies, goals or even an aversion against something), they may start some kind
of relationship. Moreover, it makes sense to assume that the more similar they
are before meeting each other, the more likely it is for them to interact and
become even more similar after that (homophilic). As a result, not only indi-
viduals, but also societies change over time due to this mechanism of cultural
inuence. Nonetheless, one could expect that these societies became homo-
geneous (global) as far as culture is concern, but as it turns out, sometimes
they do not. Instead, such interactions can give rise to dierent groups with
practically nothing in common, surprisingly enough.
Since R. Axelrod proposed an agent-based model [82] to address the issue
of cultural dissemination in 1997, much eort has been put on studying these
kind of processes [79, 8388]. We generally consider that an individual's culture
can be represented in terms of a set of attributes, such as language, religion,
technology, style of dress, literary preferences, sport preferences, and so on.
Thus, an individual can be represented with a vector
~Vi = (v
1
i , v
2
i , ..., v
F
i ), with
i = 1, 2, ..., N , and where F is the total number of features that dene a culture.
Each one of these components can take only Q integer values, or cultural traits,
and we assume that Q is the same for the F features. It is worth noticing that
within this model, we do not consider as 'cultural' those features an individual
can not change, for example skin color or physical constitution. Besides, we
consider our society as placed in a lattice of size L×L = N , where individuals
will interact only with their neighbors.
Once we have randomly distributed the initial values for all the features
of every individual in the system, the cultural interaction dynamics is dened
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Figure 2.13: (left) Dependence of the largest cluster of global cultural consensus
with the number of traits per feature for a 50× 50 node square lattice with a 4-node
neighborhood (blue), ER random network (green) and BA scale-free network (red),
and always for F = 10. The last two topologies have 〈k〉 = 6 and N = 103 nodes.
Every point is the average of 100 independent realizations. (right) Several examples
of time evolution of the relative number of blocked links. The underlying topology is
a SF network made up of N = 103 nodes and 〈k〉 = 6 and for a xed value of F = 10.
as follows: every time step, an individual i is randomly chosen and one of its
neighbors j, is also randomly selected. One measures the overlap between their
cultural vectors, given by:
Sij =
1
F
F∑
l=1
δ(vli − vlj) (2.27)
where δ(x) = 1 if x = 0 and δ(x) = 1 otherwise. If these two individuals are
totally dierent (Sij = 0) or exactly the same (Sij = 1), then nothing happens
and the link between them is blocked. But if it is not the case, Sij ∈ (0, 1), then
the link is 'active', and we take the value of the overlap Sij as the probability
that one of them imitates the other in one of the other features they have
dierent. Obviously, the more similar they are, the higher the probability of
becoming even closer through interaction.
Letting the system evolve, it will eventually reach a frozen state, meaning
that all the links between individuals are blocked. A useful order parame-
ter is the relative size of the largest cultural cluster, Smax, it is to say, the
largest group of individuals that share the values for all their cultural features.
According to some studies on lattices [83, 85, 87, 89], when F > 2, a non
equilibrium rst-order phase transition from order to disorder is observed as a
function of the number of traits Q (the control parameter). There is a critical
value, so if Q < Qc, the nal state of the system corresponds to Smax ∼ 1, a
global, homogeneous state, while if Q > Qc, then Smax  1, a polarized state
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Figure 2.14: Time evolution (relative to the nal consensus time T ) of the largest
cluster of cultural consensus at global (left) and at feature (right) level for a value
of F = 10 in SF networks made up of N = 4 · 103, with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 6.
with dierent cultural domains arises (see gure 2.13 (left)). This transition
gets sharper as the size of the system increases.
Analyzing the time evolution of the relative number of blocked links (see
gure 2.13 (right)), it can be seen that there is a non-zero initial value, due
to just random assignment of the traits, that drops quickly as the dynamics
starts, and individuals begin interacting. Then, this magnitude remains very
low for a considerable amount of time, to nally rise up to the nal value,
corresponding with the rapid rise of Smax(t). This reects the fact that, while
the individuals have almost nothing in common, the system seems to spend a
lot of time in that state, unable to get an agreement, but once the individuals
share some values for the features, then the nal state is rapidily achieved.
Notice that every realization shown in gure 2.13 (right) reaches its nal
state at its particular 'consensus time', since it is an stochastic process.
If we consider now that the pattern of interactions is given by a nite
complex network [83], instead of by a lattice, the general picture of the phase
transition remains unaltered (see gure 2.13 (left)), but with a higher value for
Qc (even higher for SF than for random networks, but qualitatively similar).
On the other hand, recent studies [88] have shown that, one can analyse
the cultural evolution process towards the nal state, from a global point of
view (it is to say, considering the macroscopic level of consensus in the system
though Smax), but also from a feature level. It means that at any given time,
we consider F layers or subgraphs of the original graph G. In the subgraph
Gf (t), two individuals are connected if they are physically connected in G, and
if they share the value of the feature f at that precise instant of time. In this
way, we can observe how cultural consensus evolve in every layer, Sfmax, and
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we get to discover that there are some relevant dierences between the two
approaches: while for the global consensus point of view, the system remains
apparently unordered for a large fraction of the simulation time, to nally get
organized very quickly (gure 2.14 (left)), the organization at a feature level
starts much earlier. Actually, Sfmax increases monotonously over time from the
very beginning (gure 2.14 (right)).
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that there are many other works with
dierent variations of the Axelrod model [79], including for example noise
[90], an external eld [91], rewiring of the connections between nodes [92] or
even movility of the individuals [93], combining the original Axelrod model for
cultural dissemination with the original Schelling model of social segregation
[94].
2.2 Games
A game can be considered as a formal abstraction of social interactions between
individuals. There must be at least two decision makers (or players), who can
choose between at least two dierent actions (also called strategies). It is worth
stressing that a player does not need a brain in order to adopt a strategy, on the
contrary, they can be very simple agents: bacteria, for example, have the basic
capacities to play games, since they are highly responsive to certain aspects
of their -chemical- environment, and they can respond dierently depending
on the actions of their neighbors, the behavior can aect the tness of others
and vice versa, and nally, the conditional strategies can be inherited by the
ospring [25]. The outcome of the interaction depends on the strategy every
player adopts. Thus, Game Theory is a branch of applied Mathematics that
tries to capture these situations and it is usually considered to have its origin in
1944 with the work of J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern [95]. Historically,
Game Theory has been used in very dierent elds, such as economics, biology,
political science or sociology, and there are two main dierent approaches:
Classic Game Theory and Evolutionary Game Theory, which made dierent
assumptions about the systems.
Classic Game Theory formally studies how rational players should behave
in order to obtain the maximum possible benet or payo. Nonetheless, one
could easily object to the concept of 'rational player' as an accurate representa-
tion of real individuals in a social or biological context. 'Rational player' means
that its only goal and motivation is to maximize its benets, given its belief
about its opponent's strategy, but there are plenty of real situations where the
actions of the players do not seem to aim a maximum payo.
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Evolutionary Game Theory [27, 96, 97] was originated in 1973 with J. May-
nard Smith and G. R. Price works, and it studies the time evolution of large
populations of individuals who repeatedly play a game and are exposed to se-
lection and replication (with or without mutation). Their strategies are xed,
and usually, the encounters between the individuals are supposed to happen
at random, in a 'well-mixed' situation, so there is no social structure behind it
(everyone interacts with everyone else), and it allows for the analytical treat-
ment of the problem. Thus, the probability of interacting with an individual
that uses strategy i is proportional to the fraction of individuals that are using
that particular strategy in the system at the moment, xi. The payos from
all these interactions are added up, and success in the game is interpreted as
reproductive success. Thus, payo means tness in the Darwinian way: the
strategies that perform better, reproduce faster, which can be straightforwardly
interpreted as natural selection.
In this section we intend to establish just a few useful concepts and results in
Classical Game Theory, always keeping in mind that our goal is to understand
the problem of cooperation. Then we will move on to the approach given by
Evolutionary Game Theory, and nally, we will point out some mechanisms
that have been introduced to explain the survival of cooperation observed in
several natural and social systems, specially, the dierences in the outcome of
a game when dealing with a structured population, it is to say, when we have
an underlying topology.
2.2.1 Classical Game Theory
In Classical Game Theory (CGT), we consider that interacting individuals can
choose a strategy -or a way to act- among a well-dened set of them. A game
is called normal-form if it is determined by a payo matrix. Thus, for instance
in a 2×2 game, we have two players and two dierent strategies A and B, and
then depending on their particular choices, the benets the players will obtain
are given by the payo matrix:
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
(2.28)
This means that, for instance, when a player uses strategy A against a player
using also A, it get a payo equal to a, when a player uses strategy A against
a player using a strategy B, it get a payo equal to b, and so on. We say
that strategy A dominates strategy B, if a > c and b > d. In that situation,
no matter what strategy your opponent uses, it is better always to use A.
Conversely, B dominates A, if a < c and b < d.
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Now, in a general case of a N×N payo matrix U , if we denote the N pure
strategies by R1, R2, ...RN , then the simplex SN of the linear conbinations of
pure strategies:
SN =
{
p = (p1, p2, ...pN ) : pi ≥ 0 and
∑
i
pi = 1
}
(2.29)
is the set of mixed strategies. A mixed strategy can be seen as the one used by a
player that chooses strategy Ri with a probability pi, where i = 1, 2, ...N . The
N vertexes of the simplex SN are the N pure strategies, while the interior of the
simplex is the set of completely mixed strategies, it is to say, those for which
pi > 0 ∀i. The boundaries of the simplex, on the other hand, correspond to
mixed strategies that must have necessarily one of the probabilities set to zero.
We can calculate the benet of a p-strategist against a q-strategist as:
pUq =
∑
i,j
piuijqj (2.30)
and the set of strategies for which the aplication p → pUq achieves its maxi-
mum value is called best responses to q.
A strategy q is called a Nash Equilibrium (originally called 'equilibrium for
n-person games' by J. Nash in 1950 in [98]) if it is the best response to itself.
This means that if two individuals are both using a strategy that is a Nash
Equilibrium, then neither of them can unilaterally deviate form that strategy
and increase its payo. Moreover, a Nash Equilibrium is called Strict if it is the
only best response to itself, therefore ∀p 6= q it is fulllled that pUq < qUq. If
q is a Nash Equilibrium, then there is a constant c that satises that (Uq)i ≤ c,
and from this result can be derived that a Nash Equilibrium is always a pure
strategy.
A strategy pˆ is Evolutionary Stable if ∀p ∈ SN with p 6= pˆ the inequity:
pU(p+ (1− )pˆ) < pˆU(p+ (1− )pˆ) (2.31)
is fullled ∀ > 0, as long as it is smaller than a certain appropriate invasion
threshold ¯(p). It can be proven the following logic chain:
Strict Nash Equilibrium → Evolutionary Stable Strategy → Nash Equilib-
rium.
Let's now consider again a particular set of 2 × 2 games. We can analyze
the possible outcomes within the CGT framework. We consider two dierent
strategies: cooperate (C) and defect (D), and the correspondent payo matrix:
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
(2.32)
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Depending on the relative ordering of the parameters, we can mention three
games:
• The Hawks and Doves (or Snow Drift or Chicken) game [41, 99101] ful-
lles T > R > S > P . Players are referred to as greedy, since they prefer
unilateral defection to mutual cooperation (T > R). In this situation, C
is the best response for D, and vice versa, so one should always try to
choose the opposite of what the opponent does, in order to maximize the
benets.
• The Stag Hunt game [102, 103] satises R > T > P > S. Players
prefer mutual defection to unilateral cooperation (S < P ), resulting in
an intrinsic fear of individuals to cooperate. In this situation, C is the
best response for C, and D is the best response for D, or in other words,
both are Nash equilibria, so it is better always to try to play the same
strategy as your opponent.
• The Prisoner's Dilemma game [2325, 27, 104, 105], for which T > R >
P > S, both tensions described above are incorporated at once, so is
the most dicult situation for cooperation to arise. In this scenario, D
dominates C. No matter what strategy your opponent uses, it is better
always to defect.
2.2.2 Evolutionary Game Theory
Within the Theory of Evolution, the central actor of an evolutionary system
is the replicator. A replicator is an entity that possesses the ability of making
copies of itself. It can be a gene, an organism, a strategy in a game, a particular
belief or opinion, a technique or any other cultural trait in general. A replicator
system is a set of replicators in a particular environment, with some kind of
interaction among the individuals. An evolutionary dynamics of a replicator
system is a process of change over time on the replicator frecuency distribution,
in such a way that the strategies with higher benets reproduce at a faster pace.
Let us consider that the population is divided into n types of individuals
E1, E2, ...En with frecuencies (or relative abundances) x1, x2, ...xn respectively.
The tness (or expected number of descendants) fi of the type Ei will be
assumed to be a function ot the composition of the whole population. If the
population is big enough, and the individuals of a generation are supossed to
meet and interact continuously and at random (well-mixed scenario), then we
can consider that the state of the system x(t) evolves in the simplex Sn as
a derivable function of time. The increase of the rate x˙i/xi of the type En
is a measure of its success, in the Darwinian evolutionary sense of the term.
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Then, we can express this success as the dierence between the tness fi of this
type and the average tness of the population, f¯(x) =
∑
i xifi(x), and thus
describe the evolution of every type in the population using the Replicator
Equation [97, 106108]:
x˙i = xi[fi(x)− f¯(x)] (2.33)
with i = 1, 2, ..., n. It is easy to see that the simplex Sn is invariant under
these equations, so if x(0) ∈ Sn, then x(t) ∈ Sn∀t > 0. Moreover, the faces of
the simplex are also invariant: if one or several strategies are not present at a
given moment t0 of the evolution of the system, then they will never be for any
t1, with t1 > t0. In the case of having mixed strategies, we can also obtain the
correspondent Replicator Equation. If there is a game with N pure strategies
R1, R2, ...RN and a N ×N payo matrix U , then a strategy is a point in the
simplex SN , and the E1, E2, ...En types of individuals present in the system
correspond to n points p1, p2, ...pn ∈ SN .
The state of the whole population is given by the frequencies xi of the types
Ei. The benets of a p
i
-strategist playing against a qi-strategist is given by
aij = p
iUpj , and thus, the tness fi of the type Ei is fi(x) =
∑
j aijxj = (Ax)i.
A state xˆ ∈ Sn is a Nash Equilibrium if xAxˆ ≤ xˆAxˆ, ∀x ∈ Sn, and it can be
proven that if xˆ is a Nash Equilibrium, then it is an equilibrium point of the
Replicator Equation. A state xˆ ∈ Sn is said evolutionary stable if ∀x 6= xˆ
in an environment of xˆ it is fullled that xˆAx > xAx. The same way, it
can be proven that if sˆ is an evolutionary stable state, then it is a point of
asimptotically stable equilibrium of the Replicator Equation (but the reciprocal
result is not necessarily true).
Replicator Equation for 2× 2 games
For the particular case of a 2 × 2 simetric game, we will have again that the
generic payo matrix is given by:
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
(2.34)
And according to the Evolutionary Game Theory, we should consider that
the tness of an individual playing a certain strategy depends on the fraction
of individuals that play every strategy (it is to say, the so-called frequency-
dependent selection), so if the vector ~x = (xA, xB) represents the composition
of the population, in terms of the two possible strategies, and we denote respec-
tively, fA(~x) and fB(~x) the tness of both of them. The selection dynamics
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can be written as
x˙A = xA[fA(~x)− φ]
x˙B = xB [fB(~x)− φ] (2.35)
where φ = xAfA(~x) + xBfB(~x) is the average tness of the entire popula-
tion. Obviously, since xA + xB = 1, we can consider x ≡ xA and 1− x ≡ xB ,
and then we can rewrite the previous dierential equation 2.35 in a simpler
way as:
x˙ = x(1− x)[fA(x)− fB(x)] (2.36)
It can be easily shown that x = 0 is a stable equilibrium if fA(0) < fB(0),
and conversely, x = 1 is a stable equilibrium if fA(1) > fB(1). On the other
hand, any interior value of x ∈ (0, 1) is a stable equilibrium x∗ if the rst
derivative of the tness functions satises f ′a(x
∗) < f ′b(x
∗).
In particular we can calculate the expected tness of an individual playing
A or B respectively, in the well-mixed scenario explained before as:
fA = axa + bxb
fB = cxa + dxb (2.37)
so if we again introduce this expression for the tness in 2.35 we obtain:
x˙ = x(1− x)[(a− b− c+ d)x+ b− d] (2.38)
Depending on the relative ordering of the coecients of the payo matrix,
we can have dierent situations for the selection dynamics [26, 105, 109]:
(a) A dominates B, if a > c and b > d. No matter what strategy your
opponent uses, it is better always to use A, and selection will lead to a
nal state where all players are A.
(b) B dominates A, if a < c and b < d. No matter what strategy your
opponent uses, it is better always to use B, and selection will lead to a
nal state where all players are B.
(c) A and B are bistable, if a > c and b < d. In this situation, A is the best
response for A, and B is the best response for B, so it is better always
to try to play the same strategy as your opponent. There is an unstable
equilibrium at x∗ = d−ba−b−c+d , and depending on the initial fraction of
every strategy, the system will converge to all-A (if x(0) > x∗) or all-B
(if x(0) < x∗).
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(d) A and B coexist, if a < c and b > d. In this situation, A is the best
response for B, and vice versa, so one should always try to choose the
opposite of what the opponent does. Selection will make the system
converge to the interior equilibrium x∗ = d−ba−b−c+d .
(e) A and B are neutral, if a = c and b = d. No matter what action
you choose, you will always win exactly the same as your opponent, so
selection will not modify the initial fraction of every strategy, but this
scenario is obviously not very interesting for us.
And some other usefull concepts are:
(a) Strategy A is called risk-dominant if a+ b > c+ d, and then strategy B
has a basin of attraction smaller than 1/2.
(b) Strategy A is called pareto-ecient if a > d.
(c) Strategy A is advantageous if a+ 2b > c+ 2d, and then strategy B has
a basin of attraction smaller than 1/3.
As a particular example of 2 × 2 game, we have the Prisoner's Dilemma
(see 2.32), that has been widely used to study the phenomenon of cooperation
in very dierent elds, from biology to sociology or economics. It is obvious
that defection is the best response, regardless the opponent's (it is in fact, the
only Nash equilibrium), despite the fact that, if both cooperate, then they will
win more than if both defect.
Thus, both in a Classic Game Theory aproach, and in an Evolutionary
context using the Replicator Equation we obtain straightforwardly an all-D
state, since defectors have higher payo than cooperators. Cooperation can
not survive in a well-mixed situation, it is inevitable. In fact, there are a great
deal of examples of this well-mixed or transitory-pairing enviroments in Nature,
which lead to non-cooperative or exploiting situations for the individuals, on
the contrary to what usually happens with stable pairing, or even mutualism
between dierent species [25].
Finite populations
Additionally, one can wonder what happens to the dynamics in the very real-
istic case of nite populations (notice that we still do not take into acount an
internal structure). In this case, in order to describe the evolution of a N-sized
population, a stochastic theory is needed, and we calculate xation probabili-
ties for the dierent possible strategies [105, 110], instead of equilibrium states
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of the system. The probability of xation of strategy B is the probability of a
single mutant B to invade an entire population of A-players.
In order to approach this situation, we can use, among other stochastic
processes, the Moran process [111], which could be a nite-N analogue to the
Replicator Equation. It is a birth-death process that describes the probabilistic
dynamics in a nite population of constant size N in which two strategies A
and B are competing for dominance. In each time step, a random individual
is chosen for reproduction and a random individual is chosen for death; thus
ensuring that the population size remains constant. To model selection, one
type has to have a higher tness (considered constant) and is thus more likely
to be chosen for reproduction. The same individual can be chosen for death
and for reproduction in the same step. It is worth mentioning that in nite
populations, even if all dierent strategies had the same tness, all but one
type will eventually go extinct. This principle is called neutral drift. Thus,
since coexistence is not possible, there are as many absorbing states as dierent
strategies at the beginning. In a population on sizeN made up ofA individuals,
we can calculate [105] the probability of xation of another strategy B (it is
to say, the probability for a single neutral mutant to take over the entire
population), and it is given by 1/N . It means that when dealing with nite
populations, just due to random drift, a mutant (with the same tness as the
majority strategy) can invade the system, which is a very dierent outcome
from the innite-population scenario, where having the same tness meant
coexistence of dierent strategies. In the same way, the probability of ending
up in an all-B state, just due to random drift, when starting with i ≤ N
individual playing B in a population of A is i/N . On the other hand, if a
mutant B has a relative tness r, with respect to the A players, it can be
proven [105] that its probability of xation is then ρ = 1−1/r
1−1/rN
. Notice that
in this scenario, there is always a nen-zero probability that a mutant strategy
can invade and take over the whole population, even though it is opposed by
selection [112].
2.2.3 Evolution of Cooperation
As we have seen previously, neither within the Classic or the Evolutionary
Game approach, can cooperation survive. Nonetheless, there are plenty of
examples of real situations where cooperators arise and thrive, so there must
be some mechanisms behind it. Over the years, ve main ideas [26] have been
proposed to help understand this phenomenon: kin selection, direct reciprocity,
indirect reciprocity, group selection and network reciprocity.
According to Hamilton [24], natural selection can favor cooperation if the
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donor and the recipient of an altruistic act are genetic relatives. More precisely,
Hamilton's rule establishes that the coecient of relatedness, r, must exceed
the cost-to-benet ratio of the altruistic act, it is to say: r > c/b. This
coecient r is dened as the probability of sharing a gene (it is equal to 1/2
for siblings, equal to 1/8 for cousins,...). This theory is called Kin Selection, but
obviously it can not help understand cooperation among unrelated individuals,
or even members of dierent species.
Trivers proposed the Direct Reciprocity mechanism. Let us assume that
there are repeated encounters [23] of a the Prisoner's Dilemma Game between
the same two individuals, and every time they can choose to be cooperators
or defectors. The idea is that if I cooperate in this round of the game, may
be you will cooperate in the next one. When considering the repeated game
on a whole population, it can be proven that direct reciprocity leads to the
evolution of cooperation only if the probability of another encounter between
the same two individuals, w, exceeds the cost-to-benet ratio of the altruistic
act: w > b/c.
Let us now consider the following scenario: among a population, two in-
dividuals meet once, one of them is in the position of helping the other one
(this help is suppossed to be less costly for the donor than benecial for the
receiver), but there is no possibility for direct reciprocation, but helping others
will establish a good reputation which will be rewarded by others. In this way,
when deciding how to act, one will take into consideration the consequences for
their reputation. Moreover, the next step can be to take into consideration the
opponents' reputation, in order to decide whether or not he deserves our help,
and how it will aect our own. This theory constitutes Indirect Reciprocity
[22, 113], and when applied to human behavior, it can help understand the
origin of moral and social norms.
We can take into account that selection not only acts on individuals, but
also in groups. A simple model for Group Selection is as follows [114]: the
population is divided into dierent groups, and individuals cooperate inside
its own group, while defectors do not help anyone. Individuals reproduce
proportional to its tness and the ospring belongs to the same group as the
ancestors. When a group reaches certain size, it can split in two, making
another group disappear, in order to preserve the total size of the population
constant. In a mixed group, a defector reproduces faster than a cooperator,
but groups of pure cooperators split faster than those of pure defectors. For
the limit of weak selection and considering the case of rare group splitting, it
can be obtained that, if n is the maximum group size and m is the number of
groups, then Group Selection allows evolution of cooperation, provided that:
b/c > 1 + (n/m), where b/c is the cost-to-benet ratio.
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Finally, one can realize that the Evolutionary approach for the PD game
always leads to all-D situations, but it considers a well-mixed scenario, it is to
say, at any given time, every individual has equal probabilities to interact with
everyone else. Nonetheless we know that this is a very unrealistic assumption,
since groups and societies have usually some kind of internal structure. In
other words, there is a well dened pattern of interactions among individuals,
so every one of them has a xed number of neighbors. It has been shown
that spatial structure aects greatly the outcome of an evolutionary dynamics,
allowing cooperators to survive in many situations. Specically, cooperators
form network clusters, where they help each other. The analytical treatment of
this problem is hard, and many times, even impossible, but it has been found
that this Network Reciprocity can favor cooperation if b/c > k, where k stands
for the average number of connections of the individuals in the population.
Prisoner's Dilemma game on structured populations
According to what we have seen previously, one of the mechanisms that helps
promote cooperation is Network Reciprocity, and it happens to be also the
one we will be interested during this Thesis, so the natural next step for us,
in order to build more realistic models of social or biological interactions, is
to consider some sort of underlying structure, in account for the particular
pattern of relationships between individuals (that can dier greatly from one
to another). The rst attempts to model such social structure for the Pris-
oner's Dilemma game considered the individuals placed in a regular lattice
[3133, 115118]. Those studies found that spatial structure aects greatly the
outcome of such dynamics. Specically, by making the agents play just with a
small number of xed neighbors, we can make cooperation and defection coex-
ist, or even enhance cooperation. In fact, when dealing with games in spatial
structure populations, the equilibria among strategies are no longer necessar-
ily characterized by their having equal average payo. Instead, the asymptotic
equilibrium properties are now determined by 'local relative payos', and not
by global averages [33]. It was also found for the PD in lattices, that under
certain symmetrical initial conditions for the distribution of strategies, certain
values of the temptation to defect b, and as long as we use deterministic updat-
ing rules, kaleidoscopic carpet-like chaotically-changing spatial patterns arise
[31, 32]. Moreover, it has been found that there is a critical phase transition in
the Prisoner's Dilemma game in lattices that falls into the same universality
class than directed percolation [118].
Some eort was put also on the analytical study of how dierent kind of
structures can favor xation of the strategies or, on the contrary, favor neutral
drift , explicitly calculating to that end the corresponding probabilities of x-
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ation of the strategies on some networks with very particular topologies, such
as stars, paths, downstreams, upstreams or funnels [105, 108, 119]. Moreover,
striking results in terms of survival of cooperation were found for random and
SF networks, but for such general structures, no explicit calculations can be
performed, so one needs to rely totally on simulations. In this area, a great
deal of eort has been put too, and as a very general remark, it can be said
that the complex topologies behind the interactions among a given popula-
tion aect the outcome of any process [65, 66, 72, 7678, 120] -not only games
[31, 42, 108, 119]- to a large extent. Specically, as we will see with some
detail in chapter 3, when it comes to the Prisoner's Dilemma game on com-
plex networks, a large number of studies [3436, 38, 39, 99] have pointed out
that cooperation benets from heterogeneity. It is to say, it has much better
chances to survive in scale-free than in random topologies, for the same given
value of the parameters of the game.

Part I
Evolutionary Dynamics on
Static Complex Networks

Presentation of Part I
In this rst part of the Thesis, we want to focus on the eect that the
topology of interactions among the constituents of a given complex system
has on the evolutionary dynamics that takes place on top of it. On the one
hand, the individuals of the system form a complex network [813, 61, 121],
that could represent a very simple version of a society or a social organization
[16, 46] of humans or other species. On the other hand, the kind of dynamics
we will be taking into consideration is dictated by Evolutionary Game Theory
[27, 96, 97, 105]. We will focus on the situation in which nodes represent
individuals engaged with their neighbors in a certain (2 × 2) game, using a
certain strategy that can be updated after every round of the game, depending
on the outcome of it. In other words, the outcome of the game, meaning the
accumulated payo every node gets in a single round, will aect the probability
of maintaining or changing its strategy for the next round of the game. This
can also be interpreted in terms of evolutionary tness and reproduction of the
individuals: instead of considering individuals of a population that update their
strategies for the next round of the game, one can also think of the benets
of an individual in terms of its reproductive success or tness, meaning the
probability of its ospring to be present in the system in the next generation,
using its very same strategy [25]. In this way, we are not specially interested
in the evolution of a particular node, but in the entire population as a whole.
To this end, we will measure the proportion of the dierent strategies that are
present in the stationary state of the dynamics, as well as its microscopical
organization within the network.
Specically, in chapter 3 we will study in detail the outcome of the (weak)
Prisoner's Dilemma game [2230, 104, 105] on top of complex networks [31
33, 115117], comparing the results obtained mainly for two kind of topologies:
ER [18] and BA [8] networks. We will also consider the same dynamics on top
of some other systems with intermediate degree of heterogeneity. On the one
hand, in order to conrm and understand the well-established fact that cooper-
ation is enhanced by the heterogeneity of the underlying graph [3445], we will
look into the microscopic organization of cooperation in the stationary state,
studying the formation of clusters for both strategies. We will nd that this
organization is quite dierent depending on the kind of network we are deal-
ing with. We will also analyze the level of cooperation for every connectivity
class, for the case of heterogeneous graphs, nding there a plausible explana-
tion for the high levels of cooperation these particular structures can sustain.
On the other hand, we will show the asymptotic existence of pure strategists
and uctuating individuals. Moreover, we will prove it by using a simplied
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but general enough case of a graph (Dipolar Model), where some analytical
calculations can be performed.
In chapter 4 we will expand all these studies not only to the general Pris-
oner's Dilemma, but also to the Hawks and Doves game [22, 37, 41, 99
101, 122126], comparing the results with the ones found previously for the
weak Prisoner's Dilemma. Analogously to chapter 3, we will study the station-
ary state of the system, the level of cooperation it can achieve, the microscopic
organization of the dierent strategies and the formation of strategic clusters.
All of it will be considered depending as usual, on the underlying topology,
remarking the dierences found not only between homogeneous and heteroge-
neous graphs, but also between the Prisoner's Dilemma game and the Hawks
and Doves game.
In chapter 5, we want to address the issue of cooperation in random scale-
free networks, comparing the level of cooperation obtained in such correlation-
free heterogeneous topologies with those corresponding to the BA networks, in
order to conrm the role that the correlations among nodes [13, 45, 60, 61] may
play on the sustenance of a certain level of cooperation in the system [34, 36].
On the other hand, we will propose a degree-based mean-eld approach to try
to explain the outcome of the Prisoner's Dilemma dynamics on top of random
SF networks. We will make further a compartmentalization of the fraction of
cooperators and defectors into dierent connectivity classes, to formulate a set
of dierential equations for the time evolution of the fraction of cooperators in
each degree class. The idea behind this approach is inspired by several works
focused on the study of disease spreading on an heterogeneous population,
using a similar theoretical framework [6567]. Thus, we will compare the
analytical results with the conventional numerical simulations performed on
top of such random SF graphs. We will analyze this in a general case, where
we will nd that the theoretical approximation and the numerical simulations
do not agree. However, we will also explore some particular initial conditions,
where cooperators are not placed initially at random, but occupying the largest
degrees of connectivity (targeted cooperation). In this latter case we will be
able to reproduce (up to an extent) the results from a simulation on top of
random SF graphs using these analytical calculations.
Finally, in chapter 6 we will propose a more realistic scenario for a pop-
ulation with a complex pattern of connections engaged in an evolutionary
dynamics such as the Prisoner's Dilemma. The set of individuals will form a
network of social contacts, namely a scale-free graph, and will play the game
with their neighbors as usual. Nonetheless, we will consider a restriction in
the number of interactions a node can sustain in every round of the game. To
our knowledge, there are not any works addressing this particular issue, apart
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from [35], where a cuto is imposed to the degree distribution of a SF network.
However, we will not proceed by altering the degree distribution of the under-
lying topology. Instead, we will force the nodes to choose randomly a dierent
selection among its topological neighbors for every round of the game. In this
way, we want to acknowledge the fact that the amount of energy and time an
individual can spend interacting with its neighbors is nite, so the number of
acquaintances it interacts with per unit of time should not be given just by its
topological connectivity, but it also should be subject to some kind of practical
limitations. We will nd some striking results that point out that in a situation
with some degree of restriction in the number of interactions allowed per node
and per round of the game, cooperation can be enhanced even more than in an
unrestricted scale-free scenario, when participation costs are also introduced
in the formulation of the evolutionary game.

Chapter 3
The Prisoner's Dilemma on
Static Complex Networks
The PD game has been frequently used [22, 24, 25, 27, 28] when trying to model
the emergence of cooperative behavior in a social or biological system. The
questions of why and how cooperation arises and survives in an environment
where it is clearly more expensive for the individual than defection in the short
term have been subject of intense research for quite some time, and the PD
turned out to be a very useful tool for this aim. One of the aspects that have
been pointed out as a responsible for the survival of cooperation is, among
others, the so-called network reciprocity [26]. Several studies have shown that
cooperation can be greatly promoted by placing the individuals of a population
on the nodes of a network of contacts, instead of letting them interact in a well-
mixed situation, where no asymptotic cooperation exists. First, some eort
was put on studying the PD on regular lattices, nding that, as long as the
connectivity of the nodes was not to high, cooperation actually got a chance
at survival (however, when the number of neighbors increases, the situation
resemblances more and more an all-to-all scenario, and cooperation dies out
again). Next, PD was studied in complex topologies [31, 3436, 3845], in an
attempt to model more accurately the pattern of connections of a real system,
and this is precisely the problem we will consider in this chapter of the Thesis.
In this way, we want to address the dependence of the PD dynamics on
top of complex networks. As we have already advanced, we are interested
in characterizing the nal equilibrium state that the system achieves when
implementing the dynamics of such structures, namely random and SF graphs,
paying special attention not only to the asymptotic level of cooperation, but
more important, to the microscopic organization of the strategies. This is
actually, as we will see in detail, the key point of the dierences found between
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both topologies when it comes to the average level of cooperation. We will
also take care of other aspects of the dynamics, such as the dependence of the
nal level of cooperators in the system with the initial fraction of them, or the
distribution of strategies according to the dierent classes of connectivity for
SF networks.
3.1 The model
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a two-player game dened in its more general form
by the payo matrix (see section 2.2):
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
(3.1)
where the element aij is the payo received by an i-strategist when playing
against a j-strategist, with i = 1 meaning cooperator (C), and i = 2 defector
(D). Thus, both receive R (Reward) under mutual cooperation and P (Punish-
ment) under mutual defection, while a cooperator receives S (Sucker's Payo)
when confronted to a defector, which in turn receives T (Temptation to de-
fect).The payo ordering is given by T > R > P > S. Under these conditions,
defection is the best response regardless the opponent's strategy. Indeed, in a
well-mixed population of N replicators, i.e. where every individual interacts
with everyone else, the defection strategy is unbeatable and reaches xation.
However, if individuals only interact with its ki neighbors, as dictated by the
underlying network of contacts, it hass been proven the asymptotic survival of
cooperation for T ≥ R on dierent types of complex topologies [31, 3436, 38
45].
Following several studies [31, 33, 34, 36, 127], we set the PD payos to
R = 1 (so the reward for cooperating xes the payo scale), T = b > 1,
P = 0 (no benet under mutual defection), and P − S =  → 0+. This
last choice places us in the very frontier of PD game, or the 'weak' Prisoner's
Dilemma. It has the eect of not favoring any strategy when playing against
defectors (while being advantageous to play defection against cooperators).
Small positive values of the parameter  1 leads to no qualitative dierences
in the results [127], so the limit → 0+ is agreed to be continuous.
The dynamic rule is specied as follows: each time step is thought of as
one generation of the discrete evolutionary time, where every node i of the
system plays with its nearest ki neighbors (given by the underlying network)
and accumulates the payos obtained during the round, say Pi. As Evolution-
ary Game Theory approach dictates, the benet an agent gets from the game
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should be interpreted as its tness in the Darwinian sense of reproductive suc-
cess [25, 126]. Specically, we consider that individuals are then allowed to
synchronously change their strategies by comparing the payos they accumu-
lated in the previous generation with that of a neighbor j chosen at random.
If Pi > Pj , player i keeps the same strategy for the next time step, when it will
play again with all of its neighborhood. On the contrary, whenever Pj > Pi, i
adopts the strategy of j with probability
Πi→j =
Pj − Pi
max{ki, kj}b (3.2)
Following previous studies, we called this updating rule Replicator-like [27, 28,
34, 35, 97, 101], because it is obviously similar to the Replicator Equation
(see section 2.2.2): the probability of changing strategy is proportional to the
dierence of payos of the nodes involved, and it is normalized by the maximum
payo a node can get, i.e., b times its connectivity. Note also that this dynamic
rule, though stochastic, does not allow the adoption of irrational strategy, i.e.,
Πi→j = 0 whenever Pj ≤ Pi.
Regarding the synchrony of the strategy updating of the individuals in
the population (also understood as discrete time), it is worth mentioning here
that we have not found signicant dierences when comparing to asynchronous
updating (also known as sequential updating or continuous time), and thus
in good agreement with previous ndings for this particular PD game and
Replicator-like rule [99], in spite of the fact that one can always argue that
synchronous or asynchronous updating more accurate in order to describe dif-
ferent biological or social scenarios, respectively [33].
Let's now specify precisely the family of networks on top of which the evo-
lutionary PD game is evolving. Strategists are located on the vertices of a xed
graph of average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4. The heterogeneity of the networks is
controlled by tuning a single parameter α, according to the recipe introduced by
Gardeñes-Moreno (GM) in [64]. As we explained in detail in subsection 2.1.3,
the GM model creates a network by combining the mechanisms of preferential
attachment with probability α and uniform random linking with probability
1− α. Thus, in this model, when α = 0 the generated networks are of the ER
[18] class of random graphs, and when α = 1 they are of the BA [8] scale-free
networks class. On the other hand, networks with an intermediate degree of
heterogeneity can be built with 0 < α < 1. We will study the dynamics on
top of such networks with intermediate heterogeneity at the end of this chapter
(see section 3.9), but for now, we will focus just on the extreme cases α = 0 and
α = 1. It is also worth stressing that the dierent topologies we will compare
during this chapter have always the same number of nodes, N , and average
connectivity 〈k〉.
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3.2 Dynamic equilibrium
Once the network has reach its full size N , the initial strategy of every node is
randomly set, with a probability of being a cooperator ρ0 = 0.5 (note that ρ0 is
also the initial fraction of cooperation on the system), and then the dynamics
starts. We let the system evolve for 5·103 time steps or generations, after which
we check whether the equilibrium has been reached. To do so, we observe the
time evolution of the fraction of cooperators, c(t), during a time window of
103 generations. If the slope of c(t) is smaller than 10−2, then we consider the
equilibrium has been reached. Otherwise, we let the system evolve 5 ·103 more
generations, after which, we will evaluate the equilibrium conditions again.
We show several examples of temporal evolution of the system in gure 3.1.
The behavior during the transient time of the fraction of cooperators in the
system can be understood as follows: as we have said, the system starts with a
fraction of ρ0 cooperators, randomly distributed on the network. The defectors
take advantage of this initial situation, getting very high payo exploiting its
cooperator neighbors, and forcing other nodes to imitate them. Therefore,the
level of cooperation drops initially. However, after a few more time steps, the
defectors are surrounded by more defectors, and they can not get benets any-
more, while cooperators start clustering themselves, and providing payo from
one another. Thus, cooperators self-organize and hold a non-neglectable level
of cooperation on the network. As it can be seen in gure 3.1, the macroscopic
behavior of the system towards its dynamical equilibrium is qualitatively very
similar, regardless the underlying topology. Nevertheless, as we will explain
later in detail in section 3.7, the microscopic organization of cooperators and
defectors when the equilibrium has been reached is very dierent depending
on the network, and it is specially non-trivial for BA networks.
From any initial condition for the whole system {si(t = 0)} (with i =
1, ..., N , and where si = 1 if node i is an instantaneous cooperator and si = 0
if it is a defector in that step), and after many generations, the instantaneous
fraction of cooperators, given by
c(t) = N−1
N∑
i=1
si(t) (3.3)
in the stochastic trajectory, {si(t)}, uctuates around a well-dened mean
value 〈c〉. In turn, this average value of cooperation can be dened as follows:
〈c〉 = 1
T
t0+T∑
τ=t0
c(τ) , (3.4)
where t0 is the transient period, and T is the period of time during which we
observe the system, once it has reached the equilibrium. Thus, this average
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Figure 3.1: Several examples of the temporal evolution of the level of cooperation
in the system for ER (a) and SF (b) networks as a function of b. The size of the
networks is N = 4 · 103 nodes and average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4.
level of cooperation depends only on the value of the parameter b, and the
initial fraction of cooperators ρ0 (and also on the topology of the system, as
we will see). The average level of cooperation 〈c〉 is computed as the average of
〈c〉 over 103 independent realizations with dierent initial conditions (dierent
random distributions of a xed value for the fraction ρ0 of cooperators, as well
as network realizations).
It is worth mentioning that the time scale of microscopic invasion processes,
it is to say, the pace of the updating rule for any given node, is controlled by
β−1 = max{ki, kj}b , (3.5)
which is essentially determinded by the highest connectivity of the pair of
nodes we take under consideration. This makes that the very high payo of
a hub (due to its very high k) is balanced by β ∝ k−1 [3436], with the side
eect that the invasion processes from and to hubs are slowed down, if hub's
(and neighbor's) payo is much smaller than its connectivity k. On the other
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hand, the transient time t0 should be greater than characteristic xation times
for the nodes, if one is interested in measuring observable quantities associated
to the dynamical equilibrium.
3.3 Pure Strategists and uctuating individuals
After the transient time t0 has passed, we establish a 10
4
time step window dur-
ing which we measure the relevant magnitudes of the system. This procedure
allows us to scrutinize in depth the microscopic temporal evolution of coop-
eration as well as to characterize how its local patterns are formed. We note
that individual's strategies asymptotically (i.e. t > t0) follow three dierent
behaviors. Let P (x, t) be the probability that a node adopts the strategy x at
any time t > t0. We say that an element i of the population is pure cooperator
(PC) if P (si = 1, t) = 1, i.e., it plays as cooperator in all generations after the
transient time. Conversely, pure defectors (PD) are those individuals for which
P (si = 0, t) = 1. And there is a third set, constituted by uctuating nodes (F)
which are those that are neither pure cooperators nor pure defectors, so they
spend alternatively some time as cooperators and some time as defectors. This
set is what was rst called 'unsatised elements' by Abramson and Kuperman
in [39].
From now on, we denote by ρC = 〈µ(PC)〉 the measure (relative size)
of the set of pure cooperators (averaged over initial conditions and network
realizations), by ρD = 〈µ(PD)〉 that of the set of pure defectors, and by
ρF = 〈µ(F )〉 that of the set of uctuating strategists. At any given time
during the simulation, the relation between the fractions ρC + ρD + ρF = 1
must be fullled by the system, obviously.
On the other hand, the macroscopic average level of cooperation 〈c〉 can be
written as:
〈c〉 = ρC + ρF 〈TC〉 (3.6)
where 〈TC〉 is the average proportion of time spent by the uctuating subpop-
ulation as cooperators (see section 3.6 for further details).
In the gure 3.2 we show the fraction of pure strategists and uctuating
individuals, and the average level of cooperation as a function of b, for BA
and ER networks. As one could expect, both the average level of cooperation
and the fraction of pure cooperators decrease as the temptation to defect b
increases, as cooperation gets more and more expensive. The uctuating indi-
viduals are present in the network only for a range of intermediate values of b,
during which, the cooperation in the system depends almost entirely on them,
because there are not pure cooperators anymore.
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Figure 3.2: Fraction ρC of pure cooperators (Red Area), fraction ρD of pure defectors
(Blue Area), fraction ρF of uctuating nodes (Green Area) and the average level of
cooperation 〈c〉 in the system (Solid black line) as a function of b for ER networks
(Left) and BA networks (Rigth). The size of the networks is N = 4 · 103 nodes and
average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4.
Regarding the dierent topologies, we conrm that BA networks can hold
higher levels of cooperation than ER networks, even for quite big values of b
[3437]. As we can see in gure 3.2, for random topologies, the average level
of cooperation is equal to 1 until it drops quite abruptly around b = 1.2, and
it disappears almost completely for b > 1.8. For SF networks on the other
hand, the cooperation starts decreasing slightly but very soon (for values of
b & 1), but its main drop takes place for higher values (around b = 1.6), and,
moreover, the cooperation survives with much higher values of the temptation
to defect, approximately until b = 3. It is interesting to stress again that for
values next to b = 1, the level of cooperation is ρC = 1 for ER networks i.e.,
all the nodes in the system are pure cooperators, but it is slightly lower for SF,
since there are already a few uctuating individuals. Nevertheless, this level
of ρC will hold on longer before the main fall in SF, while it will drop faster
for ER. This fall of ρC is present for both topologies, but it is very sharp for
ER, so ρC drops to zero when b = 1.3, while for SF is smoother, permitting
the system to keep a small but non-null value of ρC until b = 2.5.
3.4 Dipolar Network Model
As we have seen, the asymptotic state of evolutionary dynamics on networks
is often not a static equilibrium conguration under the Replicator rule for
the update of the strategies. On the contrary, we have shown that there is an
asymptotic partition of the graph into three sets, namely, pure cooperators,
pure defectors, and uctuating individuals. This last group experience cycles
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Figure 3.3: Schematic representation of the Dipolar model network. Nodes 1 and 2
are connected to all nodes in F . Node 2 is also linked to all nodes in C. Connections
inside F and C are arbitrary. The colors represent a set of 2nF dierent initial
congurations. As we usually do, blue stands for defector and red for cooperator,
while green means arbitrary strategy.
of invasion by the competing strategies.
In order to prove the generality of these results, we make a little digression
now, and present a model that mimics a local environment of a heterogeneous
graph, with simplications that allow analytical calculations for a better in-
sight. On the other hand, it is perhaps the minimal (though general enough)
network model where the partition into PC, PD and F can be rigorously proved,
illustrating thus the dynamical organization of cooperation in heterogeneous
graphs.
Let's consider the schematic graph in gure 3.3, composed of the following
elements:
(a) A component F of nF nodes with arbitrary connections among them.
(b) A node, say Node 1, that is connected to all the nodes in F and has no
other links.
(c) A component C of nC nodes with arbitrary connections among them.
(d) A node, say Node 2, that is connected to all the nodes in F and C, but
not to Node 1.
Let's also consider the set of initial conditions dened by: (i) Node 1 is a
defector, (ii) Node 2 is a cooperator, and (iii) all nodes in component C are
cooperators. Note that this choice allows 2nF dierent initial congurations.
3.4. Dipolar Network Model 61
We now prove that, provided some sucient conditions (see below), this is an
invariant set for the evolutionary dynamics.
If we consider that the nodes are engaged on the Prisoner's Dilemma game,
with the specic choices for the parameters of the payo matrix detailed in
section 3.1, then the payo of a cooperator node i in F is given by:
PCi = k
C
i + 1 + (ki − kCi + 1) , (3.7)
where ki is the number of its neighbors in F and k
C
i ≤ ki is the number of
those that are cooperators. The payo of Node 1 is then
P1 ≥ (kCi + 1)b . (3.8)
For the PD game, where  < 0 for the general case, the inequality P1 > P
C
i
always holds, so Node 1 will always be a defector. Thus, a sucient condition
for P1 > P
C
i is b > 1 + (kF + 1), where kF (< nF ) is the maximal degree
in component F , i.e. the maximal number of links that a node in F shares
within F .
The payo of a defector node i in F is
PDi = (k
C
i + 1)b , (3.9)
where kCi is the number of its cooperator neighbors in F , while the payo of
Node 2 is
P2 = nC + nF + n
C
F (1− ) , (3.10)
where nCF ≤ nF is the number of cooperators in F . Thus, a sucient condition
for P2 > P
D
i is nC > Int(b(kF + 1) − nF ). With this requisite, Node 2
will always be a cooperator, which in turn implies that all the nodes in the
component C will remain always cooperators.
This argument proves that provided the sucient conditions
nC > Int(b(kF + 1)− nF ),
b > 1 + (kF + 1), (3.11)
hold, the set of initial conditions dened by (i), (ii), and (iii) is an invariant
set: any stochastic trajectory starting in the set remains there. Moreover,
as no equilibrium conguration is included in this set, one concludes that no
trajectory from this set evolves to an equilibrium conguration. While nodes
in C and Node 2 are permanent cooperators, and Node 1 is a permanent
defector, nodes in F are forced to uctuate: at every time step, a defector in
F has a positive probability to be invaded by the cooperation strategy, and at
the same time, a cooperator in F has a positive probability of being invaded by
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the defection strategy. In other words, every conguration in the set of initial
conditions is reachable (in one time step) from any other, thus it is almost sure
that it will be reached (ergodicity).
In any stochastic trajectory starting from the set of initial conditions ex-
plained previously, the network is partitioned into three subsets: a set of pure
cooperator nodes, a set of pure defector nodes and a set of uctuating indi-
viduals. The uctuations inside the subpopulation F reect the competition
for invasion among two non-neighboring hubs with xed opposite strategies
in their common neighborhood, a local situation that occurs in heterogeneous
networks. It is also a schematic model for the competition for inuence of two
powerful superstructural institutions like "mass media", political parties, or
lobbies on a target population.
Let's now obtain some exact results for the simplest choice of topology
of connections inside the uctuating set, namely kF = 0. It means that in
this case each node in F is only connected to Nodes 1 and 2. Note that the
sucient conditions for xation of defection at Nodes 1 and 2 are respectively,
b > 1 + , and nC > b− nF .
Denoting by c(t) the instantaneous fraction of cooperators in F , the payos
of Nodes 1 and 2 are
P1 = bcnF , P2 = nC + cnF + (1− c)nF ,
and the payos of a cooperator node and a defector node in F are respectively
PC = 1 +  , PD = b .
Then one nds for the one-time-step probability ΠCD of invasion of a coop-
erator node in F , it is to say, the probability of a node in F to change from
cooperator to defector
ΠCD =
cb− (1 + )/nF
2∆
, (3.12)
where ∆ = max{b, b − }. And on the other hand, using the simplifying
notation A = + (nC − b)/nF and B = 1 + nC/nF we get
ΠDC =
A+ c(1 − )
2∆B
, (3.13)
for the probability of invasion of a defector node in F , meaning analogously,
the probability of changing from defector to cooperator. Note that A > 0
because Node 2 can not be invaded.
In this way, the expected fraction of cooperators at time t+ 1 is:
c(t+ 1) = c(t)(1 −ΠCD) + (1− c(t))ΠDC ,
3.5. Distribution of the strategies among connectivity classes on SF networks 63
and provided nF  1, the fraction of cooperators c in F evolves according to
the dierential equation
c˙ = (1− c)ΠDC − cΠCD ,
which after insertion of Eqs. 3.12 and 3.13 becomes
c˙ = f(c) ≡ A0 +A1c+A2c2 , (3.14)
where the coecients are
A0 =
A
2∆B
A1 =
1− −A+B(1 + )/nF
2∆B
A2 = −1− + bB
2∆B
.
One can easily check (A0 > 0 and A2 < 0) that there is always one positive
root c∗ of f(c), which is the asymptotic value for any initial condition 0 ≤
c(0) ≤ 1 of equation 3.14. Thus, cooperation is never driven to extinction even
for large values of the temptation to defect b.
Back to the general case, i.e. arbitrary structure of connections in F ,
it should be emphasized that the sucient conditions expressed in equations
3.11 do not impose bounds on the network's average connectivity 〈k〉, that
can take on arbitrarily large values independent of the game parameters. This
result diers from the bound on 〈k〉 reported in [26, 38] for dierent stochastic
updating rules in the weak selection limit.
3.5 Distribution of the strategies among connectivity
classes on SF networks
In order to understand the role of the heterogeneity of SF networks on the
asymptotic behavior of the dynamics, we will study the fraction of pure coop-
erators, pure defectors and uctuating nodes, within every class of connectivity,
that we denote by ρkC , ρ
k
D and ρ
k
F , respectively. Note that the total fraction of
each type of individuals in the system can be written as:
ρα =
∑
k
P (k)ρkα (3.15)
with α = C,D,F , and being P (k) the degree distribution. Recall that ρC +
ρD + ρF = 1, and also ρ
k
C + ρ
k
D + ρ
k
F = 1. Thus, in gure 3.4 we represent the
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Figure 3.4: Strategists proportion by classes of connectivity. Color-coded densities
of pure cooperator (Left) and uctuating individuals (Rigth) as a function of k
and b for BA networks. The size of the networks is N = 4 · 103 nodes and average
connectivity 〈k〉 = 4.
fraction of pure cooperators and uctuating nodes as a function of the degree
of connectivity of the node and the temptation to defect, b. It can be seen that
there are very dierent areas: rst of all, for 1 < b ≤ 1.7, the pure cooperators
control the system, with values of ρC = 0.9, while there is only a small fraction
of uctuating strategists, among the nodes with medium or low connectivity.
When 1.7 < b < 2, the pure cooperators decrease to ρC = 0.1, being set only
on the high connectivity nodes, while the uctuating individuals take over the
low classes, up to k ≤ 11. There is a third region, where the uctuating nodes
invade higher and higher classes of connectivity as b increases, with the pure
cooperators still occupying the very high ones (for example, for b = 2.9, only
the hubs remain being cooperators). Finally, for even higher values of b, ρD
starts increasing at the expense of ρF , but interestingly enough, it does so
quite independently of the degree of connectivity. This has to do with the fact
that defectors can not take advantage of the heterogeneity of the system, as
we will explain in detail next, so this defector invasion for high values of b is
consequently independent of the degree of the nodes.
The preferential xation of pure cooperators at nodes with high degree k
when cooperation is very expensive can be understood by the following plau-
sible argument [35, 36, 45]: a necessary though non sucient condition for a
node i to be a pure cooperator at a given time t is that the number kCi of in-
stantaneous cooperators in its neighborhood (i.e., the payo of i in the current
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round, since R = 1 and S = 0) must be greater than the current payo of any
instantaneous defector neighbor j, that is, kCi > bk
C
j . This condition is clearly
favored when the cooperator node i belongs to a high k class and its uctuating
neighbors j belong to lower k classes. This argument is consistent provided
that heterogeneous topologies in general either have not degree-degree correla-
tions, so that the neighbors of a node of degree k have no preferential degrees,
or they are assortative, i.e., neighbors of high degree nodes have preferentially
also high degrees. Specically, SF networks used here, built via preferential
attachment using the GM model [64], do have age-correlations, which means
that the oldest nodes of a network are usually the hubs, and moreover, they
are interconnected, since they formed the initial core of size mo from which the
whole system was grown. This particular feature enhances even more cooper-
ation, so if one destroys such age-correlations, by rewiring the structure and
preserving the degree distribution, the average level of cooperation achieved
by the system will suer an important drop, as we will see with some detail in
chapter 5.
The xation of pure cooperation on hubs yields as a byproduct of the
stabilization of cooperation around them. If we set a cooperator on a hub,
it will get very high payo, because it has very high connectivity, and it will
make a lot of its neighbors to imitate its strategy. Thus, an all-cooperating-
area will be created around the hub, from which every cooperator involved will
get high benets too (specially the hub, of course), making its situation very
stable. It is to say, the imitation of a successful cooperator hub by its neighbors
reinforces its future success, then favoring the xation of cooperation in highly
connected nodes. Nonetheless, if a hub is occupied by a defector, it will get
high benets at the beginning, due to its high connectivity, exploiting all its
cooperator neighbors. But this will make more and more of them to imitate
it, creating an all-defector-area around the hub, where nobody will get any
benets at all (recall that a defector against another defector gets P = 0). And
so the hub will stop getting high payo too, eventually becoming susceptible
of being invaded by a cooperator. In that way, the imitation of a successful
defector hub undermines its future success, so that defection cannot take long-
term advantage from degree heterogeneity. In a static topology scenario it is
impossible for a defector to persist on a hub in the long term. Nonetheless,
when dealing with growing heterogeneous structures, a very dierent picture
can arise, as we will see in chapter 7).
We also want to point out that, as we show on the left panel of Fig.3.4, for
a xed given value of b > 2, ρkC varies rather quickly from 0 to 1 in a small
interval of values of k centered around some b-dependent value k∗(b), so that
the nodes with degree k > k∗(b) are mostly pure cooperators and those with
degree k < k∗(b) are mostly uctuating (see right panel, 2 < b < 2.9). In
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the absence of degree-degree correlations the degree distribution density in the
neighborhood of a given node is independent of the node degree, and thus the
proportion of cooperators in the neighborhood of a given node is that of the
whole network. This implies that the necessary condition for a pure cooperator
i, stated previously (kCi > bk
C
j ), becomes ki > bkj , where j is the uctuating
neighbor of i with highest degree, say kj ' k∗. Now, a small increase ∆b makes
those pure cooperators i fullling (b+∆b)k∗ > ki > bk
∗
to become uctuating,
so that ∆k∗ ' k∗∆b. With these conditions one concludes that k∗(b) grows
exponentially with b, k∗(b) ∝ exp(b). The linear shape of the bright-color line
in the (b, log k) plane at the left panel of Fig.3.4, for b > 2, nicely conrms this
prediction, thus supporting the validity of the heuristic argument.
Finally, we want to mention that the invasion process of defectors as the
temptation to defect increases on a SF topology could be quite dierent if we
were dealing with structures with a high level of clustering coecient. As it has
been investigated in [128], the existence of a high number of triangular relations
within a SF network makes cooperation resilient for even higher values of b on
the one hand, but also makes the invasion of defectors quite independent of
the degree classes. It is to say, defectors invade homogeneously all the classes
of connectivity almost at the same time, which makes the plot 〈c〉(b) much
sharper.
3.6 Cooperation times of the uctuating set on SF
networks
We have noted that the uctuating subpopulation in the dipolar model (see
section 3.4) is such that any uctuating individual has a positive probability of
changing strategy in one time step, so that the dynamics is ergodic in the set of
all congurations compatible with the partition. This is not necessarily the case
in a general heterogeneous network, being perfectly possible that a uctuating
node at a given time has a null one-time-step probability of invasion, but a
positive n-time-steps probability for some n > 1; thus, ergodicity in the set of
congurations compatible with the partition is neither ensured nor discarded.
In SF graphs each uctuating individual is wired to (and then could be in-
vaded by) a dierent number of uctuating individuals, and (eventually) pure
strategists, so that one should expect that the fraction of time TC it spends
as cooperator diers widely from node to node. The lower panel of gure 3.5
shows the average fraction of time T kC a uctuating node of degree k spends
cooperating. The average of these quantities
∑
k P (k)T
k
C in the subpopulation
F , denes the parameter 〈TC〉 that appears in equation 3.6, i.e. the average
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Figure 3.5: Cooperation times in the uctuating set. Permanence times τC of the
cooperation strategy of a uctuating node (Top) and the fraction of time TC it
cooperates (Bottom) as a function of the node's degree k and the game parameter b
for BA networks and  = 0. The size of the networks is N = 4 ·103 nodes and average
connectivity 〈k〉 = 4.
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individual contribution of uctuating nodes to the macroscopic index of coop-
eration 〈c〉. To avoid misunderstandings concerning the relative importance
of the contribution of connectivity classes to 〈c〉, it is important to bear in
mind both, the power-law dependence of P (k) and the right panel of gure
3.4, showing the fraction ρkF of uctuating nodes inside the class of degree k.
Given that TC is a proportion of time, it does not provide information on
the time scales of the invasion cycles that uctuating nodes experience. The
random variable τC (cooperation permanence time) is dened as the time spent
as cooperator by a uctuating node in each cycle. For the dipolar network,
when kF = 0, the one time step invasion probabilities, ΠCD and ΠDC (equa-
tions 3.12 and 3.13), become time independent in the asymptotic regime. Then
one can compute the probability that the cooperation strategy remains for a
time τC ≥ 1 at a uctuating node, simply as
P (τC) = ΠCD(1−ΠCD)τC−1 . (3.16)
In a similar way, the distribution density P (τD) of defection permanence times
is obtained as
P (τD) = ΠDC(1−ΠDC)τD−1 . (3.17)
Thus the distribution densities of both strategies permanence times are expo-
nentially decreasing. For example, at  = 0, i.e. at the border between the
PD and the HD game, if one further assumes that the relative size µ(F ) of
the component F is large enough, i.e. µ(F ) → 1, and µ(C) → 0, one ob-
tains that the stationary solution of equation 3.14 behaves as c∗ ' (b + 1)−1
near the limit µ(F ) → 1. The distribution density P (τC) of the cooperation
permanence times of a uctuating node, as a function of the parameter b is
thus
P (τC) = (2b+ 1)
−1
(
2b+ 1
2b+ 2
)τC
, (3.18)
and the distribution density P (τD) of defection permanence times
P (τD) = (2b(b + 1)− 1)−1
(
2b(b+ 1)− 1
2b(b+ 1)
)τD
. (3.19)
For SF networks, one expects that the permanence times at the uctuating
nodes show some correlation with the node's degree. The upper panel of gure
3.5 represents the average permanence time, τkC , that uctuating nodes of
degree k remain as cooperators as a function of b and k, for observation times
of 104 generations. We see that cooperation permanence times are strongly
correlated with degree: highest τC 's occur along the line k
∗(b) of maximal
degree in the uctuating set.
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As we have mentioned before, the heterogeneity of social contacts in SF
networks provides local environments where cooperation has a distinctive se-
lective advantage at high degree nodes. This not only enhances the size of
the subpopulation where xation of cooperation occurs, but also enlarges the
average total fraction of time of cooperation in the uctuating subpopulation.
3.7 Dynamic microscopic organization of the coop-
eration
We would like to achieve now a better understanding of the important dier-
ences found between the random and the SF topologies, and in order to do
that, we will perform a microscopic study of the dynamic organization of the
system. First of all, we need to dene the concept of cluster or core of nodes
for both strategies. A cooperator cluster (CC) is a connected component (a
subgraph) fully and permanently occupied by cooperator strategy si = 1, i.e.,
by pure cooperators so that P (si(t) 6= 1,∀t > t0,∀i ∈ CC) = 0. Analogously,
a defector cluster (DC) is the subgraph whose elements are pure defectors,
namely, when the condition P (si(t) 6= 0,∀t > t0,∀i ∈ CD) = 0 is fullled. It
is easy to see that a CC cannot be in direct contact with a DC, but with a
cloud of uctuating elements that constitutes the frontier between these two
cores. Note that a CC is stable if none of its elements has a defector neighbor
coupled to more than kC/b cooperators where kC is the number of cooperators
linked to the element. Thus, the stability of a CC is clearly enhanced by a high
number of connections among pure cooperators, which implies abundance of
cycles in the CC. This microscopic structure of clusters is at the root of the
dierences found in the levels of cooperation for both networks and explains
why cooperative behavior is more successful in SF networks than in homoge-
neous topologies. In fact, as far as loops are concerned, the main dierence
between the two topologies is that the number of small cycles of length L,
NL, are given by (〈k〉 − 1)L and (logN)L, respectively [129131]. Therefore,
it is more likely that SF networks develop a CC than ER ones. This has been
tested numerically by looking at the probability that at least one cooperator
core exists. The results [45] indicate that this probability remains equal to 1
for SF networks even for b < 2 and that it approaches zero for large values of
b. On the contrary, for ER networks, the same probability departs from 1 and
shows a sudden drop to zero for b = 2.
Thus, we will focus now on the number of clusters of cooperators Ncc and
the number of clusters of defectors Ncd for both topologies. In gure 3.6 we
show the dependence of Ncc and Ncd with b for ER and BA networks. The rst
and most relevant resut we notice concerns the number of cooperator cores:
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Figure 3.6: Number of clusters of cooperators (Left) and number of clusters of defec-
tors (Right) as a function of the parameter b for both ER and BA topologies. The
size of the network is N = 4 · 103 with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4, and each point
shown is the average of 103 dierent realizations of the game and the network.
while for ER graphs Ncc there is a wide region of b where there are several
clusters of cooperators, for the SF networks the number of cooperator clusters
is always 1, no matter the value of b, they always form a single core. We have
also veried that the cooperator core in SF networks contains the hubs, which
are the ones that stick together the whole cluster, that would otherwise be
disconnected. This important dierence greatly contributes to the well-known
advantage of cooperators in SF networks, comparing with ER. Looking at the
organization of pure defectors, one can see that there are important dierences
depending on the topology, too. In ER networks, pure defectors rst appear
distributed in several clusters that later coalesce to form a single core for values
of b < 2, it is to say, before the whole system is invaded by defectors. Con-
versely for SF topologies, defectors are organized in several clusters, except
when they nally occupy the whole system completely. This latter behavior
results from the role that hubs play: as they are the most robust against defec-
tor's invasion, highly connected individuals survive as pure cooperators until
the fraction ρC vanishes, thus keeping around them a highly robust cooperator
core that loses more and more elements of its outer layer when b increases,
until cooperation is nally defeated by defection. In gure 3.7 we show the
dependence of the number of clusters of defectors Ncd as a function of the
fraction ρD of defectors present in the system (realize that this last magnitude
obviously increases with b).
We have summarized in 3.8 the picture obtained from the analyses performed.
Clearly, two dierent paths characterize the emergence (or breakdown) of co-
operation. Starting at b = 1 all individuals in both topologies are playing as
pure cooperators. However, for b > 1, the pure cooperative level in SF net-
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Figure 3.7: Dependence of the number of clusters of defectors Ncd with the fraction of
pure defectors in the system ρD for both SF and ER topologies (note that, in general,
though ρD increases with b, the same value of ρD for both topologies corresponds to
dierent values of b). The size of the network is N = 4 ·103 with average connectivity
〈k〉 = 4, and each point shown is the average of 103 dierent realizations of the game
and the network.
Figure 3.8: Schematic representation of the dierent paths from total cooperation to
total defection as b increases, for ER and BA topologies.
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works drops below 1 and the population is constituted by pure cooperators
forming a single CC, as well as by a cloud of uctuating individuals. As b
is further increased, the size of the cooperation core decreases and some of
the uctuating nodes turn into pure defectors. These defectors are grouped in
several clusters around the uctuating layer (recall that pure cooperators and
pure defectors are never put in direct contact). For even larger payos, the
cooperator core is reduced to a small loop tying together a few individuals,
among which is highly likely to nd the hubs, while the cores of pure defectors
gain in size. Finally, pure cooperators and uctuating elements are invaded
by defectors an a single N-sized defector core is formed. On the contrary, the
original N-sized cooperator core survives for higher values of b when it comes
to ER graphs. However, when b grows, this cluster splits into several cooper-
ator cores that are in a ood of uctuating elements. Larger payos rst give
rise to several defector cores that by coalescence form an outer layer that is
separated from a single central core of cooperators by individuals of uctuating
strategies. Finally, for b = 2, an N-sized defector core comes out as well.
3.8 Dependence on the initial conditions
So far, we have studied the evolution of the PD dynamics on the system start-
ing always from an initial fraction of cooperators equal ρ0 = 0.5, i.e., at the
beginning of every simulation, ρ0N nodes have been chosen randomly as coop-
erators on the network, on average. In other words, the initial probability for
any node to be a cooperator has been 0.5. Now we want to address the issue of
changing this initial cooperation fraction, so it can vary between 0 < ρ0 < 1.
We want to analyse the possible inuence of ρ0 on the nal equilibrium state
of the system, for all the range of values of the parameter b and we also want
to make a comparison between the two topologies, as usual, ER and SF net-
works. Besides, it is important to clarify, however, that the distribution of
cooperators, given by ρ0 will still be made randomly among the nodes.
The variation with the game parameter b of the stationary (asymptotic)
average cooperation, 〈c〉(b), for several values of ρ0, is shown in gure 3.9 for
ER graphs and BA networks. And as we can see, 〈c〉 depends on ρ0 generally
speaking, in such a way that increases with it, but this dependence is dierent
for random and SF topologies. When b ∼ 1, the behavior of 〈c〉 for both
topologies is quite independent from ρ0 , because there is not a big dierence
between being a cooperator or a defector as far as payos is concerned. This
is also the case when b is bigger enough to make the whole system defect. But
there is a wide range of intermediate values of b where this behavior depends
on the heterogeneity of the graph.
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Figure 3.9: Average cooperation level in ER (Left) and SF (Rigth) networks as a
function of b for several xed initial concentrations of cooperators ρ0 as indicated.
The size of the networks is N = 4 · 103 nodes and average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4. The
scale-free network is a BA graph whose P (k) ∼ k−3. Every point shown is the average
of 103 dierent realizations of the game and the network.
In the case of ER networks, dierent initial concentrations ρ0 produce a
family of curves that mainly diers in their tails, so the larger the value of
ρ0, the slower the decay of 〈c〉 as b increases (as we will see next, this is in
correspondence with the perfect saturation of 〈c〉(ρ0) at xed b, gure 3.10).
On the other hand, in BA networks the eects of dierent initial conditions
are appreciated in the whole range of b values. We thus see that degree hetero-
geneity not only favors the survival of cooperation, but also makes the value of
the average cooperation, at xed b value, more dependent on initial conditions.
In order to study these dierences more thoroughly, we plot these same
results as 〈c〉 vs. ρ0 for several values of the (xed) parameter b. As it can be
seen in gure 3.10, 〈c〉 typically increases with ρ0 until saturation is reached
much before ρ0 approaches 1. One observes that saturation occurs sooner for
smaller values of b. These features are common for both classes of networks.
However, some details of the 〈c〉(ρ0) curves are dierent: rst, for ER networks,
the departure from zero of 〈c〉(ρ0) occurs, as b increases, only above some b-
dependent threshold value of the initial fraction of cooperators; on the contrary,
for BA networks 〈c〉(ρ0) departs from zero as soon as ρ0 > 0, at all values of
b inside the coexistence region between both strategies. Second, saturation is
more perfect for ER networks, while for BA graphs the plateau in the 〈c〉(ρ0)
curve has some small positive slope. It is interesting to consider these results in
the light of those found for the Prisoner's Dilemma in regular square lattices,
where the proportion of C and D tends to depend on the starting proportion
for relatively small values of b, but for larger b the proportions are essentially
independent of the initial conguration [33].
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Figure 3.10: Average cooperation level in ER networks (Left) and BA networks
(Rigth) as a function of the initial concentration ρo for several values of b as indicated.
The size of the networks is N = 4 · 103 nodes and average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4 and
each point shown is the average of 103 dierent realizations of the game and the
network.
Let's now focus on the relation between the fraction of pure strategists (ρC
and ρD) and the parameter b. As stated in the section 3.2 (and [45]), for any
asymptotic trajectory there is a partition of the network into three sets, namely
the set PC of pure cooperator nodes, the set PD of pure defector nodes, and
the set F of uctuating nodes. The behavior of ρC and ρD versus the game
parameter b is plotted in gure 3.11 for dierent initial cooperator concentra-
tions. The rst remarkable result is that in ER networks, the density of pure
cooperators does not depend on ρ0 for the whole range of b values, in sharp
contrast with the above mentioned results for the tails of the average level of
cooperation 〈c〉(b) (gure 3.9). It is worth recalling that, as we have discussed
in section 3.6, there are two additive contributions to the average fraction 〈c〉
of cooperators, namely the measure ρC of the set of pure cooperators, and
the overall fraction of time 〈TC〉 spent by uctuating nodes as cooperators,
weighted by the relative size ρF = 〈µ(F )〉 of the uctuating set (see equation
??). Though the rst contribution is, for ER networks, independent of ρ0,
the second one does indeed depend on the initial conditions, as inferred from
gure 3.9 and the relation ρC + ρD + ρF = 1. High initial concentrations of
cooperators favor the uctuating set F at the expense of pure defectors, while
the number of nodes where xation of cooperative strategy occurs remains
apparently unaected. Thus, ρC is being mainly determined by the network
structural features. For example, in our simulations, for large values of b where
ρC is very small, we have observed that the pure cooperator nodes form cycles.
The xation of cooperation in these structures is assured if none of their ele-
ments is linked to a uctuating individual that, while playing as a defector, is
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Figure 3.11: Fraction of pure strategists in ER (Left) and SF (Rigth) networks as
a function of b and several values of ρ0. The size of the system is N = 4 · 103 nodes,
with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4. Every point shown is the average of 103 dierent
realizations.
coupled to more than kC/b cooperators, where kC is the number of cooperators
attached to the element. The number of such structures is nite in ER graphs,
but as soon as their vertices are occupied by cooperators, they will be immune
to defectors invasion.
The right panel of gure 3.11 shows the results obtained for BA net-
works. Regarding the proportion of pure cooperators, one may dierentiate
two regimes: For b < 1.7, there is a moderate dependence of ρC on ρ0, while
ρC is almost independent of ρ0 for larger values of b. This behavior corre-
lates well with our observations (section 3.5) on the distribution of strategists
inside the degree classes. In the rst range of b values, pure cooperators are
present in all k-classes and uctuating individuals are almost homogeneously
disseminated over low-to-intermediate k classes. However, for b > 1.7, there
is a b-dependent value of k, say k∗, such that k-classes are fully occupied by
pure cooperators if k > k∗ while basically no pure cooperators are found in
lower k-classes. In the second range of b values, where the degree-strategy cor-
relations are strong, the inuence of ρ0 on the asymptotic proportion of pure
cooperators is very small.
As discussed in previous paragraphs, while the proportion of pure coop-
erators is either independent (ER) or slightly dependent (BA) on initial con-
centration ρ0, the measures of the other sets in the partition, F and PD, are
indeed more inuenced by the initial conditions. The dependence of the frac-
tion of pure defectors ρD with ρ0 for BA and ER networks is qualitatively the
same, that is, the proportion of pure defectors is favored (at the expense of the
uctuating set) by a higher initial proportion of defectors. This is consistent
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Figure 3.12: Dependence with b of the number of cluters of cooperators (Ncc) and
defectors (Ndc) for both BA networks (Top) and ER graphs (Bottom), and for
dierent values of ρ0. The size of the system is N = 4 · 103 nodes, with average
connectivity 〈k〉 = 4. Every point shown is the average of 103 dierent realizations.
with the lack of degree preference (correlation) of pure defectors, which cannot
take distinctive advantage of degree inhomogeneity: the higher their instan-
taneous payo, the more likely they invade neighboring nodes, which has the
eect of diminishing their future payo.
Finally, we analyze the connectedness of the pure strategists sets, as mea-
sured by the number of cooperator cores Ncc, and defector cores Ndc. As we
have shown in section 3.7 for BA networks and ρ0 = 0.5, for all values of b
where PC is not an empty set, it is connected, i.e. Ncc = 1. Looking at
gure 3.12, it can be said that this result turns out to be independent of ρ0:
there is only one cooperator core in BA networks, which contains always the
most connected nodes or hubs, for any initial fraction of cooperators. The
grouping of pure cooperators into a single connected set PC allows to keep a
signicant fraction of pure cooperators isolated from contacts with uctuating
nodes. This "Eden of cooperation" inside PC provides a safe source of benets
to the individuals in the frontier, reinforcing the resilience to invasion of the
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set. Pure defectors, on the contrary, do not benet from grouping together,
and the set PD appears fragmented into several defector cores. Note that for
values of b ' 1, where the set PD is empty, Ndc = 0, while for very high values
of b defection reaches xation in the whole network, so that Ndc = 1. Thus,
Ndc(b) must increase rst and then decrease to 1. In gure 3.12 we show the
computed Ndc(b) curves for BA networks for several values of ρ0. It is remark-
able that these curves almost collapse, in spite of the fact that the fraction ρD
of pure defectors does indeed depend on ρ0 (see gure 3.11). This fact suggests
that it is the size of the defector clusters, what changes with b, not its number,
for the case of BA structures.
In gure 3.12 we also show the number of clusters Ncc(b) and Ndc(b) for ER
graphs, and for dierent xed values of ρ0. Regarding the number of cooperator
cores, rst we notice that the picture described in section 3.7 for the case
ρ0 = 0.5 still holds when it comes to other values of the inital proportion of
cooperators, it is to say, in general both cooperators and defectors form several
unconnected clusters. We also see that except in the small range 1.4 < b < 1.6,
the dierent curves Ncc(b) coincide, in fair agreement with the independence
of ρC on initial conditions. Note that in the small interval where they do not
coincide, the fraction ρC of pure cooperators is below 1%, for all values of ρ0.
On the other hand, we see that for higher initial proportion ρ0 of cooperators,
the set PD is more fragmented and also that Ndc reaches its maximal values
at higher values of b.
3.9 Inuence of the degree of heterogeneity of the
network
As we established at the beginning of this chapter, we have been comparing
the results of the PD dynamics and its microscopical organization for the ex-
treme cases of the GM model, i.e., for random and SF topologies only. Now it
is the time to analyse the possible dierences for intermediate degrees of het-
erogeneity. In order to inspect in detail how the results depend on the degree
distribution of the network, we monitor the same magnitudes studied previ-
ously just for SF and random topologies, but now when the value of α varies
between 0 and 1 (we will also include the extreme values, for better under-
standing). As we have mentioned before, the GM model builds networks with
dierent degree of heterogeneity, depending only on the parameter α ∈ [0, 1],
in such a way that makes the networks less heterogeneous as α increases and
approaches 1.
Figure 3.13 shows, from left to the right and from top to bottom, the
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Figure 3.13: Average level of cooperation (Top left) and densities of pure cooperators
(Top right) and pure defectors (Bottom) as a function of b for dierent values of
α. α = 0 corresponds to a BA network while α = 1 generates an ER graph. In this
case, the networks are made up of N = 2 ·103 nodes and average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4.
Every point shown is the average of 103 dierent realizations.
average level of cooperation 〈c〉, the density of pure cooperators ρC and the
density of pure defectors ρD as a function of b for several values of α. In this
case, the initial distribution of cooperators was set again to ρ0 = 0.5, i.e., at
t = 0 the nodes have the same probability to cooperate or to defect. The
results show that indeed the densities of pure strategists and the average level
of cooperation do depend on α. Therefore, the role played by the underlying
topology is conrmed: the more homogeneous the graph is, the smaller the
level of cooperation in the system for a xed value of the temptation to defect
b. Moreover, the transition for dierent values of α is absolutely smooth and
the systems do not exhibit any abrupt crossover from one kind of behavior
(α = 0) to the other (α = 1).
We have also explored how nodes where strategies have reached xation are
organized into clusters of cooperation and defection as a function of α. Figure
3.14 summarizes our computational simulations for the number of cooperator
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Figure 3.14: Number of cooperator cores for dierent networks dened by the value
of α as a function of the density of nodes that are not pure cooperators 1− ρC . The
networks are made up of N = 2 ·103 nodes and average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4, and each
point shown is the average of 103 dierent realizations of the game and the network.
cores. In this case, we have represented Ncc as a function of (1 − ρC), that
obviously grows with b. We do it this way in order to have a common reference
for dierent values of α until cooperation breaks down, so the comparison is
easier. The observed dependence of Ncc with α is again smooth and no abrupt
change in the behavior of this magnitude occurs. It is worth stressing that as
soon as the underlying network departs from the limit α = 0 corresponding
to a BA scale-free network, the number of CC slightly diers from 1. This
means that some realizations give rise to more than one cluster of CC. The
probability to have such realizations is very small, but in principle, they are
possible. As α is further increased towards one, it is clear that pure cooperators
do not organize anymore into a single cluster. We think that this deviation is
due to the fact that when α > 0 the exponent γ of the underlying network,
which still is a scale-free degree distribution, is larger that 3. It is known that
this value of γ marks the frontier of two dierent behaviors when dynamical
processes are run on top of complex heterogeneous networks. This is the case,
for instance, of epidemic spreading. For 2 < γ ≤ 3, the second moment of
the degree distribution P (k) diverges in the thermodynamic limit, while it is
nite for γ > 3. As the critical properties of the system are determined by
the ratio between the rst (that remains nite for γ > 2) and the second
moment, the divergence of the latter when N → ∞ and 2 < γ ≤ 3, makes
the epidemic threshold null. On the contrary, when the process takes place
in networks whose γ > 3, the epidemic threshold is recovered, although no
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singular behavior is associated to the critical point [66, 67]. We expect that a
similar phenomenology is behind the results shown in gure 3.14.
3.10 Conclusions
In this chapter we have studied the inuence of the topology on the dynamics,
specically, the dierences between ER and SF networks when implementing
the Prisoner's Dilemma on top of them. On the one hand, we have measured
the mean levels of cooperation as a function of the one free parameter of our
model, the temptation to defect, b, as well as the dependence with the initial
proportion of cooperators present on the system, and we have also checked
the distribution of the cooperation among the connectivity classes, for the SF
networks. On the other hand, we have shown and analytically proved that there
is always a partition of the network into three dierent sets of individuals, as
far as strategies are concerned, and we have also determined that two dierent
patterns of cooperative behavior, determined by the underlying structure, can
be clearly identied.
We have found that the evolution of cooperation in complex topologies
shows a very rich structural and dynamical behavior. For values of the temp-
tation to defect b close to one, ER networks outperform SF topologies, but the
presence of hubs and the relative abundance of small loops in SF networks re-
vert the behavior of the level of cooperation for intermediate to large values of
payos. The reason why SF networks can hold much higher levels cooperation
than ER, even when the temptation to defect makes it very expensive, is that
heterogeneous populations oer to the cooperative strategy the opportunity
of positive feedback evolutionary mechanisms making cooperation the ttest
overall strategy, in spite of not being the best reply to itself in one-time step.
Besides, we have found that regardless of the topology and even the values
of the parameters of the model, there are always three dierent classes of ini-
dividuals according to their asymptotic stategies: the set of pure cooperators
PC, pure defectors PD and uctuating individuals F , and we have developed
a simple but very useful analytical model that mimics the competition for in-
vasion of two highly connected nodes in order to prove the existence of this
partition of the network in a general case.
Regarding the microscopic organization of the system, we have found im-
portant dierences between ER and SF: we have measured the number of clus-
ters of cooperators, and shown that, while in SF networks, cooperators form
always one single cluster (its relative size depending obviously on the value of
the temptation to defect), in homogeneous topologies, they form several dis-
connected clusters, and therefore they are 'an easy target' for the attacks of
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the defectors. Nonetheless, the number of clusters of defectors is always more
than one, in general, for both ER and SF networks.
Here, we have also shown that the enhancement of cooperation due to
the heterogenity of the pattern of connections among agents is robust against
variations of initial conditions (meaning dierent initial concentrations of co-
operators, ρ0 but always randomly distributed on the population). While both
the measure of the cooperator set PC where cooperation reaches xation, and
its connectedness properties are either independent or only slightly dependent
on ρ0, the measure of the uctuating set F and the defector set PD where
defection is xed show a clear dependence of initial conditions, for defection
cannot prot from degree heterogeneity. On the other hand, the character-
istics of the asymptotic evolutionary states of the PD analyzed here, show a
smooth variation when the heterogeneity of the network of interconnections
is one-parametric tuned from Poissonian to scale-free, demonstrating a strong
correlation between heterogeneity and cooperation enhancement.
Finally, though the numerical results presented here correspond mostly to
network sizes N = 4 ·103, we have studied also larger networks up to N = 104,
with no qualitative dierences in the results. The increase of network size,
while keeping constant the average degree 〈k〉, turns out to be benecial for
cooperation, due to the fact that it has the eect of increasing the maximal de-
gree, and thus the range of degree values. This further conrms how eciently
cooperation takes advantage from degree heterogeneity.

Chapter 4
Other Games on Static
Complex Networks
In the last chapter, we have been discussing in some detail the dynamics and
microscopical organization of the the so-called weak Prisoner's Dilemma Game
[42] on static complex networks, where the payo of a cooperator against a
defector was xed to S = 0 (strictly speaking, for this value of S, we are really
at the border between the Prisoner's Dilemma game and the Hawks and Doves
-HD- game). In this chapter we want to address very briey the issue of other
evolutionary games on graphs.
Given the usual payo matrix for the 2× 2 games:
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
(4.1)
and once we have xed R = 1 and P = 0, we have four dierent games,
depending on the relative ordering of the parameters (the rst three of which
are interesting well-known social dilemmas) [22, 125, 126]:
• The Stag Hunt game [102, 103], with R > T > P > S, is a coordination
game and both strategies are strict Nash equilibria. Players prefer mutual
defection to unilateral cooperation (S < P ), resulting in an intrinsic fear
of individuals to cooperate.
• The Hawks and Doves (or Snow Drift or Chicken) game [37, 41, 99
101, 122124], with T > R > S > P , where players are referred to
as greedy, since they prefer unilateral defection to mutual cooperation
(T > R). This is an anti-coordination game, since the best strategy for
an individual is the opposite to its opponent's.
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• The Prisoner's Dilemma game, for which T > R > P > S, and where
both tensions described above are incorporated at once, so is the most
dicult situation for cooperation to arise.
• The Harmony game, for which R > S > T > P , so that mutual cooper-
ation is the best option here. Thus, this game does not represent a very
interesting case of study for us.
On gure 4.1 we sketch the disposition of all of them on the T − S plane.
As we explained in section 2.2, Evolutionary Game Theory predict that
cooperation can not survive when playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game on
well-mixed populations, whereas there is an interior equilibrium in the Hawks
and Doves game, so the system will end up in a situation where a certain
proportion of both strategies is present. Nonetheless, we also know of the
important dierences introduced by the topology on the weak PD game. Now
we will study and compare the cases of a general Prisoner's Dilemma game and
the Hawks and Doves game on complex networks. Our approach will be very
similar to the one used in chapter 3, it is to say, we will study the asymptotic
equilibrium state of the system, given by the average level of cooperation,
when engaged in general PD game and HD, respectively, on top of a complex
network comparing homogeneous and heterogeneous topologies. Then we will
focus on the partition of the graph into several sets, and also on the number
and distribution of clusters of the dierent strategies. Finally, we will look
into the level of cooperation among the dierent connectivity classes for SF
topologies. On the one hand, we want to study a more generalized Prisoner's
Dilemma game, it is to say, situations with other values of the payo parameter
S < 0, to test the results found in the preceding chapter. And on the other
hand, we will analyse the behavior of the system when playing another 2 × 2
game, namely the Hawks and Doves game, and we will compare the outcome
of the game for both scenarios.
We have used here the same dynamic rule as in the previous case of the
weak Prisoner's Dilemma (chapter 3), it is, at each time every node i of the
system plays with its nearest ki neighbors, given by the underlying network,
and accumulates the payos Pi obtained during the round. Then, individuals
are allowed to synchronously change their strategies by comparing the pay-
os they accumulated in the previous generation with the one obtained by a
randomly chosen neighbor j. In this way, if Pi > Pj , player i keeps the same
strategy for the next round of the game, when it will play again with all of its
neighborhood. On the contrary, whenever Pj > Pi, i adopts the strategy of j
with probability [27, 28, 34, 35, 97, 101]:
Πi→j = β(Pj − Pi) (4.2)
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Figure 4.1: Schematic representation of the dierent games on the T − S plane.
where β−1 =max{ki, kj}∆, and ∆ is the maximum possible dierence between
the parameters of the payo matrix, it is to say ∆ = T (given that S ≥ 0 for
the Hawks and Doves game). For the weak Prisoner's Dilemma studied before,
it was also ∆ = T , but for a more general case of this particular game, with
S < 0, it will be ∆ = T − S. This probability is proportional to the dierence
of payos of the nodes involved, and it is normalized by the maximum payo a
node can get. Recall that, though it is stochastic, the Replicator-like rule does
not allow the adoption of irrational strategy, i.e. Πi→j = 0 whenever Pj ≤ Pi.
In other words, a node will never adopt the strategy of a neighbor whose payo
was worse than its in the former round of the game.
As we did in chapter 3, the dynamics evolves on top of ER [18] or BA
[8] networks, i.e. strategists are located on the vertices of a xed graph that
dictates the pattern of social interactions of the population. The size of the
system is N = 4 · 103 nodes, and the average connectivity of the networks is
〈k〉 = 4. Once the network has reached its full size N , the initial strategy of
every node is randomly set, with a probability of being a cooperator equal to
ρ0 = 0.5 and then the dynamics starts. We let the system evolve for 5 · 103
time steps or generations, after which we check whether the equilibrium has
been reached. As usual, we again observe the system during a time window of
103 generations. If the slope of C(t) is smaller than 10−2, then we consider the
equilibrium has been reached. Otherwise, we let the system evolve for another
5 · 103 more generations, after which, we evaluate it again. The results that
we show are usually the average of 103 dierent realizations of networks and
initial conditions, except we state otherwise.
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Figure 4.2: Color-coded average level of cooperation (Top left), fraction of pure
cooperators (Top right), uctuating individuals (Bottom left) and pure defectors
(Bottom right) for ER networks.
4.1 Average level of cooperation, and fractions of
pure strategists and uctuating individuals
As we have already mentioned, we set R = 1 and P = 0, and explore the
dynamics for a continuum of values of S and T . So the gures we present next
will include a comparison of the general Prisoner's Dilemma game (S < 0) and
the Hawks and Doves game (S > 0) at once.
The rst result we present is that the asymptotic existence of the partition
of the networks into pure strategists and uctuating individuals (see section
3.3) is a general result for the games studied in this chapter. In gure 4.2 we
show the color-coded average level of cooperation reached for the system after
the transient period, as well as the fractions of pure strategists and uctuating
individuals for ER topologies. On the other hand, in gure 4.3 we represent
the same magnitudes for BA networks.
We also conrm that the dependence of the dynamics on the parameter S
is smooth, there is not an abrupt change of behavior around the line S = 0.
Or in other words, we were entitled to use the weak Prisoner's Dilemma, xing
and eliminating the parameter S, instead of using a more strict version of
4.1. Average level of cooperation, and fractions of pure strategists and uctuating
individuals 87
Figure 4.3: Color-coded average level of cooperation (Top left), fraction of pure
cooperators (Top right), uctuating individuals (Bottom left) and pure defectors
(Bottom right) for BA networks.
the game, because the results do not change drastically with small variations
around S . 0.
For a xed value of the temptation to defect T and for both topologies,
the more expensive being a cooperator against a defector gets (i.e., S going
from positive to negative values), the lower the average level of cooperation.
On the other hand, the fraction of pure cooperators ρC does not show a strong
dependence with S neither for BA nor ER networks. Pure defectors take over
the whole system for a wide range of the parameters studied (half of the S−T
plane represented, on the ER case). As expected, the value of T for which all
the nodes are pure defectors decreases as S does so, since lower values of S
or higher values of T make cooperation more expensive. The most important
result is that there are not always uctuating players present on the system
for any given value of the parameters. Obviously, if S < 0 and T is high
enough, all nodes are pure defectors, and if T is low, all individuals act as
pure cooperators, no matter what the value of S is. However, there is also an
intermediate area of parameters for which the uctuating nodes occupy almost
the entire system, being responsible for the maintenance of the average level
of cooperation shown on the system.
If we look at gures 4.2, we observe that the frontier between PC and F
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is almost S-independent, but the frontier between F and PD does depend on
the parameter S. This makes that the transition in T from total cooperation
to total defection also S-dependent: for high values of S, this transition is
smooth, while for negative values of S it is quite sharp, suggesting an almost
immediate conversion of the nodes of the system from PC to PD.
Regarding the inuence of the topology, as one could expect, both the
average level of cooperation and the fraction of pure cooperators are higher
for BA than for ER networks. We also see that the fraction of uctuating
individuals (when present) is larger in the ER networks, and the limits of the
area for which they are present are more clearly drawn in this case.
4.2 Number of Clusters of Cooperators and Defec-
tors
Using the same denition of Cluster presented in the section 3.7, we consider
a cooperator cluster (CC) as a connected component (subgraph) fully and
permanently occupied by cooperator strategy si = 1, i.e. composed of pure
cooperators so that P (si(t) 6= 1,∀t > t0,∀i ∈ CC) = 0. Analogously, a
defector cluster (DC) is the subgraph whose elements are pure defectors,it is,
a subgraph where the condition P (si(t) 6= 0,∀t > t0,∀i ∈ DC) = 0 is fullled.
In gure 4.4 we show the number of clusters of cooperators Ncc and defec-
tors Ndc as a function of T for several discrete values of the parameter S and
for both ER and BA topologies in both the Hawks and Doves (S > 0) and
the general Prisoner's Dilemma game (S < 0). As we can see, once again the
general result obtained previously for the weak Prisoner's Dilemma (section
3.7) holds in these scenarios: while cooperators form several clusters on ER
topologies, for the BA networks, as long as cooperators survive in the system,
they remain together forming one single cluster which always includes most
of the higher connected nodes, making thus the system much stronger to the
attacks of the defectors. Those, on the other hand, always form more than
one cluster, in general, on both random and scale-free networks. This behavior
of the microscopic organization of the strategies in the system for the Hawks
and Doves and the general Prisoner's Dilemma is not very surprising, since
it is proven to be basically due to the underlying topology, and it denitely
secures the robustness of the results presented in section 3.7, and highlights
the dierences between homogeneous and heterogeneous networks.
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Figure 4.4: Number of clusters of cooperators Ncc and defectors Ncd as a function of
T for the Hawks and Doves game (Top panels) and the general Prisoner's Dilemma
case (Bottom panels), for both ER and BA topologies. The size of the networks is
N = 4000 nodes and average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4. Every point shown is the average
of 5 · 102 values
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4.3 Distribution of the cooperation among the de-
grees of connectivity
We can study the role of heterogeneity on the dynamics of both PF and HD
games by plotting the probability of a node with degree k of being a cooperator,
ρkC , in a similar way as we did in section 3.5. Recall that the total fraction of
pure cooperators in the system can be written as:
ρC =
∑
k
P (k)ρkC (4.3)
with P (k) being the degree distribution, and where the relations ρC+ρD+ρF =
1 and ρkC + ρ
k
D + ρ
k
F = 1 are fullled. As one can see in gure 4.5, when T is
small enough, all nodes are cooperators, regardless of their connectivity, but as
T increases, nodes with medium degree are less likely to be cooperators, while
the higher classes remain as cooperators until the value of T is such that level
of cooperation vanishes in the system completely. This is in perfect agreement
with the results found for the weak Prisoner's Dilemma [35, 36, 45], and shown
in section 3.5. As we commented in detail in that section, the reason why
the cooperation can survive for SF topologies is due to the existence of the
hubs, which are interconnected, play as cooperators, and surround themselves
by more cooperators, creating a nice environment of cooperation (or 'Eden')
where other cooperator nodes with lower degree can get benets from it, and
resist the attacks of the defectors. On the other hand, defectors can not take
advantage of the heterogeneity of the network, because they are not stable in
the long term when set in a hub.
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we wanted to check whether or not some of the important
previous results exposed in chapter 3 for the weak Prisoner's Dilemma (it is,
when S = 0) still hold for the more general cases, and even for other two-
strategy game, specically the Hawks and Doves.
As we have seen, given the payo matrix of the game, the parameter or-
dering for the Prisoner's Dilemma is T > R > P > S, while for the Hawks and
Doves game, it is T > R > S > P . So, although in both cases players prefer
unilateral defection to mutual cooperation, the dierence between them is that
in the rst case, the worst strategy is to cooperate against a defector, while
in the second setting, it is to mutually defect. As usual, we have xed the
parameters P = 0 and R = 1, so to have two free parameters, the temptation
to defect, T and the sucker's payo, S. In this way, for a xed value of T > 1,
4.4. Conclusions 91
Figure 4.5: Probability of nding a Pure Cooperator of degree k in SF networks
for dierent values of the parameter T . (a) S=-0.2 and (b) S=-0.1 correspond to
Prisoner's Dilemma scenarios, while (c) S=0.1 and (d) S=0.2 are Hawks and Dove
situations. The networks have N = 2 · 103 nodes.
if S < 0, we are playing Prisoner's Dilemma, while if S > 0, we are playing
Hawks and Doves. Cooperation gets more expensive every time T increases
or if S decreases. On the general Prisoner's Dilemma (meaning, for values of
S < 0 strictly, instead of the weak limit, S = 0), we have checked that the
dependence with the parameter S is smooth, there are no abrupt changes, but
nonetheless, there are some dierences. In particular, for a xed value of the
temptation to defect, the more negative S gets, the more expensive the coop-
eration is, so both the mean value of cooperation, 〈c〉, and the level of pure
cooperators, ρC , decrease. And also the level of uctuating individuals, ρF ,
drops remarkably, while obviously, the level of pure defectors, ρD, increases.
In this situation, since the levels of F are low, the transition from pure co-
operation to pure defection as T increases is quite sharp. On the other hand
for Hawks and Doves (S > 0) the cooperation is less expensive than for the
Prisoner's Dilemma and the same value of T , so both the mean value of coop-
eration 〈c〉, and the fraction of pure cooperators ρC are obviously higher than
in the Prisoner's Dilemma scenario, and the level of uctuating individuals,
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ρF , is also much higher. In fact, when S > 0, there is a wide region of the
S − T plane where uctuating individuals clearly take over the entire system,
and this makes the transition from pure cooperation to pure defection as T
increases smooth.
Regarding the inuence of the underlying topology, we can conrm that
the heterogeneity of the network always favors the cooperation for both games:
〈c〉 and ρC are much higher for SF than for ER networks, while the uctuating
and pure defectors are less present on heterogeneous systems. We have checked
the microscopic organization of the cooperation on the system as well, and we
have found that the results shown in section 3.7 still hold both for the general
Prisoner's Dilemma case and the Hawks and Doves: while for SF topologies,
cooperators organize into just one single cluster, for ER they form several.
Thus, in the rst case the system can hold much higher levels of cooperation
even when it is very expensive (for high values of T or negative values of S). On
the other hand, the defectors always organize into several clusters, in general,
regardless the underlying topology.
Finally, if we look at the distribution of the cooperation across the con-
nectivity classes in SF networks, we can see that, as we have proved previ-
ously for the weak Prisoner's Dilemma case, when cooperation is not expen-
sive (T < 1.5), practically the whole system plays as a cooperator, but when it
gets more expensive, the defectors start taking over the medium classes, while
the high classes remain unconquered as long as cooperation can survive. This
hierarchical organization is preserved for all the values of S explored.
To summarize, in this chapter, we have proven the robustness and strength
of the important results previously shown in chapter 3. We have proved that all
of them hold for a wide range of parameters, specially the important dierences
regarding the topology and the microscopic organization of the system.
Chapter 5
The Prisoner's Dilemma Game
on Random Scale-Free Networks
As it has been well established in previous chapters, when implementing the
Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game on top of complex networks, scale-free (SF)
topologies greatly enhance cooperation [3445], comparing with other topolo-
gies as ER networks. It is also well known that the heterogeneity on the degree
distribution of these structures is a crucial factor in order to achieve such high
levels of cooperation in the system. More specically, the hubs, or nodes with
the highest connectivity, act always as cooperators, surrounding themselves
with middle-class cooperators, and creating a unique cluster (or 'Eden') of co-
operation that is able to resist the attack of defectors, even when cooperation
gets really expensive. Nonetheless, up to now we have only focused on the BA
model [8], among other SF network models available in literature (for a quick
review of some of them, see [12, 63]). BA SF networks have some correlations
by construction, the so-called age-correlations [11, 13, 61]. It means that older
nodes, the ones that arrived earlier to the system when it is being built are
interconnected, since they formed the original core of nodes, and besides, these
older nodes usually become hubs as the network grows. The existence of age-
correlations can be found in some real systems also, such as the collaboration
or citation networks, or the 'old boy' network, made up of former students of
the Ivy League that now work at the top investment banks [9].
In this chapter we want to study the evolution of cooperation in 'totally
random' SF structures, it is to say, without any kind of correlations. We
presume that these age-correlations among the highly connected individuals of
BA networks enhance cooperation [34, 36], by making the single cooperator
cluster even more robust to the possible invasion of defectors. Thus, now it is
our intention to analyse the situation when considering the same PD dynamics
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taking place on top of a randomized version of BA topologies. Our rst goal
in the study of such random SF networks is to check if the deletion of the
hub-to-hub links aects indeed the structure of cooperation observed in BA
networks, explaining qualitatively the drop in the cooperation level as a break
down of the cohesive arrangement of cooperators.
We want to study in detail the structure of cooperation in random SF
networks, and in order to do so, on the one hand we will perform our usual
numeric simulations. Specically, we will perform a rewiring process of the
SF networks obtained by means of the BA model, which is a procedure that
destroys any kind of correlations present in the original system [13], preserving
the connectivity of every node, and therefore the original degree distribution,
and then we will implement the usual PD dynamics. On the other hand, we
will also address the problem analytically, by using a degree-based mean-eld
approximation in order to try and incorporate the heterogeneity in the number
of social contacts of individuals in the Replicator Equation [97, 106108] (see
also section 2.2.2). To this end, we will make a further compartmentalization
of the strategists in degree-classes, by dening the fraction of cooperators and
defectors with degree k, so we will have an equation for the evolution of the
cooperation in every class of connectivity k. Finally, we will compare the results
obtained with both methods, discussing whether or not this approximation is
accurate enough to explain some of the basic behaviors of the cooperation in
the system.
5.1 Numerical Simulations on Random Scale-Free Net-
works
To study the structure and dynamics of cooperation in random SF networks
we have performed a rewiring process [132] of SF networks built via BA mech-
anism. As we have already seen in chapter 2.1.3, the BA model considers that
the network is grown from an initial core of m0 nodes, incorporating a new
node to the network every time step. Besides, every new node launches m links
to the nodes already present in the growing network, following a preferential
attachment rule, i.e., the probability of receiving a link from the new node
is proportional to the degree of the nodes. The networks generated using the
BA model have a power-law degree distribution, P (k) ∼ k−γ , with γ = 3 but,
at the same time, they possess important features that make them dierent
from random SF networks constructed by means of purely statistical algo-
rithms such as the Molloy-Reed congurational model [133]. These dierences
are the previously mentioned age-correlations that have as a consequence the
interconnection of highly-connected elements or hubs. The links between hubs
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Figure 5.1: Schematic representation of the rewiring process of two pairs of nodes.
have been shown to play a crucial role in the survival of cooperation [34, 36],
since when they are removed the cooperation level decreases notably.
The rewiring process is made as follows (see gure 5.1): let i and j be a pair
of neighbors, so they share a link, and let be m and n be another pair of nodes
linked together. Then we interchange the i − j and the m − n links, in such
a way that in the nal state, i− n and m− j are the new pairs of neighbors.
Of course, we make sure that i 6= j 6= m 6= n, to avoid double links and
auto-links, i.e., links that connect a node with itself. We repeat the process N
times, checking that the nal networks have a unique connected component.
As we have mentioned before, following this rewiring scheme destroys any kind
of correlations present in the original network preserving the degree sequence
of the graph, and thus keeping the same degree distribution (P (k) ∼ k−3) as
in the original BA network.
Once the network is rewired, we perform the numerical simulation of the
evolutionary dynamics dictated by the Prisoner's Dilemma, whose payo ma-
trix is given, as usual, by:
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
(5.1)
where we set, again P = S = 0, R = 1, T = b > 1, so we only have to deal
with one control parameter, the temptation to defect b [31, 34, 127].
In the initial conguration of the system, the probabilities of being a
cooperator or a defector are the same (ρ0 = 0.5), and the strategists are
randomly distributed across the network. On the other hand, we will use
the same updating rule as in previous chapters, that is, the Replicator-like
[27, 27, 28, 34, 35, 97, 101], so player i adopts the strategy of its neighbor j
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of the levels of cooperation achieved in the stationary state
for ER, BA and random SF networks, as a function of the temptation to defect b. All
networks are made up of N = 4 · 103 nodes and have an average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4.
Every point shown is the average over 103 dierent realizations.
for the next game round with probability:
Πi→j = β(Pj − Pi) (5.2)
where Pi and Pj are their correspondent payos from the last round of the
game, and with β = (max{ki, kj}b)−1.
The details of the numerical analysis are similar to those in previous chap-
ters: the networks we generated have N = 4 ·103 nodes and an average connec-
tivity 〈k〉 = 4. We let the system evolve until a stationary regime is reached.
This stationary regime is characterized by an average level of cooperation 〈c〉,
that is the fraction of C players in the network, 〈c〉 = c/N . To compute 〈c〉 we
let the dynamics evolve over a transient time τ0 = 5 ·103, and we further evolve
the system over time windows of τ = 103 generations. In each time window,
we compute the average value and the uctuations of c(t). When the uctu-
ations are less than or equal to 1/
√
N , we stop the simulation and consider
the average cooperation obtained in the last time window as the asymptotic
average cooperation 〈c〉. In order to make an extensive sampling of initial con-
ditions and network realizations we have performed 103 independent numerical
simulations for each value of the temptation to defect b studied, and averaged
accordingly the values 〈c〉 found in the realizations.
First of all, in gure 5.2 we show a comparison of the levels of cooperation
achieved by such random SF networks, as well as original BA and ER topolo-
gies, and as it can be seen, our results conrm previous ndings: the removal
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of age-correlations makes random SF networks much less robust to defection
than BA networks [35, 36], so the level of cooperation drops substantially. On
the other hand, in gure 5.3(a) we have also plotted the average level of co-
operation 〈c〉 as a function of b, as well as the level of pure strategists and
uctuating individuals present on the network. It is to say, on these topologies
we have also found that on the stationary regime, there is a partition of the
network into pure strategists (pure cooperators PC and pure defectors PD),
and uctuating individuals (F ). Notice that the partition of the system into
pure strategists and uctuating individuals has been made following the same
criteria as in section 3.3. As one could expect, the fraction PC decreases with
b, the uctuating take over the network for a wide range of medium values
of b, and the PD nally invade the system for large values of the parameter.
Nonetheless, the fraction of PC is remarkably lower than that for the case of
BA networks or even ER topologies, whereas the uctuating individuals dom-
inate the system for a wider range of b, so the level of cooperation is almost
exclusively due to them. This is a very dierent scenario from those studied
for BA SF networks (compare with gure 3.2).
Moreover, in gure 5.3(b) we have plotted the number of cooperator clus-
ters Ncc and defector clusters Ndc as a function of b, using to that aim the
same denition as in section 3.7, a cooperator (defector) cluster is a connected
subgraph composed of nodes that are pure cooperators (defectors). The rst
dierence with respect to BA networks is that here we nd realizations with
more than one cooperator cluster, whereas for BA networks, the number of
clusters was always exactly Ncc = 1, as long as 〈c〉(b) > 0. This dierence
explains the drop in the cooperation level previously observed [34]: the more
fragmented the cooperators are arranged, the less sources of benets they nd
in their surroundings and the larger is the probability to be invaded by the
instantaneous defectors that are in contact with them. Regarding the defector
clusters we observe the same picture as in BA networks: PD are arranged in
several clusters when they start to invade the network (b & 2). The number
of defector clusters decreases as they start to grow in size and glue together,
and nally collapse into a single one, when all the network has been totally
invaded by pure defectors.
We have also checked the probability that a node of degree k is a cooperator
in the stationary regime. Our numerical simulations show that, in agreement
with previous numerical observations we have made in BA networks (see section
3.5), high degree nodes are more likely to act as cooperators than intermediate
or low degree individuals.
Summing up, in random SF networks the fragmentation of the coopera-
tor clusters together with the extremely low fraction of pure cooperators and
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Figure 5.3: (a) Average level of cooperation 〈c〉 as a function of the temptation to
defect b in random SF graphs. The panel also shows the corresponding dependence
of the fraction of pure cooperators (PC), pure defectors (PD) and uctuating (F)
players. (b) Average number of cooperator clusters Ncc and defector clusters Ndc
as a function of b. The networks are made up of N = 4 · 103 nodes and an average
connectivity 〈k〉 = 4. Every point shown is the average over 103 dierent realizations.
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the prevalence of uctuating individuals not only makes the average level of
cooperation drop in comparison with that same PD dynamics on top of BA
networks, but also lead to an organization of cooperation that is quite dierent
to that observed in BA SF networks. Therefore, we can conrm that the high
level of cooperation that BA SF networks can hold is not only due to its degree
distribution, buy also due to the so-called age-correlations that link together
the hubs.
5.2 The degree-based mean eld approximation
The random SF graphs used in the simulations above are free of any kind of
correlation between the properties (age, degree, etc...) of two adjacent nodes.
Therefore, it is amenable to study analytically the evolution of the cooperation
by considering a similar approach to that used for disease spreading processes
in complex networks [6567] with arbitrary degree distributions and no cor-
relations. To incorporate the heterogeneity in the number of social contacts
of individuals we make a further compartmentalization of the strategists in
degree-classes. In this sense, we label ck and dk the fractions of cooperators
and defectors with degree k, respectively, so that the total number of cooper-
ators and defectors will be:
c = N
∑
k
P (k)ck , (5.3)
d = N
∑
k
P (k)dk . (5.4)
Obviously the relation ck + dk = 1 holds, and, instead of describing the evolu-
tion of the fraction of cooperators in the population via the well-known Repli-
cator Equation [97, 106108], we can write now the evolution of the fraction
of cooperators with degree k as:
c˙k = (1− ck)ΠDCk − ckΠCDk , (5.5)
where ΠDCk is the probability that a defector of degree k changes its strategy
to cooperation, and analogously, ΠCDk is the probability that a cooperator of
degree k change its strategy to defection.
Assuming that the network has no degree-degree correlations, and following
the replicator-like update rule (5.2), we can write the probabilities ΠDCk and
100 Chapter 5. The Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Random Scale-Free Networks
ΠCDk as
ΠDCk =
∑
k′
k
′
P (k
′
)
〈k〉 β Θ
[
PC
k′
− PDk
]
ck′ , (5.6)
ΠCDk =
∑
k′
k
′
P (k
′
)
〈k〉 β Θ
[
PD
k′
− PCk
]
(1− ck′ ) , (5.7)
where the function Θ[x] is dened as Θ[x] = x if x > 0 and Θ[x] = 0 otherwise.
Besides, PCk and P
D
k are the payos obtained by a cooperator and a defector
of degree k respectively, and can be written as
PCk = k
∑
k′
k
′
P (k
′
)
〈k〉 ck′ = kl c , (5.8)
PDk = b · klc , (5.9)
where lc is the probability that a node has a cooperator neighbor. Now we can
insert the above two expressions (5.8) and (5.9) in equations 5.7 and 5.6 and
nally write the evolution equation of the fraction of cooperators with degree
k (5.5) as
c˙k = (1− ck)
∑
k′>bk
k
′
P (k
′
)
〈k〉 β lc(k
′ − bk)ck′
− ck
∑
k′>bk
k
′
P (k
′
)
〈k〉 β lc(bk
′ − k)(1 − ck′ )
− ck
bk∑
k′>k/b
k
′
P (k
′
)
〈k〉 β lc(bk
′ − k)(1− ck′ ) , (5.10)
where we have separated the contributions to the transition C→D that come
from neighbors with k
′
> bk and k
′
< bk, so that it is clear that the number
of degree classes that participate in the transition C→D is larger than those
that inuence the change D→C.
We have numerically solved the set of equations 5.10 using both power-law
and a Poisson distribution for the generic expression of the degree distribu-
tion P (k). As initial conditions, we have used a homogeneous distribution of
cooperators and defectors for all the degree classes: ck(t = 0) = a ∀k where
a is a random variable homogeneously distributed between [0, 1]. This way,
the initial fraction of cooperation is ρ0 = 0.5, in agreement with the numerical
experiments shown in the previous sections.
Unfortunately, the numerics clearly showed that the total cooperation al-
ways decays to zero when b > 1, thus failing to explain the cooperation levels
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observed in the numerical simulations in both random SF networks and ER
graphs. Nonetheless, this result is consistent with previous ndings, which
have shown that the mean-eld approximation can not explain satisfactory
the observed survival of cooperation. However, in the next section we will
study the behavior of the system when it starts from a very specic set of
initial conditions: the targeted cooperation.
5.3 Targeted cooperation
We have failed to use the degree-based mean eld approximation to explain
the observed non-zero level of cooperation when simulating the PD dynamics
on top of random SF networks. Now we study a very particular case for both
random SF network simulations and our degree-based mean-eld approxima-
tion with a particular set of initial conditions. As we will see next, the results
show that at least, if not in perfect agreement, the two cases bare some resem-
blance on the qualitative behavior of both the time evolution C(t) towards the
stationary state and the nal state achieved by the state, expressed through
the dependence 〈c〉(b).
It is important to stress that the main assumption behind the above mean
eld approach is that the average level of cooperation inside a degree-class, ck,
is a proper magnitude for describing the state of the nodes within this degree.
In particular, this assumption is strictly correct when ck is either 1 or 0. This
motivated us to study the solution of equations 5.10 using a particular set of
initial conditions that we have called the targeted cooperation, and that are
explained next.
We dene targeted cooperation as a set of initial conditions for the system
described by 5.10, where ck(t = 0) = 1 if k > k
∗
and ck(t = 0) = 0 if k < k
∗
.
It is to say, all nodes whose connectivity is higher than a given value k∗ are
set initially as cooperators, while all those with lower number of neighbors
will be defectors. We have carefully explored the solutions of equations 5.10
when P (k) is a power-law degree distribution. To this end, we have considered
power-law distributions with several values of the exponent γ, and we have
also used dierent values for the degree threshold k∗. The numerical solution
of equations 5.10 reveals that, in this case, the cooperation survives for b > 1,
reaching a stationary value that depends on both the value of b and that of
the threshold k∗. In gure 5.4 we show the time evolution of the average
level of cooperation for several values of b and k∗ = 2 and k∗ = 3. The
degree distribution in the gure is a power-law with γ = 3. The solutions
show that the larger k∗ and/or b are, the lower the cooperation level is, which
makes perfect sense, since they imply, respectively that the number of initial
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Figure 5.4: Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators 〈c〉(t) obtained solving
equation 5.10 when targeted cooperation is used as initial conditions and being P (k)
a power-law with γ = 3. The dierent curves correspond to several values of b, as
shown in the bottom of the gure. The targeted cooperation used correspond to (a)
k∗ = 2 and (b) k∗ = 3. Notice the log-log representation of the axes.
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Figure 5.5: Several examples of the time evolution of the random SF network numeri-
cal simulations for targeted cooperation. All the cases shown in the (Left) panel have
k∗ = 20, while those in the (Right) one, correspond to simulations with a xed value
of b = 1.2. The networks are made of N = 4 · 103 nodes, with average connectivity
〈k〉 = 4 and γ = 3. Notice the log-log representation of the axes.
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Figure 5.6: The average level of cooperation 〈c〉 as a function of the temptation to
defect b, for several values of the degree threshold k∗ for numerical simulations on
top of random SF networks with targeted cooperation. The networks are made of
N = 4 · 103 nodes, with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4 and γ = 3.
cooperators is lower, or that the cooperation itself gets more expensive.
On the other hand, it is interesting to compare these results with the values
obtained for our conventional simulations on top of random SF networks (see
gure 5.5). We see that the behavior of both systems are relatively alike, as far
as time evolution of the cooperation is concerned (but, of course, the evolution
of the random SF networks displays nite size uctuations). As it can be seen
in the (Left) panel of gure 5.5, for a xed value of k∗ and for low or medium
values of b, the level of cooperation increases with time, until it gets its nal
value (which depends inversely on b), and for higher values of b, the level of
cooperation on the system eventually goes to zero. Conversely, if we x the
value of b ((Right) panel of gure 5.5), the bigger the k∗, the lower the nal
level of cooperation the system can achieve. Besides, in gure 5.6 we show the
dependence of the level of cooperation 〈c〉 with both the temptation to defect
b and with the value of the threshold k∗.
5.4 Dependence with the exponent of the power-law
distributions for the mean eld approximation
Returning now to the degree-based mean-eld approach, it is interesting to
study in detail the eect of the threshold k∗ over the asymptotic level of coop-
eration. In particular, we can focus on the minimum amount of degree classes
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Figure 5.7: Phase diagram k∗c (b). The three curves correspond to dierent power-
law distributions (namely, γ = 4, 3 and 2). Each curve k∗c (b) represent the border
between two dierent asymptotic regimes for the evolution of equations 5.10 with
targeted cooperation: The area below the curves correspond to the points (b, k∗)
where targeted cooperation yield nonzero asymptotic level of cooperation. Conversely,
the area above the curves correspond to the targeted initial conditions for which the
evolution of equations 5.10 yields 〈c〉 → 0.
that we have to ll initially with cooperators so that cooperation is able to
survive asymptotically in the system. We have carefully explored dierent sets
of initial conditions corresponding to dierent values of k∗. Starting from a
low value of k∗ we have solved equations 5.10 and computed the nal level of
cooperation 〈c〉. If 〈c〉 > 0 we increase the value of k∗ and solve again the
system 5.10. This process is iterated until we reach a value k∗c for which coop-
eration nally vanishes. The critical value k∗c represents the minimal amount of
cooperator degree classes needed at time 0 to sustain asymptotically a nonzero
level of cooperation. In gure 5.7 we have plotted the functions k∗c (b) for three
power-law degree distributions (γ = 2, 3 and 4). Obviously, we observe that
as the cooperation gets more and more expensive, it is necessary to ll more
degree classes to assure a nonzero level of cooperation. More interestingly, we
show that the heterogeneity of the network (or in other words, a lower value
for the exponent γ in the degree distribution P (k)) increases the value of k∗c .
This result is related to the fact that lling a given amount of degree classes is
more ecient (more nodes are initially set as cooperators) when the network
is more heterogeneous.
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5.5 Comparison between simulations and mean-eld
approximation for the targeted cooperation ini-
tial conditions
We can say that the mean eld approach represents a useful tool for sub-
stituting computationally expensive numerical simulations to a given extent.
However, how accurate are the results of the solutions of equations 5.10 when
compared to numerical simulations with targeted cooperation as the initial
condition? To check the reliability of the degree-based mean eld approach in
the context of targeted cooperation we have computed the diagram 〈c〉(b) for
random SF networks with γ = 3 using two dierent sets of initial conditions
corresponding to k∗ = 3 and 4. In gure 5.8 we show the results of the numer-
ical simulations compared to the results obtained by solving equations 5.10.
Obviously, the agreement is not complete but we can say that the dependence
of the level of cooperation with the temptation to defect b follows the same
qualitative behavior and the cooperation tends to zero (〈c〉 & 0) around the
same values of b.
The values of b for which 〈c〉 = 0 in each of the curves of the gures are
obviously related to the values k∗c . Our results show that, although the level of
cooperation starts decreasing earlier (for lower values of b), the curves 〈c〉(b)
obtained from numerical simulations on top of random SF networks can hold
larger values of b with 〈c〉 > 0 than the system described by equations 5.10.
On the other hand, the numerical simulations yield very low (but yet non-
zero) values of 〈c〉 for those values of b for which cooperation asymptotically
vanishes solving equations 5.10. The drop of the level of cooperation is much
more abrupt for the mean-eld scenario. Therefore, this mean eld approach
seems to be, at least, of help to study the behavior of k∗c (b) and the asymptotic
level of cooperation of the system when targeted cooperation is initially placed
in the system.
Regarding general (i.e. non-targeted cooperation type of) initial conditions
for the degree-based mean eld equations 5.10, some comments are in order.
For both, power-law and Poisson degree distributions P (k), random uniformly
distributed values for ck(t = 0), as well as xed value ck(t = 0) = 0.5 (mim-
icking the initial conditions in the numerical simulations of previous section),
led to asymptotic zero level of cooperation as soon as b > 1. This suggests
that, generically speaking, mean eld approaches (even in generalized forms,
as equations 5.10) to the evolutionary dynamics of prisoner's dilemma games
on graphs are likely bound to fail to account for the numerically observed sur-
vival of cooperation. This would be in agreement with some previous results
[134] on a particular type of articial networks that allow a rigorous analysis
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Figure 5.8: Evolution of the asymptotic level of cooperation 〈c〉 obtained when (i)
solving the mean eld (MF) equations 5.10 and (ii) computed through numerical
simulations (NS) of the evolutionary dynamics on top of a random SF network. The
degree distribution used is a power-law with γ = 3. In both cases we have set targeted
cooperation as initial conditions for the evolutionary dynamics. We have used k∗ = 3
and 4.
of the issue. To put it in plain terms, the network reciprocity mechanisms
[26] that enhance the evolutionary survival of cooperation in network settings
seem to be out of reach from the (homogeneity) mean eld assumptions, in the
sense that they are associated in an essential way to uctuations of averaged
quantities, like ck which are the basic descriptors in mean eld approaches.
Besides, the existence of loops and cycles is also a mechanism able to promote
cooperation that is overlooked by the mean-eld approach.
5.6 Conclusions
Scale-free networks have been recently shown as the graphs that better pro-
mote cooperation. In this chapter we have shown that the power-law degree
distribution cannot be considered as the only root for the promotion of coop-
eration. At variance with the BA networks, the SF graphs considered in this
chapter are free of any kind of node-node correlation. The rst conclusion of
our study is that we conrm the previous nding pointing out the fact that
cooperation decays when no correlations are present in the network. Moreover,
we have shown that the organization of cooperation is dramatically dierent
from that of the BA network, showing that cooperators can arrange in more
than one cluster, increasing the probability of being invaded by defectors. In
other words, the xation of cooperation is much lower than in SF networks
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with correlations, thus completing the picture provided by other studies where
correlations were added into SF networks [128, 135] enhancing the promotion
of cooperation of BA networks. On the one hand, our study in random SF
networks can be considered as the null model for the study of the cooperation
in other types of SF graphs. Besides, our results highlight the importance of
taking into account other structural properties beyond the degree distribution
of the network [136] in order to capture the mechanisms that help to xate
cooperation in real complex networks.
The second part of the chapter presents a degree-based mean eld ap-
proach to study analytically networks with arbitrary degree distribution and
no degree-degree correlations (such as random SF networks). The approach re-
lies on a degree compartmentalization of cooperators and defectors strategists.
We have shown that, contrary to diusion dynamics where a similar approach
has been applied [6567], the degree-based mean eld equations do not work
correctly when general initial conditions are applied, since no asymptotic level
of cooperation is observed when the temptation to defect is larger than the re-
ward to cooperation (b > R = 1). On the other hand, when a particular set of
initial conditions is used (consisting in placing all the cooperators in the higher
degree classes of the network) the solution of the mean eld yields a non zero
level of cooperation for a number of targeted initial congurations. The results
obtained in this latter context qualitatively agree with those obtained when
extensive numerical simulations on top of random SF graphs are performed.
As a conclusion, the results presented in this chapter complete the studies
about the Prisoner's Dilemma on top of SF networks showing that node-node
correlations play a key role for sustaining a high level of cooperation. In this
line, the wrong functioning of the degree-based mean eld approach further
conrms that heterogeneity is not the unique responsible of enhancing coop-
eration. The presence of features that are beyond the scope of this mean eld
formulation (even in uncorrelated graphs) such as cycles or loops seems to be
at the root of cooperation enhancement.

Chapter 6
The Prisoner's Dilemma game
on Scale-Free networks with
limited number of interactions
It has been widely studied in the literature how on complex networks, namely,
far from the well-mixed assumption or regular lattices [31], cooperation has
much better chances to survive, even when it gets very expensive [36, 38, 40,
119]. Specically, it has been proved that heterogeneity not only reproduces
much better some topological features of the social systems [11, 12], such as
the degree distribution, but also greatly favors cooperation. This happens,
as we have seen in some detail in chapter 3, thanks to the formation of one
single cluster, centered on the interconnected cooperator hubs, that create
a 'supporting system' for the individuals, in order to resist invasions from
defectors [34, 37]. Nonetheless, when modeling some aspects of the behavior of
individuals in a society using evolutionary games on complex networks, usually
the number of interactions a node establishes in every round is considered equal
to the number of topological neighbors it has. This widely used assumption
does not take into account real constrains such as the limited amount of time
to deal with social acquaintances nor the energy it costs to the node to pay
attention to each of its neighbors.
In this chapter we analyze a more realistic scenario in which agents are
limited to interact with a given number of neighbors during each round of the
game. In particular, we are interested on studying the eect of such a restric-
tion in the number of interactions per round of the evolutionary Prisoner's
Dilemma game on scale-free networks. In this sense, some eort has been put
on studying the eect of restricting the maximum number of possible contacts
a node can have, due to the nite resources of the node, but in a dierent way
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than the approach we propose now. In [35], the level of cooperation achieved
by the system is studied when the SF networks have a cuto at a certain value
for the connectivity, kcutoff , so there will be no nodes with a number of con-
nections above that given value. In this scenario, it was found that the level
of cooperation remains high enough even for an important cuto of the degree
distribution (up to a value kcutoff > 20 for a network made up of N = 10
4
nodes), and what is more, some slight improvement can be found in the av-
erage cooperation as the value kcutoff decreases, as long as it is larger than a
certain threshold kcutoff . 20.
It is also worth mentioning, that a dierent approach but in the same
direction of restricting somehow the available resources for a node has been
used when dealing with the Public Goods Game. In [137], Santos et. al.
compared the level of cooperation in the system for two scenarios: a xed-cost-
per-individual situation, when a node with connectivity k contributes c/(k+1)
in every one of the (k+1) rounds of the game, and a xed-cost-per-interaction
where it contributes c in every round of the game, regardless of its connectivity.
They found that the former situation promotes cooperation more than the
latter, due to the introduction of an extra source of heterogeneity, apart from
the topological one. Namely, this diversity in the amount that every node
contributes to the common goods has been proved to be benecial for the
overall level of cooperation in the system.
Nonetheless, we want to address this restriction from a dierent angle:
the degree distribution of the topological substrate remains untouched, it is
to say, the PD dynamics will take place on top of unaltered BA scale-free
networks. However, every node i of the network, even when it has ki topological
connections, will be only allowed to establish k∗ interactions per round of the
game among its neighbors. This restriction will specially aect those nodes
having a large topological connectivity, the hubs, that will only play with a
small fraction of their otherwise large number of neighbors, while it will not
aect at all those nodes with a very low connectivity. We will analyse the
consequences that limiting the number of game mates may have on the global
dynamics of the system, and more precisely on the average level of cooperation,
comparing the results with the well-known case of a standard framework in
which every node plays every round of the game with all its neighbors, as
dictates the underlying topology.
One should also keep in mind that the formulation of the Prisoner's Dilemma
that will be used in this chapter is dierent from the one used in previous chap-
ters. It means that the specic values of the coecients of the payo matrix
will be dierent, but not their relative ordering. In this way, now, instead of
having the temptation to defect, b as the (only) free parameter, we will have
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the ratio b/c, between the benet of playing against a cooperator and the cost
of being one. This particular formulation will be used again in chapter 8.
6.1 The model
We use scale-free networks built via the Barabási-Albert (BA) preferential
attachment model [8]. As we have already explained (see section 2.1.3), the
well-known BA model is based on growth and preferential attachment, and
starting from a small set of m0 fully connected nodes, every time step we add
a new node j to the network. This new node will attach to m of the existing
nodes. The probability that a link from node j connects to an existing node
i is proportional to its degree, Pi =
ki∑
l kl
. This procedure continues until the
network reaches its nal size N . The degree distribution of such networks is a
power-law, P (k) ∼ k−γ with an exponent γ = 3, and the average connectivity
is 〈k〉 = 2m. In our case, we have used networks with N = 4 · 103 nodes and
an average value for the connectivity 〈k〉 = 4.
We consider that every node on the network is a player whose initial strat-
egy, cooperator (C) or defector (D), is randomly assigned with equal probability
ρ0 = 0.5. Next, we go over every node, forcing them to choose, also randomly,
k∗ among its ki topological neighbors, so we get an 'eective connectivity ma-
trix' for the current round of the game. Obviously, if ki ≤ k∗ for a particular
node i, then it chooses all its neighbors to play with them every single time,
but if ki > k
∗
, then it will play only with some of them, making a dierent
selection every round. Notice that, in order to preserve the symmetry of the
interactions, if node i chooses node j, it means that j also chooses i straight-
away (apart from those corresponding k∗ neighbors that j has chosen or it will
choose to mate when its time comes), so the real eective connectivity of the
nodes is not strictly k∗, but it is in general keffi & k
∗
.
We can calculate the dependence of the eective connectivity keffi with
the topological connectivity of a node ki. To this aim we distinguish between
those nodes having ki ≤ k∗ and those with ki > k∗. For the former group
we trivially have keffi = ki while for the second set we have k
eff
i = k
∗ + kini .
In this latter case kini stands for the number of extra connections a node i
gets from being selected by other neighbors not contained in its own set of k∗
selected neighbors. We can write the expression for the extra kini game mates
as:
kini = ki

∑
k′6k∗
P (k′|ki) +
∑
k′>k∗
k∗
k′
P (k′|ki)

 , (6.1)
where P (k′|k) is the conditional probability that a node of degree k is con-
112
Chapter 6. The Prisoner's Dilemma game on Scale-Free networks with limited
number of interactions
Figure 6.1: Comparison of the actual topological connectivity of the nodes, ki, and
their eective connectivity, keffi , and the approximate expression, for three xed
values of k∗ = 5, k∗ = 10 and k∗ = 30 (a single realization of the network per each).
The lines are for the theoretical estimation (equation 6.4).
nected with a node of degree k′. Assuming that the network is uncorrelated
(as the BA network) we have P (k′|k) = k′P (k′)/〈k〉. Taking the continuous
approximation for the degree we can write equation 6.1 as
kini ≈
ki
〈k〉
[∫ k∗
k0
k′P (k′)dk′ + k∗
∫ ∞
k∗
P (k′)dk′
]
, (6.2)
where k0 is the minimum degree of the network. Solving the right hand side of
the above equation for a scale-free network, P (k) = (γ−1)kγ−10 k−γ , we obtain:
kini ≈
ki(γ − 1)kγ−10
〈k〉
[
k2−γ0 − (k∗)2−γ
γ − 2 +
(k∗)2−γ
γ − 1
]
. (6.3)
In our particular case we have networks with γ = 3, 〈k〉 = 4 and k0 = 2,
therefore the eective connectivity for those nodes with ki > k
∗
reads
keffi ≈ k∗ + ki(1−
1
k∗
) . (6.4)
In order to check the above approximation, we plot in gure 6.1 the function
keffi (ki), along with the pairs of values (ki, k
eff
i ) obtained in a single realization
of the network when k∗ = 5, k∗ = 10 and k∗ = 30, respectively. From the gure
it becomes clear that the agreement with equation 6.4 is good.
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Once all the nodes have selected their current eective neighborhood, keffi ,
they play a round of the PD game with every single one of them, and accu-
mulate their corresponding benets pii , according to the payo matrix of the
Prisoner's Dilemma game [38, 108, 138] we are using, given by:
( C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
)
∼
( C D
C b/c− 1 −1
D b/c 0
)
(6.5)
where c is the cost of being a cooperator, and b is the benet of playing against
one (obviously, the larger the ratio b/c gets, the cheaper it becomes to be a
cooperator). Immediately afterwards, in order to update its strategy, every
node i compares its own payo pii with the payo of one of its neighbors, pij ,
randomly chosen from the current eective neighborhood. For the probability
that i imitates j's strategy for the next round of the game, and following
previous works [102, 110, 116, 118, 139], we have chosen the so-called Fermi
function from Statistical Physics, given by:
Pi→j =
1
1 + ew(pii−pij)
, (6.6)
where w is a parameter that accounts for the importance of the relative dier-
ence of payos on the change of strategy of node i. Notice that, for w → ∞,
the probability Pi→j strongly depends on the dierence of payo between the
two nodes involved, so with a very high probability, if pii < pij , i will imitate j,
and if pii > pij , i will not imitate j. But on the other hand, when w → 0, one
gets that the probability of changing strategies is Pi→j = 1/2, independently
of the values of the payos (in this case we have the so-called random drift
evolution of the system). We can also interpret this situation as a total loss of
information: the individuals know nothing at all about their neighbors, so they
decide by tossing a coin [118]. The results shown on this work correspond only
to the value w = 1. Nonetheless, we have checked that they are quite robust
by testing out other values for w we get qualitatively the same outcomes.
We iterate the above discrete-time dynamics for a number of time steps,
until the system reaches the nal static state. As oppose to what happened
with the replicator dynamics used in previous chapters, where cooperation and
defection could coexist in the asymptotic state which, moreover, uctuated in
general around a well dene mean value of cooperation 〈c〉(b), now, due to this
particular choice for the probability function (6.6), the nal state of the system
will be one of the two absorbing states: all-C or all-D [110]. As we have seen,
with this probability we allow irrational changes of strategy, so that a node will
always have a non-zero probability of adopting the neighbor's strategy, even
when the neighbor's payo is smaller than its own. It is worth noticing that
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Figure 6.2: Average level of cooperation as a function of the ratio b/c for the case
of restricted number of connections without frustration. The SF networks are made
up of N = 4 · 103 nodes, and the average connectivity is 〈k〉 = 4. Every point is the
average over 500 dierent realizations.
this aects the dynamics of the system in such a way that it will always end
up on one of the two possible absorbing states. Therefore, one should interpret
the average level of cooperation, for a particular set of the parameters b/c and
w, as the fraction of realizations in which the system ends up in the all-C state,
instead of the average fraction of cooperators present in the stationary state
of the system.
It is worth stressing that the neighborhood a node selects to play one
round of the game with, is also the one used to choose the node to compare
its benets, but for the next round, all the nodes will select a dierent new
eective neighborhood (except, of course, those with ki ≤ k∗, that play with
the same opponents). This neighborhood selection procedure is quite expensive
in terms of computational time. And, in addition to this, the fact that the
system must achieve eventually one of the two absorbing states, makes the
time evolution of the dynamics remarkably slow, specially, for the range of b/c
values corresponding to intermediate values of 〈c〉.
6.2 Average level of cooperation
In gure 6.2 we plot the level of cooperation 〈c〉 as a function of the ratio
b/c, for dierent values of the restriction k∗. Obviously, as one can easily
expect, the larger the value of b/c is, the cheaper being a cooperator is, and
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Figure 6.3: Average level of cooperation as a function of the restriction k∗ for dierent
values of the ratio b/c. The SF networks are made up of N = 4 · 103 nodes, and the
average connectivity is 〈k〉 = 4. Every point is the average over 2 · 103 dierent
realizations.
thus the larger the average level of cooperation the system can achieve. On
the other hand, we have found a surprising and non-trivial dependence of
the level of cooperation 〈c〉 with the value of the restriction for the number
of connections k∗. From gure 6.2 for some low values of b/c, i.e., when
cooperation is relatively expensive, the larger level of cooperation is achieved
when no restriction is imposed to the connectivity of the nodes, but for larger
values of the ratio b/c, the opposite trend occurs, and a network with some
level of connectivity restriction performs better than the original one, meaning
that it achieves larger levels of cooperation. Of course, those cases with a too
restrictive value for k∗ . 10, always perform worse, regardless of the value of
the ratio. Notice that by setting k∗ = N we actually mean that every node i
plays always with all its ki topological neighbors.
As a matter of fact, if we represent the level of cooperation as a function
of k∗ for a xed value of the ratio b/c, we obtain a non-monotonous behavior
(see gure 6.3), where moreover, the optimum value of k∗, i.e. the value that
yields the larger level of cooperation for a xed b/c, seems to increase as the
cooperation gets more expensive.
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6.3 Imposing a more tight connectivity restriction
As we have already mentioned, the rst procedure we have chosen for the
restriction of the number of interactions per node and per round of the game,
k∗, is not as strict as one would like, and does not guarantee the value k∗ for
every node with ki > k
∗
present on the network. On the contrary, and due to
the need of symmetry, keffi turns out to be larger than k
∗
, in general. In order
to obtain a more severe restriction, while preserving the symmetry condition
for the interaction between nodes, we propose now a dierent method.
This second selection scheme works as follows: starting with the nodes of
lower degree for a given network, we make them choose its k∗ neighbors (or
ki < k
∗
if necessary), among its topological connections, but now, we keep
track of the number of possible connections still available for every node, using
a tagging system, so all the nodes start with its label set to li = k
∗
if ki > k
∗
,
and li = ki if ki ≤ k∗, and every time an eective connection between nodes
i and j is made, we rest one unit to the labels li and lj . Thus, if one node
i intends to chose another node j whose label is already set to lj = 0, then
this pick will not be allowed, even if node i can not establish connections with
anyone else. When this situation happens, we say that node i gets frustrated.
We repeat this process for all the increasingly connected nodes, ending up
with the hubs, and then, as usual, everyone plays a round of the game with its
current eective neighborhood, and accumulates its benets pii. Then every
one of them compares this value pii with that corresponding to a neighbor,
randomly chosen among their keffi , and decide whether or not they change
their strategy with the same probability used before. All the nodes change
their strategy synchronously.
Notice that we have obviously chosen to start from the lowly connected
nodes, and not the other way around in order not to margin poorly connected
nodes due to the restriction procedure, so they would not get the chance to
play. It is also worth mentioning that we have checked the 'average level of
frustration' for the nodes on the network at a given round of the game, dened
as the fraction between the sum of labels dierent from zero present on the sys-
tem once the assignment process has nished (i.e. the number of connections
that were not able to be established, and remain 'unused', although they were
allowed), and the maximum possible number of connections the whole network
would have made with the restriction k∗ but without frustration. This quality
always yields values under ten percent for any set of the parameters of the
system. So we consider that this method, though not perfect and somehow
more articial than the rst one, is a good approach to this non-trivial prob-
lem of restricting the number of connections to a constant value on a scale-free
underlying topology.
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Figure 6.4: Average level of cooperation as a function of the ratio b/c for the case of
restricted number of connections with frustration. The SF networks are made up of
N = 4 ·103 nodes, and the average connectivity is 〈k〉 = 4. Every point is the average
over 500 dierent realizations.
Figure 6.5: Average level of cooperation as a function of the restriction k∗ for dierent
values of the ratio b/c for the case of restricted number of connections with frustration.
The SF networks are made up of N = 4 · 103 nodes, and the average connectivity is
〈k〉 = 4. Every point is the average over 2 · 103 dierent realizations.
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Similarly to what we have done in the previous section, we show now in
gure 6.4 the level of cooperation as a function of the ratio b/c for several
values of the restriction k∗ for the case of restricted number of connections
with frustration. It can be seen that they are quite similar to those presented
for the case without it, with mainly one quantitative dierence: the value
of b/c needed to maintain the same level of cooperation is larger, it is to
say, the cooperation is in general more expensive in this second scenario with
frustration.
But as far as the qualitative demeanor is concerned, we can say that this
second model behaves in the same way as the rst one, so when we represent
the level of cooperation as a function of k∗ for a xed value of the ratio (see
gure 6.5), we also nd a non-monotonous dependence which clearly indicates
that, in order to achieve the highest level of cooperation for a xed value of
the parameters of the payo matrix, it is better to restrict the number of
interactions to a certain extent.
In order to understand better the origin of this optimum value for the
number of interactions, k∗opt, when playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game with
costs, we will next check it for two other dierent scenarios: rst, we will
change the payo matrix to its form without cost, and second, we will keep
the cost-benet ratio but we will adopt another updating rule, namely, the
Replicator rule. By introducing these changes in our original model, we want
to determine the crucial factor for the observed optimum in the number of
interactions.
In this way, let us now consider the Prisoner's Dilemma game with the
Fermi updating rule, but with the formulation without cost per cooperation,
given by the following payo matrix:
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
=
(C D
C 1 0
D b 0
)
(6.7)
where we x, as usual, R = 1 and P = S = 0. In gure 6.6 we show the average
level of cooperation in the system as a function of the restriction k∗, for dierent
values of the temptation to defect, b. In this case, we can clearly see that, for
any xed value of b, the system renders the highest value of cooperation for
the unrestricted situation i.e., for k∗ = 4 · 103 (not explicitly shown). So,
comparing gure 6.6 with gure 6.5 or 6.3, we can deduce that the reason
why such an optimum, k∗opt, exists is due to a necessary compromise every
node has to establish between the cost of cooperating with all its neighbors
and the benets obtained in those interactions. It is reasonable to think that,
even if all neighbors are cooperators, it will be very expensive to pay a cost to
cooperate with all of them, so the benets will decrease. On the other hand,
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Figure 6.6: Average level of cooperation as a function of the mate limitation, k∗, for
the case of a restriction in the number of connections without frustration, and using
the Fermi updating rule and the formulation of the Prisoner's Dilemma without cost
for cooperation. The SF networks are made up of N = 4 · 103 nodes, and the average
connectivity is 〈k〉 = 4. Every point is the average over 200 dierent realizations.
if one interacts with too few of its neighbors, the cost will be low, but so will
be the benet.
Finally, as a further check, let us consider the second change to our model:
the Prisoner's Dilemma game with cost and a the Replicator updating rule.
We show in gure 6.7 the result of our simulations, and we can see that the
optimum, k∗opt, reappears in this scenario, though it is not so pronounced as in
the case with Fermi-like updating rule for any value of the ratio b/c. We can
conclude that the root of this optimum is indeed in the use of a cost formulation
of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
6.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have studied a realistic -but almost unexplored until now-
scenario where the number of interactions that a node can establish per round
of the game are restricted to a maximum value k∗, regardless of its topological
connectivity of the nodes. We have studied two dierent mechanisms to per-
form such restriction. The rst method does not need any global information,
since every node chooses its k∗ game mates and it just guarantees the symme-
try of the interactions. However, as it turned out, this is not a strict restriction,
since the actual connectivity of some of the nodes is in general keffi & k
∗
. The
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Figure 6.7: Average level of cooperation as a function of the mate limitation, k∗, for
the case of a restriction in the number of connections without frustration, and using
the Replicator updating rule and the formulation of the Prisoner's Dilemma with
cost for cooperation. The SF networks are made up of N = 4 · 103 nodes, and the
average connectivity is 〈k〉 = 4. Every point is the average over at least 200 dierent
realizations.
second one is somehow more articial, since one needs some global knowledge
of the network (precisely the degree of every node) in order to proceed. But
on the other hand, it imposes strictly the restriction of having k∗ game mates.
We have studied the eect of such restrictions on scale-free networks and
found that the results are qualitatively the same for both methods. In partic-
ular, we have focus on the level of cooperation achieved by the system at the
stationary state, comparing the results with those for the Prisoner's Dilemma
game on the original BA scale-free networks. Our main result is that for a
range of values of the cost-benet b/c ratio of the payo matrix, the highest
levels of cooperation are achieved when some connectivity restriction is im-
posed on the network, i.e., the larger levels of cooperation do not occur for the
original unrestricted BA scale-free network scenario, but for a more realistic
situation, where every node can engage on a round of the game just with a cer-
tain number of neighbors k∗, that is in general, lower than its real topological
connectivity ki.
This is a quite surprising result, since previous studies always have pointed
out the well-known enhancement of cooperation due to heterogeneity of the un-
derlying topology. Here we have claried that this is only true up to a certain
extent: although heterogeneity does greatly favor cooperation, when compar-
ing it with the case of random networks, the restriction of forcing the nodes
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to play just with k∗ < ki of its neighbors in every round of the game seems
to lead to even larger levels of cooperation in some regions of the parameter
space of the ratio b/c.
We also showed that the existence of this optimum, k∗opt, was due to the the
compromise of a node between the cost of cooperating with all the neighbors
and the benets obtained from those interactions. In order to conrm this
hypothesis, we simulated the dynamics for two other scenarios: in the rst one,
we kept the updating rule, but we changed the formulation of the dilemma,
using a payo matrix where the cost per cooperation is zero. As we expected,
now the highest values of cooperation achieved by the system occur when there
is no limitation to the number of interactions. On the other hand, if we consider
the dynamics with a dierent updating rule, namely the Replicator rule, but we
keep the cost-benet ratio formulation, then the optimum value k∗opt appears
again. In conclusion, the results shown in this chapter point out that the
particular formulation chosen when implementing the Prisoner's Dilemma on
top of complex topologies will introduce important dierences in the outcome
of the dynamics, specially in realistic scenarios as the one proposed here.

Part II
Evolutionary Dynamics on
Growing Complex Networks

Presentation of Part II
In this second part of the Thesis, we will focus on the study of the coupling
between the growth of a complex topology and the dynamics taking place
simultaneously on top of it.
As we have been seeing, a great deal of eort has been aimed to study
the inuence of a (static) complex topologies on the outcome of several games
[26, 3437, 3745, 140]. Specially the PD, being a paradigmatic example of
cooperative-defective interaction, has been proved to be a very useful tool
when trying to explain the reasons why such a expensive behavior as cooper-
ation can arise and survive in a population. On the other hand, it has been
proven for many real networked systems in a wide variety of contexts that
topology greatly aects dynamics but also the other way around ([141] and
references therein), establishing thus a feedback loop. In this way, when it
comes specically to Evolutionary Game Theory on non-static graphs, some
nice works [125, 138, 142, 143] have tried to consider a more complex situa-
tion, as far as the structure is concerned, by placing the dynamics on a N-sized
network whose links are being rewired, according to some dynamics-dependent
rules (adaptative networks), or even using two dierent networks, one for the
interaction, the other one for the comparison procedure. Nonetheless, to our
knowledge, the attempt we have made is the rst to aim a growing structure,
where this growth is entangled somehow with the dynamics of the nodes. We
have developed two models to address this issue, and in both of them the par-
ticular dynamics evolving in the population is the PD game. However, there
are some important dierences between the specics of each one.
Thus, in chapter 7 we introduce the rst model, for which we will con-
sider that the probability of attachment is a linear function of the tness of
the chosen node. On the other hand, the strategy updating rule we will use is
Replicator-like. During this chapter, we will study the dierent topologies that
can arise depending on the values of the relevant parameters of the system.
Specically, we will be able to build random and SF networks. We will study
the dynamical organization of cooperation among connectivity classes for het-
erogeneous structures obtained with our model, comparing these results with
the well-known ones for SF BA networks, and trying to explain the dierences
found. Also, we will check the average level of cooperation achieved by our
networks, in two instants: when the growth has just stopped, and some time
later, after letting the population play the same game, but without adding
new individuals. We will nd that the structures built via this rst model can
support, when used as static substrate for the PD game, higher levels of coop-
eration than the celebrated BA SF networks [3436]. Besides, we will compare
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these levels of cooperation with those for a rewired version of the resultant
topology, and we will be able to make some conclusions about the adequacy of
the networks our model gives rise to, when it comes to supporting cooperation.
Moreover, we have found that the structures obtained with this model share
some topological features with real systems, such as the power-law dependence
of the clustering coecient with the degree of the nodes, compatible with hier-
archical organizations. So we consider that our work can help understand the
origin of these heterogeneous networks from an evolutionary point of view.
In chapter 8 we propose a second model, that is a little dierent from the
rst one, but always within the framework of an interdependence between the
growth and the dynamics. Thus, we consider again that the nodes are playing
the PD game, although with another formulation, but now, the strategy up-
dating rule is dictated by a Fermi-like function, which allow irrational changes
of strategy, it is to say, it is possible to imitate a neighbor with worse payo.
As we will see, the introduction of this Fermi probability will aect greatly the
nal state of the system, when it comes to the levels of cooperation. Moreover,
the probability of attachment we will use in this second model is exponential
with the tness of the nodes, instead of linear, which permits the appearing of
not only random and scale-free structures, buy also star-like ones, with nodes
that are 'super-hubs'. Apart from the degree distribution and the nal levels
of cooperation in the system, we are also interested in analyzing whether co-
operation benets from the growth process or just from the resulting complex
structure, and to that aim, we will look again into both the level of cooperation
after nishing the growth and after letting the system evolve for some time. We
will also consider the case of using the full grown network as a static substrate,
and letting the dynamics evolve after reinitializing the level of cooperation to
50% of each strategy, randomly distributed. In this department, we will nd
some remarkable dierences between the two models, since for this second one
cooperation turns out not to get promoted when using the resulting topologies
as static substrate for the dynamics.
Chapter 7
Complex Networks from
Evolutionary Preferential
Attachment
In this chapter we analyze the growth and formation of complex networks by
coupling the network formation rules to the dynamical states of the elements
of the system. As we have already mentioned, some mechanisms have been
proposed for constructing complex scale-free networks similar to those observed
in natural, social and technological systems from purely topological arguments
(for instance, using a preferential attachment rule or any other rule available
in the literature [11, 12]). As those works do not include information on the
specic function or origin of the network, it is very dicult to discuss the
origin of the observed networks on the basis of those models, hence motivating
the question we are going to address. The fact that the existing approaches
consider separately the two directions of the feedback loop between the function
and form of a complex system demands for a new mechanism where the network
grows coupled to the dynamical features of its components. Our aim here is to
introduce for the rst time an attempt in this direction, by linking the growth
of the network to the dynamics taking place among its nodes.
Our model combines two ideas in a novel manner: preferential attachment
and evolutionary game dynamics. Indeed, with the problem of the emergence
of cooperation as a specic application in mind, we consider that the nodes
of the network are individuals involved in a social dilemma and that new-
comers are preferentially linked to nodes with high tness, the latter being
proportional to the payos obtained in the game. In this way, the tness of
an element is not imposed as an external constraint [63, 144], but rather it is
the result of the dynamical evolution of the system. At the same time, the
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network is not exogenously imposed as a static and rigid structure on top of
which the dynamics evolves, but instead it grows from a small seed and ac-
quires its structure during its formation process. Finally, we stress that this is
not yet another preferential attachment model, since the quantity that favors
linking of new nodes has no direct relation with the instantaneous topology of
the network. In fact, as we will see, the main result of this interplay is the for-
mation of homogeneous or heterogeneous networks (depending on the values of
the parameters of our system) that share a number of topological features with
real world networks such as a high clustering and degree-degree correlations.
Thus, the model we propose not only explains why heterogeneous networks are
appropriate to sustain cooperation, but also provides an evolutionary mech-
anism for their origin. On the other hand, we will nd that there are some
important and quite surprising dierences between the networks we build using
this model, and SF topologies, as far as the microscopic organization of the
dynamics is concerned.
7.1 The model
Our model naturally incorporates an intrinsic feedback between dynamics and
topology. In this way, the growth of the network starts at time t = 0 with a
core of m0 fully connected nodes, whose initial strategy is cooperation. New
elements are incorporated to the network and attached tom existing nodes with
a probability that depends on the dynamics of each node. On the other hand,
the particular dynamics we consider is dictated by the Prisoner's Dilemma
(PD) game [145]. Initially, every node adopts with the same probability one of
the two available strategies, cooperation C or defection D. At equally spaced
time intervals (denoted by τD) each node i of the network plays with its ki(t)
neighbors and the obtained payos are considered to be the measure of its
evolutionary tness, fi(t). There are three possible situations for each pair
of nodes linked together in the network, as far as the outcome of the game is
concerned: (i) if two cooperators meet, both receive R, when (ii) two defectors
play, both receive P , while (iii) if a cooperator and a defector compete, the
former receives S and the latter obtains T . The ordering of the four payos
is the following: T = b > R = 1 > P = S = 0, where we haver xed the
value of the three parameters as usual [31, 34, 127], when considering the weak
Prisoner's Dilemma game (see chapter 3). Thus, the temptation to defect b
remains as the unique free parameter of the dynamics. After playing, every
node i compares its evolutionary tness (payo) with that corresponding to a
randomly chosen neighbor j. Then, if fi(t) ≥ fj(t), node i keeps its strategy
for the next round of the game, but if fj(t) > fi(t) node i adopts the strategy
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of player j with probability [27, 28, 34, 35, 45, 97, 101]
Pi =
fj(t)− fi(t)
b ·max [ki(t), kj(t)] . (7.1)
The growth of the network proceeds by adding a new node with m links to
the preexisting ones at equally spaced time intervals (denoted by τT ), and the
probability that a node i in the network receives one of the m new links is
Πi(t) =
1− + fi(t)∑N(t)
j=1 (1− + fj(t))
, (7.2)
where N(t) is the size of the network at time t, and the parameter  ∈ [0, 1)
controls the weight of the tness fi(t) [112] during the growth of the network.
Provided that  > 0, nodes with fi(t) 6= 0 are preferentially chosen.
The growth of the network as dened above is thus linked to the evolution-
ary dynamics that is simultaneously evolving in the system, and it is controlled
on the one hand by the parameter , but also by the two time scales, τT and
τD, associated to both processes. Therefore, equation 7.2 can be viewed as an
`Evolutionary Preferential Attachment' (EPA) mechanism. Depending on the
value of , we can have two extreme situations:
(i) When  ' 0, referred to as the weak selection limit [26], the network
growth is independent of the evolutionary dynamics as all nodes have
roughly the same probability of attracting new links.
(ii) Alternatively, in the strong selection limit,  → 1, the ttest players
(highest payos) are much more likely to attract the links from newcom-
ers.
Between the above situations, there is a continuum of intermediate values that
will give rise to a wide range of in-between behaviors.
We have carried out numerical simulations of the model exploring the (, b)-
space. It is worth mentioning that we have also explored dierent time relations
τD/τT , but for the time being, we focus on the results obtained when τD/τT >
1, namely, the network growth is faster than the evolutionary dynamics. Later
on we will discuss the eects associated to other time ratios. Taking τT = 1
as the reference time, networks are generated by adding nodes every time
step, while they play at discrete times given by τD. As τD > τT , the linking
procedure is done with the payos obtained the last time the nodes played.
All results reported have been averaged over at least 103 realizations, and the
number of links of a newcomer is taken to bem = 2 (so the average connectivity
will be 〈k〉 = 2m = 4), whereas the size of the initial core is m0 = 3.
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Figure 7.1: Degree distribution of the topologies created for xed values of b = 1.5
(Top left) and b = 2.5 (Top right), and xed values of  = 0.3 (Bottom left) and
 = 0.99 (Bottom right). The networks are made up of N = 103 nodes, with average
connectivity 〈k〉 = 4, and τD = 10τT . Every point is the average of 300 independent
realizations.
7.2 Degree Distribution and Average Level of Coop-
eration
The dependence of the degree distribution on  and b is shown in gure 7.1.
As it can be seen, the weak selection limit produces homogeneous networks
characterized by a tail that decays exponentially fast with k. Alternatively,
when  is large, scale-free networks arise. Although this might a priori be
expected from the denition of the growth rules, this needs not be the case:
indeed, it must be taken into account that in a one-shot PD game, defection
is the best strategy regardless of the opponent's strategy. However, if the
network dynamics evolves into a state in which all players (or a large part of
the network) are defectors, they will often play against themselves and their
payos will be reduced (we recall that P = 0). The system's dynamics will
then end up in a state close to an all-D conguration rendering fi(t) = 0 ∀i ∈
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Figure 7.2: Color-coded average level of cooperation in the system 〈c〉 right at the
end of the EPA procedure, it is to say, when the nal size is achieved as a function of
the temptation to defect b and the selection pressure . The networks are made up of
103 nodes with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4 and τD = 10τT .
[1, N(t)] in equation 7.2. From this point on, new nodes would attach randomly
to other existing nodes (see equation 7.2) and therefore no hubs can come out.
This turns out not to be the case, which indicates that for having some degree
of heterogeneity, a nonzero level of cooperation is needed. Conversely, the
heterogeneous character of the system provides a feedback mechanism for the
survival of cooperators that would not overcome defectors otherwise.
In gure 7.1 we also show the dependence of the degree of heterogeneity of
the networks with the temptation to defect, and we found out that only in the
strong selection limit, it depends slightly on b. On the other hand, for small
values of , there is not any dependence of the degree distribution on b, because
in this scenario the dynamics does not play a relevant role on the attachment,
on the contrary, it is almost random.
Regarding the outcome of the dynamics, we have also represented the aver-
age level of cooperation 〈c〉, as a function of the two model parameters  and b.
The gure 7.2 shows that as  grows for a xed value of b & 1, the level of co-
operation increases. In particular, in the strong selection limit 〈c〉, the system
attains its maximum value. This is a somewhat counterintuitive result as in
the limit → 1, new nodes are preferentially linked to those with the highest
payos, which for the PD game, should correspond to defectors. However, the
population achieves the highest value of 〈c〉. On the other hand, higher lev-
els of cooperation are achieved in heterogeneous rather than in homogeneous
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Figure 7.3: Probability Pc(k) that a node with connectivity k plays as a cooperator
for dierent values of b in the strong selection limit ( = 0.99) at the end of the growth
of a network with N = 103 nodes and average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4.
topologies, which is consistent with previous ndings [34, 45, 119].
7.3 Degree Distribution among cooperators
In this section we want to study the dependence between strategy and degree of
connectivity, comparing this results with those obtained for the static SF sce-
nario, where we recall that cooperators occupy always the highest and medium
classes of connectivity, while defectors are not stable when setting on the hubs
(section 3.5). As we will show, the interplay between the local structure of the
network and the hierarchical organization of cooperation seems to be highly
nontrivial, and quite dierent from what has been reported for static scale-free
networks [34, 45]. In gure 7.3 one can see that, surprisingly enough, as the
temptation to defect increases, the likelihood that cooperators occupy the hubs
decreases. Indeed, during network growth, cooperators are not localized nei-
ther at the hubs nor at the lowly connected nodes, but in intermediate degree
classes. It is important to realize that this is a new eect that arises from
the competition between network growth and the evolutionary dynamics. In
particular, it highlights the dierences between the microscopic organization
in the steady state for the PD game in static networks and that found when
the network is evolving.
To address this interesting and previously unobserved phenomenon, we
have developed a simple analytical argument that can help understand the
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reasons behind it. Let kci be the number of cooperator neighbors of a given
node i. Its tness is fdi = bk
c
i , if node i is a defector, and f
c
i = k
c
i , if it is
a cooperator. The value of kci is expected to change because of two factors.
On the one hand, due to the network growth (node accretion ow, at a rate
of one new node each time unit τT ) and on the other hand, due to imitation
processes dictated by equation 7.1, that take place at a pace τD. As it has
been mentioned before, we will focus on the case in which τD is much larger
than τT , for now. Thus, the expected increase of tness is:
∆fi = ∆flowfi +∆evolfi, (7.3)
where ∆flowfi means the variation of tness in node i due to the newcomers
ow, and ∆evolfi stands for the change in tness due to changes of neighbors'
strategies. The above expression leads to an expected increase in kci given by:
∆kci = k
c
i (t+ τD)− kci (t) = ∆flowkci +∆evolkci . (7.4)
On the other hand, the expected increase of degree of node i in the interval
of time (t, t+ τD) only has the contribution from newcomer ow, and recalling
that new nodes are generated with the same probability to be cooperators or
defectors, i.e, ρ0 = 0.5, it will take the form:
∆ki = ∆flowki = 2∆flowk
c
i . (7.5)
If the tness (hence connectivity) of node i is high enough to attract a
signicant part of the newcomer ow, the rst term in equation 7.3 dominates
at short time scales, and then the hub's degree ki increases exponentially.
Connectivity patterns are then dominated by the growth by preferential at-
tachment, ensuring, as in the BA model [8], that the network will have a SF
degree distribution. Moreover, the rate of increase of the connectivity:
∆flowk
c
i =
1
2
mτD
fi∑
j fj
(7.6)
is larger for a defector hub by a factor b, because of its larger tness, and then
one should expect hubs to be mostly defectors, as conrmed by the results
shown in gure 7.3. This small set of most connected defector nodes attracts
most of the newcomer ow.
On the contrary, for nodes of intermediate degree, say of connectivity m
ki  kmax, the term ∆flowfi in equation 7.3 can be neglected, in other words,
the arrival of new nodes is a rare event, so for a large time scale, we have
that k˙i = 0. Note that if k˙i(t) = 0 for all t in an interval t0 ≤ t ≤ t0 + T , the
size of the neighborhood is constant during that whole interval T , and thus the
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evolutionary dynamics of strategies through imitation is exclusively responsible
for the strategic eld conguration in the neighborhood of node i. During these
periods, the probability distribution of strategies in the neighborhood of node
i approaches that of a static network. Thus, recalling that the probability
for this node i of intermediate degree to be a cooperator is large in the static
regime [45] (see also section 3.5), we then arrive to the conclusion that for these
nodes the density of cooperators must reach a maximum, in agreement with
gure 7.3. Of course, it is clear that this scenario can be occasionally subject
to sudden avalanche-type perturbations following "punctuated equilibrium"
patterns in the rare occasions in which a new node arrives.
Furthermore, our simulations show that these features of the shape of the
curve Pc(k) are indeed preserved as time goes by, giving further support to
the above argument based on time scale separation and conrming that our
understanding of the mechanisms at work in the model is correct.
7.4 Clustering Coecient and Degree-degree corre-
lations
Apart from the degree distribution, we are also interested in exploring other
topological features emerging from the interaction between network growth
and the evolutionary dynamics in our EPA networks. Namely, we will focus on
two important topological measures that describe the existence of nontrivial
two-body an three-body correlations: the degree-degree correlations and the
clustering coecient respectively. We will show that the networks generated by
the EPA model display both hierarchical clustering and disassortative degree-
degree correlations.
7.4.1 Clustering coecient
The clustering coecient of a given node i, cci, expresses the probability that
two neighbors j and m of node i, are also connected. The value of cci is
obtained by counting the actual number of edges, denoted by ei, in Gi, the
subgraph induced by the ki neighbors of i, and dividing this number by the
maximum possible number of edges in Gi:
cci =
2ei
ki(ki − 1) . (7.7)
The clustering coecient of a given network, CC is calculated by averaging
the individual values {cci} across the network nodes, CC =
∑
i cci/N . There-
fore, the clustering coecient CC measures the probability that two dierent
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Figure 7.4: (Left) Clustering coecient CC as a function of b and . (Right) Scaling
of CC with the network size for several values of b in the strong selection limit
( = 0.99). The networks are made up ofN = 103 nodes and have average connectivity
〈k〉 = 4.
neighbors of a same node, are also connected to each other. In the left panel
of gure 7.4 we show the value of CC as a function of b and . In this gure
we observe that it is in the strong selection limit where the largest values of
CC are obtained. Therefore, in this regime, not only highly heterogeneous
networks are obtained but the nodes also display a large clusterization into
neighborhoods of densely connected nodes. In the right panel of gure 7.4 we
show the scaling of the clustering with the network size CC(N) in the strong
selection limit. In this case we observe that for b ≥ 2.5 the value of CC is
stationary while when b < 2.5 the addition of new nodes in the network tends
to decrease its clustering.
We now focus on the dependence of the clustering coecient CC with the
degree of the nodes, k, in the strong selection limit ( = 0.99). Interestingly
enough, we show in gure 7.5 that the dependence of CC(k) is consistent
with a hierarchical organization expressed by the power law CC(k) ∼ k−β ,
a statistical feature found to describe many real-world networks [12]. The
behavior of CC(k) in gure 7.5 can be understood by recalling that in scale-
free networks, cooperators are not extinguished even for large values of b if they
organize into clusters of cooperators that provide the group with a stable source
of benets [45]. But to understand this feature in detail, let us assume that a
new node j arrives to the network: since the attachment probability depends
on the payo of the receiver, node j may link either to a defector hub or to a
node belonging to a cooperator cluster. In the rst scenario, it will receive less
payo than the hub, so it will sooner or later imitate its strategy, and therefore
will get trapped playing as a defector with a payo equal to fj = 0. Thus,
node j will not be able to attract any links during the subsequent network
growth. On the other hand if it attaches to a cooperator cluster and forms
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Figure 7.5: Dependence of the clustering coecient CC(k) ∼ k−β with the nodes'
degree for dierent values of b in the strong selection limit ( = 0.99). The networks
are made up of N = 103 nodes and average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4. The straight line is
an eye guide that corresponds to k−1.
a triad with m elements of the cooperator cluster, two dierent outcomes are
possible, depending on its initial strategy: if it plays as a defector, the triad
may eventually be invaded by defectors an may end up in an state where the
nodes have no capacity to receive new links. But if it plays as a cooperator,
the group will be reinforced, both in its robustness against defector attacks
and in its overall tness to attract new links.
To sum up, playing as a cooperator while taking part in a successful (high
tness) cooperator cluster reinforces its future success, while playing as a de-
fector undermines its future tness and leads to dynamically and topologically
frozen structures (it is to say, with fi = 0), so defection cannot take long-
term advantage from cooperator clusters. Therefore, cooperator clusters that
emerge from cooperator triads to which new cooperators are attached can then
continue to grow if more cooperators are attracted or even if defectors attach
to the nodes whose connectivity veries k > mb. Moreover, the stability of
cooperator clusters and its global tness grow with their size, specially for
their members with higher degree, and naturally favors the formation of triads
among its components. Thus, it follows from the above mechanism that a node
of degree k is a vertex of (k − 1) triangles, and then
CC(k) =
k − 1
k(k − 1)/2 = 2/k , (7.8)
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which is exactly the sort of functional form for the clustering coecient we
have found (gure 7.5).
7.4.2 Degree-degree correlations
Now we turn the attention to the degree-degree correlations of EPA networks.
Degree-degree correlations are dened by the conditional probability, P (k
′ |k),
that a node of degree k is connected with a node of degree k
′
. However, since
the computation of this probability yields very noisy results, it is dicult to
assess whether degree-degree correlations exist in a given network topology. A
useful measure to overcome this technical diculty is to compute the average
degree of the neighbors of nodes with degree k, Knn(k), that is related with
the probability P (k|k′) as
Knn(k) =
∑
k′
k
′
P (k
′ |k) . (7.9)
In networks without degree-degree correlations the function Knn(k) is at
whereas for degree-degree correlated networks the function is approximated
by Knn ∼ kν and the sign of the exponent ν reveals the nature of the corre-
lations. For assortative networks ν > 0 and nodes are connected to neighbors
with similar degrees. On the other hand, for disassortative networks ν < 0,
and high degree nodes tend to be surrounded by low degree nodes.
In gure 7.6 we plot several functions Knn(k) corresponding to dierent
values of b in the strong selection limit. We observe that for all the cases
there exist negative correlations that make highly connected nodes to be more
likely connected to poorly connected nodes and viceversa. Therefore the EPA
topologies are disassortative while this behavior is enhanced as the temptation
to defect, b, increases as observed from the slope of the curves in the log-log
plot. This disassortative nature of EPA networks will be of relevance when
analyzing the results presented in the following section.
7.5 Dynamics on static networks constructed using
the EPA model
Up to this section we have analyzed the topology and the dynamics of the
EPA networks while the growing process takes place. Now we adopt a dierent
perspective by considering the networks as static substrates while studying the
evolutionary dynamics of the nodes. This approach will be done in dierent
ways allowing us to have a deeper insight on the EPA networks and their
robustness.
138 Chapter 7. Complex Networks from Evolutionary Preferential Attachment
Figure 7.6: Degree-degree correlations among the nodes of the EPA networks. We
plot the average nearest-neighbors degree Knn(k) of a node of degree k for several
values of the parameter b used to generate the networks. The networks are generated
with  = 0.99, and have N = 4 · 103 nodes and average connectivity 〈k〉. Note that
negative correlations imply that hubs are not likely to be connected to each other.
7.5.1 Stopping growth and letting evolutionary dynamics evolve
To conrm the robustness of the networks generated by Evolutionary Preferen-
tial Attachment, let us consider the realistic situation that after incorporating
a large number of participants, the network growth stops when a given size
N is reached, and after that, only evolutionary dynamics takes place. The
question we aim to address here is: will the cooperation observed during the
coevolution process resist?
In gure 7.7, we compare the average level of cooperation 〈c〉 when the
network just ceased growing with the same quantity computed after allowing
the evolutionary dynamics to evolve many more time steps without attaching
new nodes, 〈c〉∞. The green area indicates the region of the parameter b where
the level of cooperation increases with respect to that at the moment the net-
work stops growing. On the contrary, the red zone shows that beyond a certain
value, bc, of the temptation to defect the cooperative behavior does not survive
and the system dynamics evolves to an all-D state. Surprisingly the coopera-
tion is enhanced by the growth stop for a wide range of b values pointing out
that the cooperation levels observed during growth are very robust. Moreover,
the value of bc appears to increase with the intensity of selection  in agree-
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Figure 7.7: Degree of cooperation when the last node of the network is incorporated,
〈c〉, and the average fraction of cooperators observed when the system is time-evolved
〈c〉∞ after the network growth ends. The four panels show these measures for several
values of . From top to bottom and left to right we show  = 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 and 0.99
(strong selection limit. The networks are made up of N = 103 nodes with average
connectivity 〈k〉 = 4 and τD = 10τT . Every point is the average over 103 realizations.
ment with the increase of the degree heterogeneity of the substrate network.
These results highlight the phenomenological dierence between playing the
PD game simultaneously to the growth of the underlying network and playing
on xed static networks.
7.5.2 Eects of randomizations in the evolutionary dynamics
Now, in order to gain more insight in the relation between network topology
and the supported level of cooperation, we study the evolution of cooperation
when network growth is stopped and we make dierent randomizations of both
the local structure and the strategies of the nodes. In particular, in gure 7.8,
we show the asymptotic level of cooperation when the following randomizations
are made after the growth is stopped: (i) the structure of the EPA network
is randomized by rewiring its links while preserving the degree of each node;
(ii) the structure of the network is kept intact but the strategies of the nodes
are reassigned while preserving the global fraction of cooperation (strategy
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Figure 7.8: Cooperation levels at the end of the growth process and after letting the
network relax as a function of b. The original network was grown up to N = 4 · 103
nodes with  = 0.99 and average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4, and the asymptotic coopera-
tion levels are computed 107 time steps afterwards. Full circles show the cooperation
level when the network stops growing. The other curves show the asymptotic co-
operation when the structure of the network has been randomized (triangles), when
the strategies of the nodes have been reassigned randomly (squares) and with both
randomizations processes (diamonds).
randomization); and (iii) when the two former randomization procedures are
combined.
As it can be seen from gure 7.8, the crucial factor for the cooperation
increment during the size-xed period of the dynamics is the structure of these
EPA networks, since its randomization leads to a decrease of cooperation at
levels far away from those of the original one or even of a BA SF network
[8, 12]. This drop of cooperation when randomizing the structure is in good
agreement with previous ndings in complex topologies, specically, for static
BA networks [35, 36] (see also section 5.1). On the other hand, the strategy
randomization does not prevent high levels of cooperation, thus conrming
that the governing factor of the network behavior is the structure arising from
the co-evolutionary process. Moreover, the asymptotic level of cooperation in
this case (squares in gure 7.8) is larger that those observed when the network
is simply let to evolve without any randomization (C∞ in gure 7.7). This
result points out that using a random initial condition for the strategies diers
strongly from starting from a conguration where degrees and strategies are
correlated as a result of the EPA model (gure 7.3). We will come back to this
point in section 7.7.
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Figure 7.9: Cooperation levels in ER, BA, and our Evolutionary Preferential Attach-
ment network models, as a function of the temptation parameter b. The EPA network
is built up using the model described in the main text for b = 2.1 and  = 0.99. All
networks are made up of N = 103 nodes, with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4, and every
point shown is the average over 103 independent realizations.
7.5.3 EPA networks as substrates for evolutionary dynamics
The high levels of cooperation observed when applying a random initial cong-
uration for the strategies to EPA networks motivate the question on whether
EPA networks are best suited to support cooperative behavior than other well-
known models. In order to answer this question, we consider our EPA networks
when used as static substrates for the evolutionary dynamics and compare with
the cases of both Barabási-Albert [8] and Erd®s-Re«yi (ER) [18] graphs. To
this aim, we take a particular example of our model networks, grown with
b = 2.1 and  = 0.99, and run the evolutionary dynamics starting from an
initial conguration with 50% cooperators and defectors placed at random.
The average level of cooperation as a function of the temptation to defect is
represented in gure 7.9 together with the diagrams for BA and ER networks.
Surprisingly, the plot shows that the EPA network remarkably enhances the
survival of cooperation for all the values of b studied. Therefore, the attach-
ment process followed by EPA networks is seen to be more ecient than the
BA preferential attachment model studied in [34, 37, 45]. Obviously, the roots
of this behavior cannot be found in the degree distribution, P (k), but in the
high levels of clustering [128] and the disassortative mixing [135] shown above.
It is worth mentioning here that we have performed an study of the asymp-
totic state of the system, and we have computed the fractions of pure strategist
and uctuating individuals (as we have dened them in section 3.3), once the
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network has grown to its nal size. But since there are not very new results, we
will not discuss them right now. Instead, we will show them as a comparison
with the case τD = τT , in section 7.8. We just conrm here the existence of the
partition of the (static) EPA network into the usual sets of pure cooperators,
pure defectors and uctuating individuals.
7.6 Time evolution of the Pc(k) after network growth
As it has been well established before, SF topologies are able to sustain higher
levels of cooperation than random structures, due to the microscopical organi-
zation of the strategies [34, 45]. In particular, it has been shown that in those
heterogeneous settings the hubs always play as cooperators being surrounded
by a unique cluster of cooperators, while defectors cannot take advantage of
high connectivity, and thus occupy medium and low degree classes. Nonethe-
less, in our EPA structures, we have observed (section 7.3) that during network
grows, some hubs play as defectors, thus implying a very dierent scenario than
that of static heterogeneous networks.
In this section we turn again to the situation in which the network growth
has stopped (and no randomization is made) to study the roots of the increment
of the asymptotic level of cooperation observed in gure 7.7.
To this aim we look at the temporal evolution of the probability that a
node of degree k is a cooperator, Pc(k), once the network growth has ceased.
As we have observed in section 7.3, the growth process leads to a concentration
of cooperators at intermediate degree nodes, explained from the fact that while
the network is growing, newcomers join in with the same probability of being
cooperators or defectors. In this situation, defectors have an evolutionary ad-
vantage as they get higher payos from cooperator newcomers. Although these
cooperators will subsequently change into defectors and stop providing payo
for the original defector, the stable source of fresh cooperator nodes entering
the network compensates for this eect. However, when the growth stops while
the dynamics continues, we observe that low degree nodes are rapidly taken
over by cooperators, and after 104 time steps they are mainly cooperators. On
the contrary, hubs are much more resistant to change, and even after 107 time
steps not all of them have changed into cooperators (revealed by those values
Pc(k) = 0 in gure 7.10).
The persistence of hub defectors is a very intriguing observation, in contrast
with previous ndings in static SF networks [34, 36, 45] (see also chapter
3), for which hubs are always cooperators or, in other words, a defector hub
is unstable. As we have widely explain in chapter 3, this occurs because a
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Figure 7.10: Probability of being a cooperator as a function of the degree at the end
of the Evolutionary Preferential Attachment process, 104 time steps later, and 107
time steps later, for b = 2.2 and  = 0.99.
defector sitting on a hub will rapidly convert its neighbors to defectors, which
in turn leaves it with zero payo; subsequently, if one of its neighbors turns
back to cooperation, the hub will eventually follow. It seems, however, that
the coupling of evolutionary game dynamics with the network growth leads to
a structural and dynamical conguration that stabilizes the defectors on hubs.
The unexpected result that gure 7.10 shows is that defector hubs can also
be asymptotically stable once the network growth has ceased, i.e., it became
static. Indeed, we have observed in our simulations that hubs are defectors
for as long as the dynamics continues (at least, t = 107 extra time steps after
nishing growing the network). However, it is important to stress that not all
realizations of the process end up with defector hubs. For low values of b, this
is practically never the case and almost no realizations produce defectors at the
hubs, but, as b increases, the percentage of realizations where this phenomenon
is observed increases rapidly.
In section 7.3 we have discussed why a hub can be a defector while the
network is growing, because it takes advantage of the newcomer ow, getting
high benets from them. Nevertheless, the surprising fact that defector hubs
may have very long lives on the static regime, may be the relevant feature
for the behavior of the network resulting from the growth process, and it is
important to fully understand the reason for such a slow dynamics. We claim
that it can be traced back to the payo structure of the network, so in section
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7.7, we will analyse it in detail.
7.7 Microscopic roots of cooperation after network
growth
Having identied the coexistence of cooperator and defector hubs, we next
study why this conguration seems to be asymptotically stable and why the
hubs are not invaded by opposite strategies. In gure 7.11, we present an
example taken from a single realization of the process. Had we plot the results
of payos averaged over realizations, we would not have been able to obtain
this picture, because in that case payos are seemingly very dierent in the
region of large degree, as a consequence of the statistical properties of our
networks, in which hubs do exist but their degree and payo depend on the
specic realization. As can be seen, the payo grows approximately as a power
law, fk ∼ kα; however, the key point here is not this law but the fact that
the payos for defectors and cooperators of the same degree are very similar.
In view of the strategy update rule (equation 7.1), it becomes clear that the
evolution must be very slow. Moreover, if we take into account the role of
the degree in that expression, we see that hubs have a very low probability to
change their strategies, whatever they may be.
Considering now the disassortative nature of the degree-degree correla-
tions (gure 7.6) we can explain how these dynamical congurations can be
promoted by the structure of the network. The large dissasortativity of EPA
networks suggests that hubs are mostly surrounded by low degree nodes and
not directly connected to other hubs. Instead, the connection with hubs is
made in two steps (i.e. via a low degree node). This local conguration re-
sembles that of the so-called Dipole Model [134], a conguration in which two
hubs (not directly connected) are in contact with a large amount of common
neighbors which in turn are low degree nodes. In this conguration, it can be
shown analytically that the two hubs can coexist asymptotically with opposite
strategies, provided that the hub playing as cooperator is in contact with an
additional set of nodes playing as cooperators, for this will provide the hubs
with a stable source of benets. On the contrary, defector hubs are only con-
nected to the set of nodes that are also in contact with the cooperator hubs. In
this setting, the low degree individuals attached to both hubs experience cy-
cles of cooperation and defection (we call them uctuating individuals, because
their strategies can never get xed) due to the high payos obtained by the
hubs. If such a local conguration for the strategies of hubs and their leaves
arises, neither of the two hubs will take over the set of uctuating individuals,
nor the latter will invade the hubs as they are mainly lowly connected nodes
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Figure 7.11: Average payos of cooperators and defector nodes at the end of network
growth (t = 0) as a function of their degrees, k, for a realization of the Evolutionary
Preferential Attachment model with b = 1.8. Note that the similarity between coop-
erators' and defectors' payos implies that imitation events take place on a long time
scale.
with small payos.
In order to test if the grown networks exhibit local dipole-like structures,
we have measured the connectivity of the neighbors of defector and cooperator
hubs, which we represent in gure 7.12. The gure undoubtedly shows that
highly connected nodes playing as defectors are mainly connected to poorly
connected cooperators (acting as the set of uctuating strategists), whereas
cooperator hubs are connected to each other and also to a signicant fraction
of lowly connected nodes. This fully conrms that, in contrast to all previous
results, there is a structure allowing the resilience of defector hubs, and more-
over, it gives rise to a situation quite similar to that described by the Dipole
Model.
7.8 Other τD/τT time relations
During this whole chapter, we have always worked with a time relation between
the dynamics and the growth of the network equal to τD = 10τT , meaning
that the network grows in ten at the time, and then one single round of the
dynamics takes place. We have studied the degree distributions that can arise
from this Evolutionary Preferential Attachment mechanism, as well as the
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Figure 7.12: Connectivity matrix of cooperators with defectors (Top) and of cooper-
ators with themselves (Bottom) for a single realization of the process. The element
(i, j) is set to 1 (black square in the gure) when a link between a defector (cooperator)
of degree i and a cooperator (cooperator) of degree j exists, respectively.
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Figure 7.13: Degree distribution for xed values of b = 1.5 (Top left) and b = 2.5
(Top right), and xed values of  = 0.3 (Bottom left) and  = 0.99 (Bottom
right). The networks are made up of N = 103 nodes, with average connectivity
〈k〉 = 4, and τD = τT . Every point is the average of 300 dierent realizations.
levels of cooperation, comparing them with some well-known cases, such as
BA scale-free or ER random static networks. Nevertheless, it is interesting
to explore the behavior of the system for other time ratios. Specically, now
we will explore briey the case when both time scales are exactly the same
τD = τT , i.e., starting with a small core of nodes fully connected, we add a
new node at a time and then we make the system play one round of the game.
We will compare the results with the τD = 10τT scenario.
Thus, in gure 7.13 we show some degree distributions obtained for this
particular time relation, and as we can see, there are some qualitative dier-
ences between this case and the one with τD = 10τT one (see gure 7.1 to
compare them). First of all, if we look at the two upper panels, we can see
that the dependence of P (k) with  and for a xed value of the temptation to
defect is less clear in this case, while it was obvious and very gradual for the
τD = 10τT scenario. Also, when  = 0.99, the networks that arise from the
process have very fat-tailed degree distributions (even more so for high values
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Figure 7.14: Average level of cooperation and fractions of pure strategists and uc-
tuating individuals as a function of b, for τD = τT (Left) and τD = 10τT (Right),
both for  = 0.0 (weak selection limit). The networks are made up of N = 103 nodes,
with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4. Every point is the average of 300 independent
realizations.
of the parameter b), which means that there are 'super-hubs' present in the
system, which were not in the previous case. On the other hand, there is a
more pronounced dependence on the parameter b, for a xed value of  (bottom
panels of gure 7.13), while for the τD = 10τT case, the degree distributions
were almost b-independent.
In order to characterize better the behavior of the system when the time
relation is τD = τT , we also need to look at the level of cooperation, comparing
the 〈c〉(b) curves, as well as the fractions of pure strategist and uctuating
individuals for several cases. But rst of all, we need to point out an impor-
tant dierence between the present scenario and the one studied in previous
sections. In the situation with τD = 10τT , we observed that the nal state of
the system was, in general, uctuating around a well-dened value of coopera-
tion, so the interpretation of the magnitude 〈c〉 was the fraction of cooperation
present in the network in the stationary state. Nonetheless, for the case we
are studying now, the situation is dierent, since the system always reaches
an all-C or an all-D state. Thus, one shoud interpret 〈c〉 as the fraction of
realizations for which the system ends up in an all-C state. Now, as we can
see in gures 7.14 and 7.15 for both extreme values of , the weak and strong
selection limits, the average level of cooperation is remarkably lower for the
case of τD = τT . This fact can be understood as follows: if we start with a
small core of nodes fully connected, and the networks grows very slowly (since
the time relation is now τD = τT ), the situation is in many ways similar to
a well-mixed scenario, where it has been proved that the cooperation can not
survive [25, 104, 105, 115] (see section 2.2.2). On the contrary, if the network
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Figure 7.15: Average level of cooperation and fractions of pure strategists and uctu-
ating individuals as a function of b, for τD = τT (Left) and τD = 10τT (Right), both
for  = 0.99 (strong selection limit). The networks are made up of N = 103 nodes,
with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 4. Every point is the average of 300 independent
realizations.
grows faster (for example, when the relation τD = 10τT is fullled), the coop-
eration has better chances to survive, due to the structure of the graph. We
can also notice that the level of uctuating individuals is lower for the τD = τT
situation, since the pure defectors start invading the network much earlier, it
is to say, for much lower values of the temptation to defect. We have also tried
other time relations, such as 10τD = τT , it is, a new node is added, and then
the system plays 10 rounds of the game. Obviously, in this case we have found
the same well-mixed eect than in the τD = τT but enhanced: the level of
cooperation drops even more, because this new scenario promotes cooperation
even less than the previous one.
150 Chapter 7. Complex Networks from Evolutionary Preferential Attachment
7.9 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented a model in which the rules governing the
formation of the network are linked to the dynamics of its components. The
model provides an evolutionary explanation for the origin of the two most
common types of networks found in natural systems. Thus, when the selection
pressure is weak, homogeneous networks arise, whereas strong selection pres-
sure gives rise to scale-free networks. A remarkable fact is that the proposed
evolution rule gives rise to complex networks that share many topological fea-
tures with those measured in real systems, such as the power law dependence
of the clustering coecient with the degree of the nodes. Interestingly, our re-
sults make it clear that the microscopic dynamical organization of strategists
in evolutionarily grown networks is very dierent from the case in which the
population evolves on static networks. Namely, there can be hubs playing as
defectors during network growth, while cooperators occupy mainly the mid-
dle classes. It is worth stressing that the level of cooperation during network
growth reaches the largest values for the strong selection limit in which the
newcomers launch their links to those ttest elements of the system.
Furthermore, the generated networks are robust in the sense that after the
growth process stops, the dynamical behavior keeps its character. Moreover,
we have shown that for most cases the cooperative behavior arising in these
networks exhibits a great resilience, in the sense that it does not decrease for a
wide range of parameters upon stopping the growth process, and, in most cases,
it even displays a large increase of the cooperation level. We have also shown
that the non-trivial topological patterns of EPA networks are the roots for such
enhancement of the cooperation. In particular, we have shown that rewiring
the links while keeping the degree distribution (thus destroying any kind of
correlations between nodes) yields a dramatic decrease of the levels of coop-
eration. On the other hand, a randomization of the strategies does not aect
the asymptotic levels of cooperation. Therefore, the ability of EPA networks
to promote the resilience of cooperation is rooted in the correlations created
during network formation via the coevolution with evolutionary dynamics.
Finally, maybe the most important dierence we have found between the
networks grown with our model and the static SF case, is the dynamic stabi-
lization of defectors on hubs. We have shown that these defector hubs can be
extremely long-lived due to the similarity of payos between cooperators and
defectors arising from the co-evolutionary process. Moreover, we have been
able to link the payo distribution to the network structure. In particular, we
show that the disassortative nature of EPA networks together with the for-
mation of local dipole-like structures [134] (and see also section 3.4) during
network growth is responsible for the xation of defection in hubs.
Chapter 8
Complex Networks from other
Dynamic-dependent
Attachment rules
In this chapter, we will keep on addressing the issue of the entanglement be-
tween the growth of a complex structure and the dynamics that is taking place
on top of it simultaneously, in such a way that the outcome of the game, mean-
ing the benets the nodes get out of the interaction, will aect the probability
of the existing nodes to attract a link from a newcomer. So we will work with
a model similar to the one introduced in chapter 7, but with two important
dierences: on the one hand, the dependence of the probability of attachment
will be exponential with the tness of the nodes, instead of linear. On the
other hand, we will also modify the imitation rule to a Fermi-like function,
instead of using a Replicator-like probability, so irrational changes of strategy
will be allowed now, meaning that a node can imitate a neighbor whose payo
is lower than its own.
The approach we will take here will be a little dierent too. Since this
model has one more parameter than the one exposed in chapter 7, instead of
presenting it at once, considering simultaneously all the eects, we will study
rst a case where the dynamics has no eect on the growth, just to separate
the two contributions, and then we will take the dynamics into consideration,
too.
In the model we presented here, new individuals establish connections to
the existing individuals, and the newcomers can either connect to m arbitrary
individuals or preferentially attach to those that have been successful players
in the past, depending on the values of the corresponding parameter. Success
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is based on the cumulated payo pi from an evolutionary game, which each
individual plays with all its neighbors on the network. Although for the model
itself we do not need to specify the kind of game or the number of strategies,
we will use the two-strategy Prisoner's Dilemma, as in chapter 7. However,
the formulation of the game, it is to say, the values of the coecients of the
payo matrix, will be dierent. We will use the cost-benet ratio approach,
like we did in chapter 6.
8.1 The model
We start from a small complete network of m0 individuals with one strategy.
Subsequently, new individuals arrive and form connections to existing individ-
uals. Evolutionary dynamics proceeds in the following way: At each time step,
every individual j plays with all its neighbors and obtains an accumulated
payo pij . All players choose then synchronously between their old strategy
and the strategy of a randomly selected neighbor. In this way, player j will
adopt the strategy of its neighbor i with probability [102, 110, 116, 118, 139]:
Tj→i =
1
1 + eβ(pij−pii)
(8.1)
where β is the intensity of selection. Obviously, with probability (1 − Tj→i),
node j will stick to its old strategy. This updating rule is usually called Fermi
rule, since it is based on the Fermi distribution function from Statistical Me-
chanics. The parameter β, which in Physics means inverse of temperature, can
be here also interpreted as noise associated with errors in the decision making
process [146]. Thus, depending on the value of this parameter, we can have
now dierent limiting situations:
• For β  1, selection is weak and the game is only a linear correction to
random strategy choice, it is to say, a random drift process.
• For strong selection, β →∞, node j will always adopt a better strategy
and it will never adopt a worse strategy (imitation dynamics).
It is important to stress that, by using this strategy updating rule, we allow
individuals to be irrational, in the sense that they can adopt a strategy that
performs worse than its own current one.
Every τ time steps, a new individual with a random strategy is added
to the system. It means that when τ  1, several nodes are added before
one round of the dynamics takes place on the system, and when τ  1, the
network grows very slowly and the game dynamics can bring the system close
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to equilibrium before a new node is added. The new individual establishes m
links to preexisting nodes, which are chosen preferentially according to their
performance in the game in the last time step. Node j is chosen as game
partner with probability:
pj =
e+αpij∑N(t)
l=1 e
+αpil
(8.2)
where N(t) is the number of nodes that already exist when the new node
is added at time t. The remaining m − 1 links are added in the same way,
excluding double links, as usual. Again, one should realize that dierent cases
are possible, depending on the value of the parameter α:
• For α = 0, the newcomer attaches to a randomly chosen existing node.
• For small α, attachment is approximately linear with payo.
• For high α, the newcomers will make connections to only very few nodes
with high payos.
• In the limit α → ∞, all newcomers will always attach to the m most
successful players.
Besides, since m links and a single node are added at each τ time step, the
average degree of the network at a given moment is:
m0(m0 − 1)12 +m tτ
m0 +
t
τ
(8.3)
where t is the number of time steps that has passed. Throughout this chapter,
we will use m = 2 (therefore, 〈k〉 = 4) and m0 = 3.
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8.1.1 A simplication of the model
As we have mentioned previously, in order to fully understand this model and
the dierent contributions each feature makes to the nal outcome, we want to
focus on the simplest case, in which each interaction leads to the same payo,
which we set to one. Or in other words, it would correspond to a game whose
entries of the payo matrix were all equal: it does not make any dierence
which strategy you or your opponent may choose. Then, the payos pij are
just the number of interactions an individual has, i.e. the degree kj of the node
(note that normalizing by the degree of the node would essentially wash out
the eect of the topology at this point [36, 135]).
Thus, evolutionary dynamics of strategies has no consequences and thus,
the topology is independent of β. This allows us to discuss the growth dynamics
without any complications arising from the dynamics of strategies. We have
several simple limiting cases:
• For α = 0, the newcomer attaches at random to a pre-existing node.
This leads to a network in which the probability that a node has k links
decays exponentially, similar to ER networks. In this case, topology is
independent of strategies for all intensities of selection β, even when indi-
viduals play dierent strategies leading to dierent payos. Nonetheless,
whenever α > 0, there is an interplay between topological dynamics and
strategy dynamics.
• For α  1, we can linearize the probability of attachment pj , and we
obtain:
pj =
α−1 + kj∑N
k=1 (α
−1 + kk)
. (8.4)
Thus, we recover the linear preferential attachment model introduced by
Dorogovtsev et al [60]. When strategies dier in their payos, then not
only the degree, but also the strategy of the nodes and their neighbors
will inuence the probability to attach to a node.
• When α is large, we will typically observe a network in which m of the
m0 nodes of the initial complete network will be connected to almost all
nodes that have been added during the growth stage. The emergence of
these super-hubs is due to the nonlinearity in equation 8.2.
Examples for the network structures in these limiting cases are given in
gure 8.1. As it is shown, for α = 0, random networks are generated. On
the other hand, when α increases, some degree of heterogeneity appears in
the resulting structure, whereas for α = 1, the probability of attachment is so
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Figure 8.1: Networks for a game in which both strategies have identical payos, such
that the payo is given by the degree of a node. The left hand side shows the degree
distributions of networks of size N = 104, while the right hand side shows snapshots
of networks of N = 100 nodes. (a) For α = 0.0, the degree distribution decays
exponentially. (b) For α = 0.1, some highly connected nodes appear in the network
and the degree distribution begins to resemble a power-law. (c) Already for α = 1.0,
the vast majority of nodes (>99.9 %) has only two links. In addition, 〈k〉 = 2m = 4 of
the m0 = 3 initial nodes are connected to almost all other nodes. Degree distributions
are obtained from an average over 102 networks of size N = 104. Note that the x-axis
is linear in (a), but logarithmic in (b) and (c).
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strongly dependent of the connectivity, that it exclusively benets m among
the m0 initial nodes, that become super-hubs, and so the model always gives
rise to star-like structures.
Next, we will go back to evolutionary games in which the payo per interac-
tion is no longer constant, but depends on the strategies of the two interacting
individuals. In general, such an interplay of evolutionary dynamics of the
strategies and the payo-preferential attachment will change the structure of
the network.
8.2 Degree Distribution
After this brief study of a simplied version, let's now address the whole model
again. The dynamics we will consider here is once again the Prisoner's Dilemma
[23, 26, 145], where the two players can choose between two possible strategies:
cooperation (C) and defection (D). But as we have mentioned before, in this
case, the values of the coecients of the payo matrix will be dierent from
those we used mainly in previous chapters, although the relative ordering of
them must remain the same. Namely, the parameter that characterizes how
expensive cooperation is, compared with defection, will be the ratio b/c, instead
of using the temptation to defect b. In this way, we will consider that there is
a cost c for cooperation, whereas a cooperative act from an interaction partner
leads to a benet b (> c). Thus, the lower the value of b/c is, the more expensive
the cooperation is. The payo matrix of the game can be written as:
( C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
)
∼
( C D
C b/c− 1 −1
D b/c 0
)
(8.5)
No matter what the opponent does, defection always leads to a higher payo,
because b > b − c and 0 > −c, thus selsh, rational players should defect.
Similarly, if the payo determines reproductive tness, evolution will lead to
the spread of defection. However, the payo for mutual defection is smaller
than the payo for mutual cooperation (b − c > 0) and thus players face a
dilemma. One way to resolve it is to consider structured populations in which
players only interact with their neighbors [31]. Here, we follow this line of
research and consider in addition growing populations, as discussed above.
Since there is an interaction between strategy dynamics and network growth,
the topology of the system will obviously change under selection. So, in gure
8.2, we show how it changes with the benet to cost ratio b/c, the intensity
of selection β and the attachment parameter α for the particular dynamics of
the Prisoner's Dilemma game. From gure 8.2, it is clear that the inuence of
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Figure 8.2: Impact of the game dynamics on the degree distribution at the end of
network growth. Left column corresponds to α = 0.1, while the right one is for α = 1.
The networks are made of N = 103 nodes, with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 2m = 4,
m0 = 3, and τ = 0.1. All values are obtained from the average of 10
3
dierent
realizations.
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the game on the degree distribution is relatively weak, for small degrees a clear
dierence is only found for large α and small b/c. The distribution of the rela-
tively few nodes with many connections, however, is more sensitive to changing
either b/c or β. Moreover, as we have already learn from the simplied version
of the model in subsection 8.1.1, for a value α = 1 we have structures where
super-hubs are present, regardless of the values of the other two parameters
of the system, b/c and β. On the other hand, for more moderate values of
α, we can observe some dierences in the topologies arising from the model,
depending on the values of the two other mentioned parameters. Thus, for
a xed value of the ratio benet-cost, some dierent degree distributions ap-
pear, depending on β. We can also say that, in general, almost all structures
obtained have fat-tailed P (k). We can see that there is not a very important
dependence of the degree distribution with b/c, which was also the case of the
model presented in chapter 7.
8.3 Average Level of Cooperation as a function of the
parameters of the system
Typically, we are interested in the promotion of cooperation on dierent net-
work structures, so gure 8.3 shows the average level of cooperation for strong
selection as a function of τ and for several xed values of the ratio b/c. It
turns out that payo preferential attachment increases the level of coopera-
tion in the system signicantly compared to random attachment. We want
to point out here that, although we do not show it, this eect is also present
for weak selection, but less pronounced. On the other hand, we observe that
cooperation gets higher levels for small values of τ , i.e. when many nodes
are added before dynamics takes place and strategies are changed (which is
in good agreement with the results obtained in chapter 7, where we showed
that the equivalent time relation τD = 10τT promotes cooperation much more
than when τD = τT ). Indeed, this particular choice for the time ratio puts
the system further from equilibrium, whereas the case of large τ means that
strategies have been equilibrated at least locally before the next new individual
with a random strategy is added to the system. Note that for τ larger than
a certain value (τ . 1), cooperation levels become independent of τ , which
points out that playing just once after a given number of new players have
been incorporated is enough to reach a dynamical equilibrium.
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Figure 8.3: The average level of cooperation under strong selection (β = 1) and α = 1,
depending on the time scale of attachment, τ . Cooperation benets most from small
values of τ , i.e. when many new nodes are added before players update their strategies.
For random attachment (α = 0, inset) cooperation does not emerge, only for high
benet to cost ratios a few cooperators prevail. The networks are made of N = 103
nodes, with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 2m = 4, m0 = 3, and all values are obtained
from the average of 102 dierent realizations.
8.4 Average Level of Cooperation after the growth
has nished
Now, we intend to focus on analyzing the level of cooperation the system
achieves once the growth has nished, it is to say, when the individuals of
the network just play the game, but no new nodes are added anymore. As
in most structured populations, cooperators that are disadvantageous in the
Prisoner's Dilemma in well-mixed population benet from the spatial structure.
Of course, this eect is larger when cooperation becomes more protable, i.e.
when the benet to cost ratio b/c increases. It turns out that for weak payo
preferential attachment (small α), the promotion of cooperation is relatively
weak and levels of cooperation beyond 50 % are only reached when cooperation
is very protable (see gure 8.4). However, when the probability to attach to
the most successful nodes becomes large (large α), then the average fraction
of cooperators becomes larger, approaching one when the benet to cost ratio
b/c is large.
Interestingly, for small b/c ratios, the abundance of cooperators decreases
with increasing β, whereas it increases with the intensity of selection for large
b/c ratios. The existence of a threshold for intermediate b/c can be illustrated
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Figure 8.4: The average level of cooperation 〈c〉 104 time steps after the network stops
growing. For α = 0.1 (Left) the level of cooperation exceeds 50 % only for very high
benet to cost ratios b/c. For α = 1.0 (Right), the abundance of cooperators is
signicantly higher. Even for neutral strategy dynamics (β = 0), payo preferential
attachment can lead to high levels of cooperation in this case. The networks are made
of N = 103 nodes, with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 2m = 4, m0 = 3, and τ = 0.1. All
values are obtained from the average of 103 dierent realizations.
as follows for large α: assume that we start from m0 fully connected cooperator
nodes. For τ < 1, we add 1/τ nodes with m = 2 links, half of which are
defectors and half cooperators, on average. All new players interact only with
the initial cooperator nodes, such that an initial cooperator will on average
obtain
m
m0τ
new links. Thus, the payo of a new defector is mb. The average
payo of an initial cooperator is (b− c)(m0−1+ 12 mm0τ )− c12 mm0τ . Both payos
are identical for
b
c
=
1
τ +
m0(m0−1)
m
1
2τ −m0 + m0(m0−1)m
. (8.6)
For large values of b/c, cooperators will dominate in the very beginning of net-
work growth. The threshold increases with τ and decreases withm0: the larger
the initial cooperator cluster and the more nodes are added before strategies
are updated, the easier it is for cooperation to spread initially. This argument
shows qualitatively that a crossover in the abundance of cooperators should
exist, and therefore that above a certain threshold, it is easier for cooperation
to spread. Only in the very beginning of network growth, this argument will
hold quantitatively.
In general, the average level of cooperation can be based on two very dif-
ferent scenarios: either it is the fraction of realizations of the process that
ultimately ends in full cooperation, or it is the average abundance of cooper-
ators in a network in which both cooperators and defectors are present. This
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also happened in the model we presented in chapter 7: when the time relation
was τD = 10τT , the average level of cooperation 〈c〉 must be interpreted as the
fraction of cooperators present in the system in the stationary state, whereas
for τD = τT , the whole network always ends up in a state all-C or all-D, so
〈c〉 means the fraction of realizations for which the system achieves the all-C
state.
For any nite intensity of selection β, we have Tj→i > 0, regardless of the
payos. Thus, after growth has stopped, our dynamics describes a Markov
chain with two absorbing states in which all players follow one of the two
strategies. Therefore, ultimately one of the two strategies will go extinct, in
contrast to evolutionary processes that do not allow disadvantageous strategies
to spread. In other words, using this model, the systems will always end up
whether on an all-C or on an all-D state. Nonetheless, it is important to
remark that the time to extinction can become very large, in particular when
the intensity of selection is high or the population size is large [110, 139, 147].
8.5 Probability of xation
Now, we want to analyze this issue numerically, and in order to do that, we
compute the probability that xation (for either cooperation or defection) oc-
curs within 104 time steps after the network has stopped growing, during which
only the dynamics takes place on the system, but no new nodes are added (see
gure 8.5). For small α, the results follow the intuition from well-mixed pop-
ulations: Fixation within this time is more likely if the intensity of selection
is weaker. With increasing benet to cost ratio, xation times increase, so
xation within the rst 104 time steps becomes less and less likely. For large
α, however, xation is faster for strong selection (large β) for a wide range of
parameters. Only when the b/c ratio is very high, xation times are very large
under strong selection. This is based on the peculiar structure of the network
obtained for large α. In addition, we observe an area in gure 8.5 where the
xation time increases slightly before it decreases again, i.e. the probability for
xation in the rst 104 time steps has a minimum. Interestingly, this occurs
for the range of b/c ratios where the average levels of cooperation intersect at
50 % for the dierent intensities of selection. In this parameter region, neither
cooperators nor defectors are clearly favored. Thus, both of them spread ini-
tially. When the abundance of both strategies is approximately the same in the
beginning, then it will be more dicult to completely wipe out one strategy
later. Thus, the increased time of xation in the parameter region where the
abundance of cooperation becomes 50% makes intuitive sense.
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Figure 8.5: The probability of xation for one strategy within 104 time steps after
growth has stopped as a function of the attachment parameter: (Left) α = 0.1 and
(Right) α = 1, for dierent intensities of selection β. The networks are made up of
N = 103 nodes, with average connectivity 〈k〉 = 2m = 4, m0 = 3 and τ = 0.1. Every
point is the average over 103 independent realizations.
8.6 Level of cooperation after re-initializing the strate-
gies
Finally, we want to focus on studying what happens when the network stops
growing: Does cooperation benet from growth or only from topology? Typ-
ically, one would expect that defectors prot from growth, because there is a
steady ow of new cooperators that they can potentially exploit. Thus, co-
operation should increase if the game dynamics proceeds on the fully grown,
static network (in fact, this was the result we obtained in chapter 7). In con-
trast to that case, here we have changed the game dynamics in such a way that
individuals sometimes can also adopt a worse strategy (irrational changes). It
has been shown in previous works that this apparently small change can signif-
icantly decrease the level of cooperation [108]. The overall level of cooperation
drops signicantly and is only higher than 50% if cooperation is very protable.
Indeed, we haver found that with this model, the level of cooperation now de-
cays once the network no longer grows (see gure 8.6). This means that in the
current case, cooperators, not defectors, benet from the continuous supply of
new players, so when the structure stops growing, they stop getting such high
benets, and their proportion in the system drops a little.
Thus, it makes sense to ask whether the topologies that are obtained from
the network growth are powerful promoters of cooperation at all. This can be
tested, as we did in section 7.5, by taking the fully grown structure as a static
substrate, and run the game dynamics on that xed topology with initially
8.6. Level of cooperation after re-initializing the strategies 163
Figure 8.6: The average level of cooperation in three cases: once the network is
fully grown (drawn in blue), after the game dynamics has proceeded 104 additional
steps beyond the growth phase of the network (in red), and 104 time steps after the
fully grown network has been re-initialized with random strategies (in yellow). The
intensity of selection is (a) β = 0.01, (b) β = 0.1, and (c) β = 0.5, respectively. The
networks are made up of N = 103, with m0 = 3, average connectivity 〈k〉 = 2m = 4
and τ = 0.1. Every point is the average over 102 dierent realizations, and α = 0.1
in all cases.
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random strategies, 50% cooperators and 50 % defectors. Interestingly enough,
this does not lead to any signicant enhancement of the level of cooperation, on
the contrary, cooperators almost disappear from the system after 104 steps of
the dynamics, once the re-initialization has been made (see gure 8.6). Thus,
our model of network growth based on payo preferential attachment itself
leads to comparably high levels of cooperation, while the resulting topology
alone, used as a static substrate, does not support cooperation at all in the
Prisoner's Dilemma.
8.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have studied another dynamical model for evolutionary
game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population [141]. In contrast
to most models for evolutionary games on dynamical networks that consider
a constant population size [40, 45, 138, 142, 148150], these networks grow.
Nonetheless, individuals cannot break links and cannot control directly how
many new individuals will establish connections with them. The two main
changes we have made in this new model, with respect to the evolutionary
preferential attachment studied in chapter 7, are on the one hand, that now
the probability of attachment is exponential with the payo of the node, and on
the other hand, that we allow irrational strategy changes, by using a Fermi-like
function for the probability of changing the strategy.
One important dierence that has been found is that under strong Payo
Preferential Attachment (α = 1), the topology of the networks generated are
dominated by the presence of a few super-hubs, which attract most of the links
of the rest of the nodes. The existence of very few hubs and a large number
of lowly connected nodes in network models have been widely reported before
[151]. In fact, it has been shown that when networks are grown following a
non-linear preferential attachment rule of the sort pj =
kνj
∑N
l=1 k
ν
l
, with ν > 1,
star like structures are obtained [152]. Here, we have shown that the same
kind of networks can be produced when the dynamics driving the attachment
process is dominated by the most successful players.
Even when Payo Preferential Attachment is not too strong (for instance,
for α = 0.1), super-hubs emerge, a clear mark that successful players are likely
to attract many of the links of the new nodes. If newcomers preferentially
attach to the successful players in the game, then high levels of cooperation
are possible. But this cooperation depends on the growth of the network,
the population structure alone would not lead to such high levels of coopera-
tion. Thus, payo preferential attachment diers from the usual promotion of
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cooperation in structured populations. In particular, it has been shown that
heterogeneous static structures favor cooperative behavior due to the existence
of hubs. However, as Fig. 8.6 shows, the presence of super-hubs is not enough
to sustain cooperation in the networks grown following the scheme discussed
here.
In other models, the probability to adopt a strategy that performs worse
than your own is zero [34, 134] (see also some previous chapters). In particular
together with synchronous updating of strategies, this can lead to evolutionary
deadlocks, i.e. situations in which both strategies stably coexist. Here, we have
adopted an update scheme in which individuals sometimes adopt a strategy
that performs worse. Due to the presence of such irregular moves, sooner or
later (often much later) one strategy will reach xation. It is to say, the nal
state of the systems discussed here will be inevitably all-C or all-D. However,
when β and the ratio b/c are large enough, both cooperation and defection can
coexist for a very long time.
We also want to remark that our growth mechanism has another interesting
feature: it has been shown that the average level of cooperation obtained in
static, scale-free networks, is robust to a wide range of initial conditions (see
chapter 3). However, for the networks grown using the Payo Preferential
Attachment, the initial average number of cooperators in the neighborhood of
the super-hubs determines the fate of cooperation in the whole network, leading
to a much more sensitive dependence on the initial conditions of the system.
This has been proved by the huge drop of cooperation in the system after
some time steps, once we have reinitialized the strategies randomly among the
individuals when the full size had been achieved. From this point of view, the
weak dependence on the initial conditions reported in static scale-free networks
is not trivial.
Finally, we point out that it would be of further interest to study the model
discussed here with other 2 × 2 games. As we have shown, the game dynam-
ics seems to have a weak impact on the structure of the resulting networks.
Whether or not this holds in general will elucidate the question of the inuence
of dierent games on the network formation process.
In summary, the model studied in this chapter shows that the interplay
between the game dynamics and the network growth leads to complex network
structures. Moreover, not only the structure of the interaction network is
important for the evolution of cooperation, but also the particular way this
structure has been obtained. Our work shows that playing while growing can
lead to radically dierent results with respect to the most studied cases in which
game dynamics proceeds in static networks (which is in fact a conclusion we
also made when studying the model of chapter 7).
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